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1
Introduction: Presidential legacy in the era of 
Obama and Trump
As Barack Obama took the oath of offi ce to become the 44th 
president of the United States on January 20, 2009, he immedi-
ately left a distinct imprint on the history of the institution. The 
presidency was no longer the exclusive preserve of white men. 
As the fi rst African American to win the White House, Obama, 
by virtue of becoming president, had established a legacy that 
could not be repeated or undone. In itself this was a moment of 
consequence for a nation with a history steeped in racial divi-
sion, but it did not automatically bestow a record of achievement 
that would last beyond his presidency. On that day, however, it 
was unsurprising that the historic nature of events generated even 
more excitement, especially amongst supporters of the President, 
than is always present as someone newly elected takes offi ce. That 
enthusiasm also came with raised expectations for what would be 
achieved and Obama’s inheritance suggested that there was much 
that needed to be done.
By the end of 2008 it was evident that the fi nancial crisis, 
which had already left many of the Wall Street giants diminished 
and gasping for survival, was going to extend its toxicity and 
cause damage well beyond the world of investment bankers into 
the wider economy. That damage, in turn, brought into sharper 
relief other long-standing problems, such as the number of Amer-
icans without, or with inadequate, health insurance. Moreover, 
Obama’s victory along with Democratic control of both chambers 
of Congress gave hope to all those progressive activists whose 
voices had been marginalized in recent years. Hence climate 
change campaigners jostled with representatives of other liberal 
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causes, such as those championing an expansion of same-sex 
rights, to get their place near the front of the line to advocate for 
their preferred policies. In addition to domestic challenges Obama 
faced a complex international situation, with the nation wearied 
by the loss of blood and treasure resulting from extended engage-
ments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Inevitably the burst of enthusiasm accompanying his entry 
to the White House at the start of 2009 wore off. The reali-
ties of compromising in an effort to fi nd solutions to complex 
real-world problems on the home front and dealing with, to 
paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, unexpected as well as expected 
problems and fractures in the international order took its toll 
on Obama’s approval ratings. Moreover, his political opponents 
quickly regained their mojo and organized resistance to the 
administration’s initiatives. In fact, the backlash was soon mani-
fested with the rise of the so-called Tea Party in 2009 and the 
surprise victory of Republican Scott Brown in a Massachusetts 
Senate special election in January 2010, providing a harbinger 
of what was to come in the 2010 November midterm elections.1 
In institutional terms, the Republican takeover of the House of 
Representatives in those elections and the continued GOP con-
trol of that chamber throughout the rest of Obama’s presidency 
meant that the administration effectively had only two years to 
push through its most ambitious legislative goals.
Much of the presidential literature in the latter part of the 
twentieth century correctly pointed to the importance of the 
negotiation process between executive and legislative branches 
and the capacity of the former to bring together enough votes in 
the latter to form a majority coalition, be that on a case-by-case 
basis or over a series of measures.2 But the increase in parti-
san polarization in Washington, DC—so evident from the early 
1990s—made cooperation between an executive branch run by 
one party and a legislature with at least one chamber controlled 
by the opposite party ever more unlikely.3 As the 2010 midterm 
elections approached, Republican leaders, anticipating victory 
in at least one chamber, made their intentions plain. Then Senate 
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (Kentucky) somewhat infa-
mously refl ected: “The single most important thing we want to 
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achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president.”4 
In reality, it is hardly surprising that leaders of the “out” party 
should wish for an incumbent to be defeated by their own party’s 
candidate in the next election, but it was nevertheless unexpected 
to hear such an explicit expression of that sentiment. As it was, 
the words of soon-to-be-Speaker of the House John Boehner 
(Ohio) were more ominous for the President. With regard to 
Obama’s ongoing agenda, he commented, “We’re going to do 
everything—and I mean everything we can do—to kill it, stop it, 
slow it down, whatever we can.”5
Yet, for all the frustration and disappointment that Obama and 
his supporters felt as his time in offi ce drew to a close, on the eve of 
the 2016 presidential election it did look as if the next occupant of 
the White House would be Obama’s fi rst secretary of state, Hillary 
Clinton, who would continue to push most areas of policy in the 
same direction—and that the stand-out legacies of Obama’s time 
in offi ce would become a direction of travel rather than an end 
point. Health care reform, the expansion of LGBT+ rights, and the 
nuclear deal with Iran would not just be preserved but would be 
further consolidated.6 That, as everyone knows, is not how things 
turned out: Not only did Donald Trump win the White House, but 
he entered offi ce reinforced by a unifi ed Republican government 
in Washington, DC. The GOP’s congressional majorities in 2017 
were not as big, especially in the Senate, as Obama’s had been in 
2009, but Trump and congressional Republicans had the apparent 
institutional capacity to deliver on some of their major promises. 
These included repealing the signature health care reform, rolling 
back the expansion of the regulatory state that had taken place 
over the previous eight years, and rowing the US back from a range 
of international agreements—such as the Iran deal—that had been 
negotiated by the Obama administration. Yet, just as President 
Obama had often found himself thwarted by the fragmented insti-
tutions of US government and the capacity of opponents to turn to 
the courts to challenge executive authority, so too President Trump 
found that resistance could not always be overcome. Some aspects 
of Obama’s legacy could be straightforwardly reversed and others 
picked apart, but other parts of that legacy proved more resilient. 
Moreover, and just as with Obama, Trump’s party lost control of 
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the House in the fi rst midterm elections of his presidency, mak-
ing major legislative action explicitly to undo the remaining legacy 
highly unlikely.
It is the purpose of this book project to come to an understand-
ing of the nature and substance of the Obama presidency’s legacy 
and President Trump’s repudiation of that legacy. In discussing 
President Obama’s legacy and the efforts of the Trump adminis-
tration to roll back much of that inheritance, this project seeks 
to shine light on some broad questions about the nature of the 
modern presidency, but the fundamental clash of philosophies of 
governance, both in terms of substance and style, thrown up by the 
juxtaposition of Presidents Obama and Trump is also very particu-
lar. It became a staple of political journalism to point to President 
Trump’s obsessive efforts to undo the record of his predecessor, 
and justifi ably so, with some journalists even stretching to contrast 
their approaches to visiting US forces serving in Iraq.7 Even 30 
months into his presidency, Trump displayed a continuing desire 
to dismiss not just the record but the person and popularity of 
his predecessor. In an interview with Meet the Press in June 2019, 
President Trump referred to the Obamas and Obamacare twenty-
three times.8 In the summer of 2019, leaked memos revealed that the 
UK ambassador to the US thought that the Trump administration’s 
decision to withdraw the US from the nuclear deal with Iran was 
at least partly motivated by “personality reasons,” since the agree-
ment was “Obama’s deal.”9 The personal antagonism between the 
two, unsurprising given Trump’s promotion of so-called “birther-
ism,” was self-evident and on public display as early as the 2011 
White House Correspondents’ Dinner.10 As Trump emerged as a 
serious political fi gure in 2016, President Obama broke with con-
vention and angered conservatives by attacking Trump while over-
seas at the G-7 summit in Japan.11 Later he aggressively mocked 
the Republican nominee a month before the 2016 election on the 
Jimmy Kimmel show.12
Obama campaigned ferociously for Clinton, certainly surpass-
ing the recent efforts of George W. Bush on John McCain’s behalf 
or Bill Clinton for Al Gore. In doing so he often invoked his own 
actions as reasons for supporting her candidacy.13 The day prior 
to the election, he told an audience in Michigan: “I think I’ve 
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earned some credibility here,” as he referred back to the efforts 
to save jobs in the automobile industry. He also made clear that 
he saw the clash between Clinton and Trump as one that would 
help defi ne his legacy: “Tomorrow, you will choose whether we 
continue this journey of progress, or whether it all goes out the 
window.”14 The reporting told of a cheering crowd, repeatedly 
declaring its affection for the outgoing president—but fatefully, 
that mood was not matched across the whole state. The theme 
was a regular feature of Obama’s stump speech in the closing 
stages of the campaign as he tried to sound the alarm that his 
legacy was at stake in the election: “All the progress we’ve made 
over these last eight years . . . goes out the window if we don’t 
win this election.”15
After the election, however, in an interview with the New 
Yorker’s editor, David Remnick, Obama was more sanguine about 
his legacy lasting through Trump’s time in offi ce. He explained 
just how diffi cult it was for any president to get done what they 
wanted to get done:
I think that the possibility of everything being out the window exists. 
But, as a practical matter . . . the federal government is an aircraft car-
rier, it’s not a speedboat. And, if you need any evidence of that, think 
about how hard we worked over the last eight years with a very clear 
progressive agenda, with a majority in the House and in the Senate, 
and we accomplished as much domestically as any president since 
Lyndon Johnson in those fi rst two years. But it was really hard.
Obama added that “maybe fi fteen percent . . . gets rolled back, 
twenty percent, but there’s still a lot of stuff that sticks.”16
For his part, Trump constantly made clear his disdain for the 
incumbent president. It is unsurprising that a presidential candi-
date from the “out” party would attack the record of the incum-
bent and their party, but there was an edge to Trump’s rhetoric 
beyond standard political rebukes. That was evident before he 
was recognized as a serious political fi gure when he became a 
leading booster of the “birther” movement, which cast doubt on 
whether Obama had been born in the US and hence whether he 
was ever a legitimate president. Very late in the 2016 campaign, 
Trump did acknowledge the fact that Obama had been born in 
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the country; but it is important to understand the importance of 
Trump’s embrace of birtherism in winning him support amongst 
Republican voters.17 That movement, denounced by many as 
racist at the time, was clearly seen by the Obamas as such even 
if they did not say so publicly until after they had left the White 
House.18 Beyond that personal attack, candidate Trump’s por-
trayal of Obama’s America was not simply of a country on “the 
wrong track,” but one that had derailed and crashed. This mes-
sage was at its sharpest in his inaugural address, when he used 
language that spoke of “American carnage” that “stops right 
here and stops right now.”19
More specifi cally, throughout the campaign, candidate Trump 
promised to revoke Obama-era initiatives. His acceptance speech 
at the Republican National Convention pledged to “repeal and 
replace disastrous Obamacare,” to stop the Trans-Pacifi c Partner-
ship (TPP), and to end “Excessive regulation . . . very quickly.” 
He declared that the Iran nuclear agreement signed by the Obama 
administration would “go down in history as one of the worst 
deals ever negotiated.” He refl ected that he was “certain” that 
naming Hillary Clinton as secretary of state was a decision that 
Obama “truly regrets.” Tying Clinton and Obama together, he 
denounced “the legacy of Hillary Clinton: Death, destruction 
and terrorism and weakness.”20 In May 2016 he had announced 
that he would “cancel” the Paris climate agreement if he became 
president, arguing that the pact would give “foreign bureaucrats 
control over how much energy we use.”21 In August 2016, in a 
speech recounting stories of Americans who, left vulnerable by 
“Obama–Clinton open borders policies,” were murdered by ille-
gal immigrants, he made a more particular commitment:
We will immediately terminate President Obama’s two illegal execu-
tive amnesties, in which he defi ed federal law and the constitution to 
give amnesty to approximately 5 million illegal immigrants.22
This referred to two programs the Obama administration 
had introduced through executive actions: Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). As it was, 
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legal challenges prevented DAPA, which was the wider-ranging 
of the two actions, from ever coming into effect, but DACA was 
in force when Trump took offi ce.
Here, in the cases of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Iran 
deal, environmental regulations, DACA, the TPP, and the Paris 
accord, Trump was speaking of identifi able actions taken by the 
Obama administration (though, it should be noted, the last two 
had not come into effect). Yet, to boil Obama’s legacy down to 
such a limited range of features misses much of the story and 
impact of his presidency. In turn, this leads to the question of 
what we mean by “legacy,” which is something that is assumed 
but relatively undefi ned in much writing about individual presi-
dents and the institution of the presidency.
Defi ning legacy
Presidential legacy is something that generates debate and contro-
versy almost from the moment a new president enters the White 
House, reaching a fever pitch as their time in offi ce draws to a 
close. Historians and social scientists periodically update their 
league tables that rate and rank presidents, presumably based 
largely on the signifi cance of their legacy, be that positive or nega-
tive.23 Yet, for all the discussion of each president’s legacy, there 
is little formal analysis of what criteria we should use to judge 
legacy, nor even of when it is fair to make any judgment at all. 
The weighty Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency has 
no chapter dedicated to the study of presidential legacy, nor even 
any index references to “legacy.”24 Nevertheless, book and jour-
nal article titles will often include the word “legacy” as they seek 
to assess the record of any particular president, sometimes even 
before that president has left offi ce.25
Hence, before moving on to look at particular examples of 
Obama’s legacy and the Trump administration’s efforts to roll 
that back, it is important to think through the complexities of 
defi ning presidential legacy, the means of establishing and consoli-
dating a legacy, and then the factors that facilitate or hinder later 
moves to undo that legacy. In this context, the purpose of the rest 
of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, we offer some thoughts on the 
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diffi culty of defi ning legacy and thinking about the ways in which 
legacies do, or do not, become institutionalized and the different 
ways in which legacies can, or cannot, be rolled back. Secondly, 
we move on to look at legacy reversal and Trump’s repudiation 
of Obama’s legacy. The chapter aims to provide a framework for 
moving on to looking at what we can think of as Obama’s legacy 
and how successfully the Trump administration has instigated 
moves to undo that legacy.
When considering the meaning and impact of presidential 
legacy, a range of questions present themselves. How do presi-
dents choose to articulate their ambitions, and then what means 
do they use to pursue those objectives? What factors facilitate 
or hinder their efforts? And, given that presidents rarely get all 
that they ask for in any particular political or policy episode, 
how should we assess compromise and incremental movement? 
What circumstances make a president’s “positive achievements” 
most likely to prove resilient over time, particularly if a successor 
perceives those changes through a more negative lens and seeks 
to undo or remake them? And, in turn, what factors facilitate or 
impede a president’s efforts to repeal the legacy of their prede-
cessor? Our intent is to think through these questions across a 
range of presidential activity. So we look not only at key aspects 
of domestic and foreign policy, but also at how the institution of 
the presidency is molded by its occupant and their vision of how 
leadership is most effectively displayed.
This is not a book about presidential power per se, but when 
looking at a president’s legacy the institutional capacity to estab-
lish that legacy, as well as the skills used to maximize that capac-
ity, clearly matter. In this context, some of the recent literature 
on presidential authority has emphasized the limits of powers to 
bring about change. George Edwards has pointed to the over-
confi dence of presidents, who misunderstand the restraints on 
their power and misinterpret their mandate.26 Jeremi Suri notes 
how the responsibilities of the modern presidency, defi ned as the 
post-Franklin Roosevelt world, have become so sprawling that 
it is now an “impossible” job, while the presidential scholars 
William Howell and Terry Moe lay the blame for presidential 
weakness on the Constitution.27 For these last authors, “blame” 
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is an operative word: They lament the manner in which institu-
tional barriers have enfeebled the occupant of the White House, 
whom they see as the political actor who is most able to take a 
national perspective.
For all the constraints on presidential power, however, it is 
clear that presidents strive to leave a legacy. As Howell and Moe 
assert, “If there is one motivator that most forcefully drives presi-
dential behavior, it is their concerns about legacy.”28 This results 
from their “burning desire to be remembered as great leaders.” 
Presidents, of course, do not get to choose which aspects of their 
legacy historians and political scientists focus on. Lyndon John-
son, for example, clearly wanted to be judged according to his 
domestic policy record, but however ranging his achievements 
on the home front, his presidency will be remembered as much, 
if not more, for the calamitous engagement in Vietnam29—which 
Johnson himself implicitly recognized, as his memoir of his time 
in the Oval Offi ce spends disproportionate space attempting to 
rationalize his actions with regard to that war.30 Further, while 
there have been scholarly attempts to rehabilitate Richard Nix-
on’s reputation and deal with important policy aspects of his 
presidency, his presidency will forever be framed by the Water-
gate scandal and his resignation from offi ce.31 Indeed, one last-
ing legacy of his presidency is the term “Nixonian,” meaning 
deceptive and corrupt. Yet the examples of Johnson and Nixon 
also illustrate that we do need to look at legacies in terms of their 
complex parts as well as a perhaps oversimplifi ed sum.
Hence, while legacy is a construct that does have a meaningful 
everyday use, it is simultaneously somewhat intangible. Onlookers 
can intuitively grasp that a legacy is what a president passes on to 
their successor, but that does not always mean that any onlooker 
can see all that there might be to see, and it is likely that differ-
ent onlookers will see different things and come to quite differ-
ent judgments about the merits of a presidential legacy. Nor does 
it tell us what a presidential successor will make of what they 
have been left by their predecessor. Here, rather obviously, the 
two candidates in 2016 offered profoundly different verdicts on 
the virtues of the Obama presidency and its legacy. Hence, those 
80,000 votes cast across Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan, 
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which gave Trump victory in the electoral college, meant that the 
US had elected a president whose political identity was based not 
only on a rejection of Obama-ism but also a personal repudiation 
of Obama.
As Bert Rockman notes, to talk of legacy “implies that some-
thing durable” has been passed from one administration to the 
next, which the latter “will benefi t by or have to deal with as a 
set of problems well into the future.” Rockman adds that almost 
“every presidential administration has something to leave, either 
by design, circumstance, or ineptitude.”32 Also helpful are Hugh 
Heclo’s comments in his review of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, 
when he notes that for all major leaders, “legacy is a complex 
thing. It is a mixture of intended accomplishments and unintended 
by-products, of actions taken and things left undone.”33
Using the framework provided by these insights, it is pos-
sible to identify a series of different ways in which we can think 
about what should be included when discussing a president’s 
legacy. Given that new Presidents arrive in offi ce touting their 
agenda for change, be that major change to set the country in a 
new direction or just to leave their own imprint while improv-
ing what is already working, one test of legacy is to ask how 
much of that agenda they were able to put in place.34 In short, 
does a president leave offi ce with a series of White House policy 
initiatives having become legislative accomplishments? Or, if not 
codifi ed by legislation, does a president at least manage to secure 
some of a preferred agenda through exercising the powers of the 
administrative presidency?35
Crafting legacy
Some presidents clearly leave legacies that are truly unique and 
arise from circumstances that cannot be replicated. George 
Washington’s initial shaping of the institution and Abraham 
Lincoln’s leadership through the Civil War provide examples 
of presidencies whose legacies owed much to a particular time 
and place. Similarly it is unlikely that the conditions seen dur-
ing Franklin Roosevelt’s tenure, which included combating an 
economic depression that ravaged politics in Europe, managing 
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the US’s role in a global confl ict, and helping shape the emerg-
ing post-war international environment, will be repeated. Those 
conditions created almost a perfect storm for a president of 
“reconstruction.”36 As it was, Roosevelt’s time as president left 
transformative policy legacies across a range of socio-economic 
and foreign affairs, re-cast the nature of the institution he occu-
pied, and established the Democrats as the majority party, if in 
an inherently unstable coalition. Hence, Roosevelt’s was a leg-
acy of a scope that has not been matched since. If nothing else, 
the passage of the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution means 
that no future president can be in offi ce as long as Roosevelt.
Yet, even Roosevelt faced considerable institutional obstacles 
in terms of both his domestic and foreign policy agenda.37 At 
home, his administration’s early troubles with a recalcitrant 
Supreme Court caused much frustration and abroad, while mea-
sures such as Lend-Lease nudged the US away from neutrality 
with regard to the confl ict engulfi ng much of the world through-
out 1940 and 1941, Roosevelt remained thwarted from adopt-
ing a more decisive response by isolationist sentiment through 
to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Moreover, scholars still debate 
the long-term consequences and policy legacies of choices and 
compromises that were made, and why they were made, by the 
Roosevelt administration.38 For example, it is clear that the early 
rollout of the Social Security program distributed pensions ineq-
uitably, as a disproportionate number of the workers excluded 
from the program were African American. Whether this was 
an unfortunate but unintended consequence of program design 
or a refl ection of how the administration conceded ground to 
pressure from Southern congressional forces through the policy-
making process remains contested.39 The long-term legacy of the 
Social Security Act was to establish a program that covers vir-
tually all of the nation’s seniors, but these alternative accounts 
of the decision-making process clearly frame the actions of the 
Roosevelt administration quite differently.
As it is, presidents who leave the most signifi cant legacies 
are clearly likely to have many of their favored policy initiatives 
enacted into law, even in adulterated form, although it is worth 
distinguishing between quantity and quality. In this context, 
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measuring presidential success by relying too heavily on roll-call 
votes or support scores for a president in Congress is potentially 
misleading, certainly if we are thinking about the signifi cance 
and what might be thought of as the weight of legacy. President 
Carter, for instance, scores better on these voting indicators than 
President Reagan, but there are few tomes dedicated to explaining 
the age of Carter or refl ecting on his lasting imprint on Demo-
cratic Party development. In contrast, Reagan is often seen as the 
dominant political fi gure of his time, with Republicans consistent 
in their continuing praise of his leadership and promising to main-
tain his legacy.40 Hence, crafting a substantive legacy is different 
from winning numerous legislative skirmishes.
Clearly, given the sausage-making machine nature of the leg-
islative process in Washington, DC, presidents very rarely get 
exactly what they want from Congress, even in times of uni-
fi ed partisan government, but they can still get more or less of 
what they initially wanted.41 In most cases, assuming a presi-
dent chooses to take ownership of the fi nal product upon sign-
ing it, then it seems reasonable to label that outcome as part 
of their legacy, though that might be different from ascribing 
any particular legislative episode that culminates in a presiden-
tial signature as a success for the executive branch. Sometimes 
this is very straightforward to judge, as a compromise might 
affect the choice of side dish but the executive branch’s choice 
of main course prevails; for example, President Obama may 
have supported the idea of including the “public option” in the 
health reform package as it developed through 2009, and he 
later lamented the absence of such a measure, yet the Afford-
able Care Act, minus the public option, was very obviously the 
major aspect of his social policy legacy.42 Equally, the tax cuts 
enacted in 2001 did not match the Bush administration’s initial 
plans, but they were clearly an accomplishment from the White 
House’s perspective, leaving a lasting legacy.43
Sometimes, though, it is potentially more problematic to decide 
on whether the president’s role in the legislative process warrants 
that the White House explicitly be seen as responsible for the 
fi nal product. A presidential focus can certainly lead to an overly 
top-down perspective on what drives political development. For 
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example, historians may disagree about how much direct credit 
President Johnson deserves for the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act in 1964, suggesting that emphasizing Johnson’s role dimin-
ishes the role of the civil rights movement.44 Yet, acknowledging 
Johnson’s role while appreciating the wider social movements and 
the force for change that the latter created are not intellectually 
incompatible. Moreover, in this case it is important to refl ect that 
there was still political opposition to be overcome in Washington, 
and Johnson showed bolder leadership than President Kennedy 
had previously done and set a direction in pushing for a strong 
and unambiguous law in a manner that would not have come 
from congressional leadership alone.45 Hence, whether Johnson 
should be regarded as the prime mover or as playing a more lim-
ited facilitator role, the Civil Rights Act should clearly be seen as 
a legacy of his time in offi ce.
A more problematic, if narrower, case of where to attribute 
credit—or blame—for a particular law comes with the pas-
sage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 
(PRWORA) into law in August 1996. At issue here is whether 
this law should be seen primarily as the work of the Republi-
can-controlled Congress that crafted the fi nal bill. At the time, 
President Clinton could claim to be fulfi lling a campaign promise 
from 1992 when, as a candidate, he had famously embraced the 
slogan “Ending welfare as we know it” on the campaign trail; 
but the actual plans he set out during the campaign and the plan 
advanced by the administration, if to little avail, in the summer of 
1994 were different in kind from the welfare reform package that 
he ended up signing. PRWORA was the product of the work of 
congressional Republicans and Clinton had in fact twice vetoed 
very similar plans, though he was given political cover to do so by 
additional measures attached to those bills. When a stand-alone 
measure came to his desk, the White House divided over the issue, 
but Clinton signed the bill, angering his welfare policy advisors.46 
George Stephanopoulos was one of those preferring another 
veto, but he acknowledged that his mood was “tempered by my 
complicity” as he had been part of the 1992 campaign team that 
was happy to let the public over-interpret the campaign’s welfare 
reform promises.47 As it was, Clinton not only signed PRWORA, 
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but demanded that he be seen as an equal parent to congressio-
nal Republicans.48 Hence, welfare reform properly should be seen 
as part of his legacy, even though he signed on to crucial policy 
elements that were as much a product of unintended political con-
sequences and circumstance as of design.49
Another layer of complexity comes when we consider legacies 
that arise from a president acting, partially at least, in order to 
deny political opponents an opportunity to exploit an issue. For 
example, George W. Bush did not simply sign into law the Medi-
care Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003: He aggressively pushed 
its passage in Congress, including making 4.00 a.m. calls to hesi-
tant Republicans preparing to vote and withholding revised higher 
cost estimates of the bill.50 Yet the MMA, in contrast to conserva-
tive orthodoxy, expanded the welfare state by introducing a pre-
scription drug program to Medicare. It should also be emphasized 
that the bill did many other things, much more amenable to con-
servative thinking, but the drug benefi t was a response to political 
pressure as Democrats attempted to develop this popular mea-
sure into a wedge issue to their partisan advantage.51 Clearly the 
MMA is part of Bush’s legacy, but whether the prescription drug 
benefi t included in it should primarily be regarded as a new wel-
fare state program offering some help to seniors or as a cheaper 
and less expansive arrangement to the alternatives on the table is 
less certain.
Another muddying example comes from the Nixon era and the 
passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which 
established the Occupational and Safety Health Administration 
(OSHA). The law itself, passed by overwhelming margins in both 
chambers of Congress, was a compromise between Democrat and 
Republican alternatives, pushing respectively for relatively stron-
ger and more limited powers of regulation and intervention to 
be given to government. The new agency exercised its author-
ity uncertainly in its opening years under the eyes of presidents 
Nixon and Ford, but did bare its teeth and antagonize industry 
under the leadership of Eula Bingham, who was asked to lead 
OSHA during the Carter administration. When Reagan appoin-
tee Thorne Auchter replaced Bingham, however, OSHA adopted 
a much lighter touch in its enforcement of worker protection 
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measures and has not subsequently re-emerged as an aggressive 
agency, lacking confi dence in its remit when pressured by other 
government bodies and business interests to tread softly.52 Thus, 
there is no straightforward narrative that accounts for how the 
creation of OSHA should be assessed as part of Nixon’s legacy.
An even more perplexing, if rare, category of legislation is one 
where a president subsequently explicitly denounces a law that 
they signed. For example, President Clinton signed the Defense 
of Marriage Act into law in September 1996. Yet, even as the 
House passed its version of the bill, White House spokesperson 
Michael McCurry called the bill “gay baiting, pure and simple” 
while simultaneously saying that the President believed that mar-
riage was something that should be between a man and a woman 
and that he would sign the bill.53 Clinton may have felt compelled 
rather than heartened to sign the law, passed with veto-proof 
majorities, in the context of the looming presidential election, 
but he did then invoke his signing of the bill on advertisements 
broadcast, if briefl y, on Christian radio stations the following 
month.54 And, if this makes it diffi cult to discern a clear legacy 
when Clinton left offi ce, it became even more diffi cult to cat-
egorize when he later declared that the law should be declared 
“incompatible with our Constitution.”55
The complexities embedded in these examples of legacy-mak-
ing owe much to the bargaining inherent to the legislative pro-
cess, but if presidents fi nd themselves frustrated by the obstacles 
embedded in that process they can turn to use more unilateral 
powers afforded their offi ce, and presidential scholarship has 
paid greater attention in recent years to this aspect of execu-
tive authority.56 This “unilateralism” may be a consequence of 
frustration with the legislative process, though it is misleading 
to think of executive action as signaling a retreat from attempt-
ing to get legislation enacted.57 The effort to expand the remit 
of executive authority is likely to draw ire from the “out” party, 
but it is unlikely that future presidents will walk too far back 
from employing the same institutional tools, however much 
they may have criticized the behavior of their predecessor for 
its violation of constitutional norms. And unilateralism can be 
an effective means of baring presidential teeth.58 As Andrew 
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Rudalevige charts, the Obama administration carried through a 
range of actions, some of considerable consequence, such as the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, the 
use of drones to carry out targeted killings, and selective delayed 
implementation of aspects of the ACA. To illustrate the variety 
of tools available, none of these examples were accomplished 
through the use of an executive order.59 One critic of this use of 
executive power was citizen Donald Trump. In February 2016, at 
a debate for Republicans seeking the party’s presidential nomina-
tion, he declared: “Obama goes around signing executive orders. 
He can’t even get along with the Democrats. He goes around 
signing all these executive orders. It’s a basic disaster. You can’t 
do it.”60 President Trump, however, found executive action an 
attractive tool, leading Rudalevige to conclude at the end of his 
fi rst year in offi ce that “on the whole, the major policy changes 
Trump achieved in his fi rst year came mostly from the use of 
administrative power, not via Congress.”61
Nevertheless, when assessing the impact of executive action it 
is important to distinguish between quantity and quality, as often 
these actions are symbolic or instruct agencies to develop plans 
for action rather than implementing action in the short term.62 
Furthermore, the limits of unilateral action to establish a legacy 
that will be consolidated over time sit in the very existence of those 
powers. “Incoming presidents regularly relax, or altogether undo, 
the regulations and orders of past presidents; and in this respect, 
the infl uence a sitting president wields is limited by the anticipated 
actions of their successors.”63 Furthermore, as President Obama 
and subsequently President Trump have found, opponents are 
sometimes able to use the judiciary as a check on the potential 
excessive exertion of executive authority. Hence, as we will dis-
cuss later in the book, the Obama legacy did not include the Clean 
Power Plan or DAPA.
The judiciary’s role in downsizing the Obama administration’s 
imprint on immigration and climate policy highlights another 
area of uncertainty in terms of defi ning presidential legacy. What 
of the relationship between a president and the Supreme Court? 
Firstly, while presidential nominations to the Supreme Court are 
a means by which a president’s favored perspectives can infl uence 
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American life long after the White House has a new occupant, 
the opportunity to nominate a new justice to the Court for each 
individual president arises as much by chance as design, or is 
dependent on where they fi t in the cycle of judicial longevity, 
given that justices are more likely to retire when the president is 
one they are comfortable with. Hence, one-term president Jimmy 
Carter did not get a chance to nominate a justice to the Court, 
while one-term president George H. W. Bush got to place two 
members on the Court.
Yet, while nominating justices to the Supreme Court is one 
of the acts taken by presidents that can leave a legacy well 
beyond their time in offi ce, the evidence suggests that this is 
not always the legacy that they intended. One of George H. W. 
Bush’s nominees was David Souter, who turned into a reliable 
liberal vote and, importantly, retired from offi ce to let a Demo-
crat replace him. Even President Reagan’s nominees did not all 
turn into conservative stalwarts. Sandra Day O’Connor proved 
to be a genuine “swing justice” and Anthony Kennedy, while 
mostly siding with the Court’s conservatives, was a decisive lib-
eral vote on same-sex rights as well as reproductive rights. The 
example of Kennedy’s role on the Court and his standing as part 
of the Reagan legacy is especially illustrative of why it is impor-
tant to pay attention to individual cases as well as broad data 
points. Before Kennedy took his place on the Court, Reagan had 
nominated Robert Bork to the vacant seat. Bork, who was (in)
famously rejected by the Senate, later helped draft a proposed 
constitutional amendment that would have prevented same-sex 
marriage. The difference between the judicial philosophies of 
Bork and Kennedy and the fact that the latter rather than the 
former served as a justice leaves a distinct imprint on the legacy 
of the Reagan presidency.64
As it is, the more recent evidence, from President Clinton 
onwards, suggests that administrations have become more adept 
at choosing justices who will be consistently sympathetic to the 
preferences of the president who nominated them. It may be that 
the vetting applied by outside groups to check a president’s choice 
means that the chances of further Earl Warren or David Souter 
type “mistakes” are much diminished.
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Second, there is the question of how to weigh the decisions that 
occur during a particular presidency. If the Court rules in a case 
directly related to an action taken by the administration, be that 
the ACA or DAPA, then clearly that decision will weigh directly 
upon a presidential legacy. Yet the judiciary can make decisions 
that carry signifi cant public policy implications, which the White 
House may support or oppose, but which arise from challenges 
to pre-existing federal or state law. Hence, the Court’s capacity to 
reinforce or disrupt the status quo remains in place. Sometimes a 
president may welcome a Court’s decision and so effectively adopt 
the outcome as part of the administration’s legacy. For example, 
the Obama White House celebrated the Supreme Court decision 
that effectively granted a constitutional right to same-sex marriage 
and the administration certainly made wider efforts to promote 
LGBT+ rights.65 This included the Department of Justice fi ling an 
amicus brief in the Obergefell case, as it had also done two years 
earlier when asking the Court to strike down California’s Propo-
sition 8, with reporting that Obama personally helped craft that 
brief.66 So, in the Obergefell case, the White House very credibly 
chose to own the Court’s decision, even though the new right was 
not a direct result of presidential action and was conferred by a 5–4 
decision with Chief Justice John Roberts vocal in his displeasure.67 
On the other hand, the Obama administration would hardly claim 
the undoing of campaign fi nance reform as part of its legacy, but 
that was the consequence of the 2010 Citizens United decision of 
the Supreme Court; nor would it want the elimination of part of 
the Voting Rights Act that occurred in the Shelby County ruling to 
be counted as part of its record.68 
Things undone and unintended
Heclo’s category of things “left undone” can be further divided 
into things undone as a result of a president’s failed efforts, or 
because a president shied away from a major political challenge 
despite being aware of the core unresolved problem, or potentially 
through a conscious decision not to address a particular issue.
Furthermore, the evidence can sometimes be contradictory. 
President Obama became only the third president not to sign 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   18 18/08/20   1:30 PM
introduction
19
into law an increase in the value of the minimum wage, despite 
repeated efforts during his second term in offi ce to persuade 
Congress to lift the level from $7.25 to $10.10.69 Hence, one leg-
acy of the Obama presidency was a decline in the real value of 
the federally mandated minimum wage of 9.6 percent.70 Clearly, 
advocates for the Obama White House would push back against 
such a categorization, noting that he did aggressively push for an 
increase but was thwarted by a recalcitrant Republican Congress 
and that he took executive action where he could. Moreover, the 
Obama White House did celebrate the fact that from 2013, when 
the President started to press for an increase in the federal level 
of the minimum wage, through to the end of his time in offi ce, 
eighteen states plus Washington, DC did increase their minimums, 
with a further fl urry of activity at city and county level.71 The 
example of the minimum wage also illustrates the importance of 
issue framing when assessing legacy. One of the other presidents 
not to sign into law an increase in the minimum level was Ronald 
Reagan. The nominal minimum stayed at $3.35 an hour from 
1981 through 1989, which was the equivalent of a decrease, in 
constant 2015 dollars, from $8.71 to $6.38.72 Yet, for Reagan this 
represented a positive legacy, as by ideological inclination he was 
skeptical of the whole notion of a mandated minimum.73
The question of how to account for the unintended conse-
quences of presidential decisions when assessing legacy provides 
a further layer of uncertainty. This is particularly the case as these 
consequences are likely to emerge after the passage of time and 
only come into focus with the benefi t of hindsight: For exam-
ple, while there were plenty of contemporaries who criticized US 
actions during the 1980s that provided support for authoritarian 
regimes in Latin American and Africa, there was less understand-
ing of how Reagan’s fi xation on seeing the world as either com-
munist or non-communist led him to support actions in the name 
of anti-communism, particularly in Lebanon, that reinforced an 
image of the US as an imperialist, anti-Islamic power, which “did 
much to aid the growing cause of radical jihadists in the Middle 
East.”74 Oddly, it can also be argued that the Reagan adminis-
tration’s decision to decline to cooperate with a plan by Soviet 
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to begin to move Soviet forces out of 
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Afghanistan in 1987 helped create the conditions for the contin-
ued rise of Islamic radicalism in that country.75
In turn, this brings into focus the problem of deciding when 
it is appropriate to judge a legacy. In reality, few commentators 
have the patience to wait any decent length of time, but as the 
case of Harry S. Truman illustrates, snap judgments based on low 
approval ratings and diffi cult circumstances at the time a pres-
ident leaves offi ce can lead to a premature negative verdict. In 
addition, a successor can make a predecessor’s missteps look less 
damning. As Rockman, if a little cruelly, concludes in his assess-
ment of George W. Bush, one of his most signifi cant legacies was 
“the rehabilitation of his father’s presidential reputation.”76 Our 
purpose, however, is less to judge where Obama’s legacy should 
place him in the pantheon of presidential greatness, but to inves-
tigate what he was able to achieve and how those “achievements” 
survived when under intense fi re after he left offi ce.
Rollback
As the discussion above illustrates, defi ning legacy is problem-
atic, but we also need to explain what we mean by “rollback.” 
The term implies that some action has been deliberately taken in 
order to reverse direction. It is possible to conceive of accidental 
rollback, where a policy is undone as an unintended consequence 
of other actions, but in the context of Trump’s treatment of the 
Obama legacy what might be described as “blue on blue” roll-
back is not the issue. The Trump administration was often happy 
to be very public in its effort at legacy reversal. In fact, as we shall 
see, Trump himself was eager to announce the end of Obama-era 
initiatives when it was far from clear that this was the case.
More generally, given the nature of presidential power, the 
tools afforded a president for rolling back a predecessor’s legacy 
and the strengths and weaknesses of those tools are much the same 
as for legacy creation, as is the likelihood of sources of effective 
resistance to presidential action. Whether rollback efforts are suc-
cessful will likely depend on the institutional balance of partisan 
power across federal and state governments. Further, the extent 
to which a legacy in a specifi c policy fi eld has embedded itself 
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and established positive feedback effects impacts the capacity to 
undo what has been done.77 If a policy has generated strong sup-
portive constituencies amongst the public and/or infl uential elite 
or economic actors, this can generate stiff resistance to revers-
ing that policy. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Affordable Care 
Act proved to be more resilient than might have been anticipated 
given the constant promises from candidate Trump and congres-
sional Republicans to “repeal Obamacare.” Part of the reason for 
this resilience was that it turned out that the law had higher levels 
of public support than indicated by polling since the law’s enact-
ment in 2010 and it had also benefi ted key health care providers, 
who therefore wished to preserve its central aspects.78
On the other hand, negative feedback can lead to reversal of 
policy even when this has been enacted in a bipartisan fashion. 
This reversal can be prompt, as witnessed in the case of the Medi-
care Catastrophic Care Act (MCCA). The MCCA, which added 
a catastrophic coverage package to Medicare for benefi ciaries 
who had used up their Medicare entitlements, was enacted in 
summer of 1988 only to be almost entirely repealed just over a 
year later.79 This was not a law that would seem a natural fi t for 
the Reagan administration, but it was advocated by the admin-
istration’s Secretary of Health and Human Services, Otis Bowen, 
and appealed to congressional Democrats. It was enacted with 
large majorities in both chambers, with the administration happy 
to engage in credit claiming. The expectation on all sides was 
that this would be a popular measure, and Vice President Bush, 
running for the presidency in the election later that year, report-
edly urged Reagan to back the measure. Yet the law drew a sharp 
backlash due its funding mechanism that relied on increased con-
tributions from seniors and as Congress hurriedly backtracked so 
too did President Bush.80
If the MCCA was an odd example of uncoordinated rollback of 
an unlikely legacy, the slow death of the No Child Left Behind law 
(NCLB) suggests a type of political suffocation of a law that was 
also passed with bipartisan congressional majorities, and which, 
in this case, was very much embraced by the president who signed 
it. The NCLB, which imposed new federal testing standards on 
schools, was not popular with all conservatives, but it was one 
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of President Bush’s top priorities when he took offi ce in January 
2001. As the NCLB was rolled out, however, it aggravated state 
and local educational administrators as well as drawing the ire of 
the teacher unions and became a target for both left and right 
of the political spectrum. In 2008 candidate Obama was critical 
of some central aspects, but did not demand a simple repeal.81 As 
it was, the law was supplanted rather than directly rebuked in 
December 2015 when Obama signed into law the Every Student 
Succeeds Act.82 This case might best be described as legacy roll-
back with a soft landing.
Importantly, rollback can take other forms than highly visible 
legislative repeal or direct revocation of an executive action. As 
the Obama administration had illustrated, executive actions can 
take the form of interpreting and implementing existing rules dif-
ferently.83 Furthermore, as we will discuss in Chapter 2 with respect 
to the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, executive agencies can 
be led in ways that undermine the original intent of the agency’s 
role and so effectively hollow out its mission.
A similar example would be the shift in behavior by the 
Department of Justice with regard to investigating alleged mal-
practice and discrimination by local police departments. For 
Attorneys General Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch, conduct-
ing these investigations and publishing the results had been an 
important part of an effort to increase transparency and poten-
tially improve relations between the police and local communi-
ties, especially minorities, where these had become strained. In 
the aftermath of the rioting that followed the death of Michael 
Brown in August 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri, the Justice 
Department looked at the wider role of the police in the city. 
The report did clear the offi cer involved in Brown’s death of 
all federal charges, but Holder spoke of how the police regu-
larly “blatantly cross the line” in their use of force, particularly 
against African Americans. Holder also noted how the police 
acted as a “collection agency for the municipal court rather than 
a law enforcement entity” and added that while the problems in 
Ferguson may have been “particularly acute,” they raised “ques-
tions about fairness and trust that are truly national in scope.”84 
President Trump’s fi rst Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, on the 
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other hand, announced that these types of study would be scaled 
back and resources prioritized elsewhere in order to “fulfi ll my 
commitment to respect local control and accountability, while 
still delivering important tailored resources to local law enforce-
ment to fi ght violent crime.”85
Assessing legacy reversal in foreign policy is perhaps even 
more diffi cult than in domestic affairs. Ending (or starting) a 
war, withdrawing troops from (or introducing them to) a com-
bat zone, or pulling the US out of (or entering into) an interna-
tional treaty contrary to the policies pursued by a predecessor 
would all constitute tangible measures of legacy reversal. For 
Obama and Trump the clear-cut cases would be the latter’s with-
drawal from the Iran nuclear deal and, taking a broad defi nition 
of international affairs, the Trans Pacifi c Partnership trade deal 
and the Paris climate agreement. Yet much of foreign affairs is 
less categorical than is apparent in these types of instance. And 
this is further complicated by the somewhat ambiguous nature of 
Obama’s foreign policy as we discuss in Chapter 4, and also the 
emerging evidence in Trump’s opening 30 months in offi ce that 
his willingness to back up a loud rhetorical bark with a sharp-
toothed bite was sometimes questionable. Yet the distinct over-
arching approach on offer from the two presidents was clear and 
is captured in the following commentary from summer 2018 by 
Jeffrey Goldberg, editor of The Atlantic:
The administration offi cials, and friends of Trump, I’ve spoken with 
in recent days believe . . . that Trump is rebuilding American power 
after an eight-year period of willful dissipation. “People criticize 
[Trump] for being opposed to everything Obama did, but we’re justi-
fi ed in canceling out his policies,” one friend of Trump’s told me. This 
friend described the Trump Doctrine in the simplest way possible. 
“There’s the Obama Doctrine, and the ‘Fuck Obama’ Doctrine,” he 
said. “We’re the ‘Fuck Obama’ Doctrine.’”86 
This quotation also explains the importance of thinking about 
the different ways in which a president can try to exercise their 
powers and communicate with the public. Leadership is a less 
tangible resource than policy accomplishments, but the effective-
ness of the executive branch’s internal processes and its capacity 
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to work with its political allies to achieve what might be regarded 
as achievable objectives can signifi cantly impact presidential leg-
acy. One area, for example, where presidents leave a legacy that 
extends well beyond their time in offi ce is in the choice of judges 
to the federal bench including, but also beyond, the Supreme 
Court. In addition, there are legacies that a president would 
rather avoid—most notably scandal, be that all-consuming, as in 
Watergate, or a stain on a presidency, as witnessed through the 
Lewinsky-related impeachment proceedings. As it turned out, the 
Obama White House was certainly not free from scandal, but it 
did avoid the indignity of being investigated by a special prosecu-
tor. The Trump White House, on the other hand, was quickly 
engulfed in scandal.
Structure of the book
It is not our purpose to provide an exhaustive account of the 
Obama and Trump presidencies. Rather than offer a compre-
hensive account of all aspects of either presidency, we are look-
ing at areas where the Obama administration worked toward 
cementing strands of legacy, which were later challenged or 
overturned by President Trump. The work attempts to set up 
a framework for examining the Obama legacy, which will pro-
vide context to readers who are curious to know to what extent 
the Trump administration is genuinely fulfi lling its promise to 
reverse the direction taken by the Obama White House. Look-
ing beyond the noise and hyperbole, the book will examine how 
robust the Obama legacy proves to be in the face of Trump’s 
challenge. Others before Trump have promised to tear up the 
rule book, but Washington’s institutional obstacles and consti-
tutional safeguards have often proved to be more resilient than 
anticipated.
The next section of the book will contain examples of 
Obama’s policy implementation, and his successor’s aims and 
efforts of rollback. In Chapters 2 and 3 we discuss aspects of 
what we describe as Obama’s “hard” and “soft” legacies and the 
Trump administration’s attempts to repeal these. The distinction 
between hard and soft is not a scientifi c one. In what might be 
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thought of as “material” policy domains it does refl ect a divi-
sion between legacies arrived at through legislative action (hard) 
and those relying on executive action (soft). Hence much of the 
focus of discussion with respect to hard legacy is on the Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) and the creation of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. With regard to soft legacy, 
we concentrate on the Obama administration’s executive actions 
on immigration policy and environmental regulation after its 
efforts to bring about policy change in those areas through the 
legislative process largely failed. Yet, we also consider LGBT+ 
issues as part of hard legacy. This did include some legislative 
measures and executive actions, but the landmark moment came 
from the judicial branch. Finally, we look at trade policy as an 
aspect of soft legacy. Here Obama followed a familiar trajectory 
of being a free trade skeptic as a candidate before switching to 
broadly endorse the expansion of free trade agreements when in 
offi ce. As it was, he left a potentially signifi cant but very thinly 
embedded legacy in the shape of the Trans Pacifi c Partnership, 
which was negotiated but bereft of congressional ratifi cation as 
he left offi ce. As we shall see, aspects of both types of legacy 
proved perhaps surprisingly resilient, others susceptible to what 
might be thought of as hidden rollback, and others still predict-
ably vulnerable to effective repeal.
Next we turn to international affairs. To what extent did 
Obama turn the ship of foreign policy state around from George 
W. Bush’s tumultuous presidency and establish an identifi able and 
distinctive trajectory? And how did the “Fuck Obama” doctrine 
materialize in practice? The fi nal section of the book will consider 
the signifi cance of the exercise of presidential powers of appoint-
ment, particularly to positions of infl uence that last beyond the 
lifetime of a presidency, as well as matters of presidential com-
munication, interaction, public perception, use of the media and 
engagement with other actors.
The content of the book will look at key areas of domestic 
policy, including health care, immigration, fi nancial regulation, 
racial justice and reproductive rights. On the foreign policy front, 
relations with Iran and Russia will be considered, along with how 
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a president prioritizes a range of international commitments and 
challenges including, for example, climate change. Both domestic 
and foreign policy case studies will be considered in the context of 
the president’s relations with other actors, and his ability or desire 
to implement his campaign promises.
Conclusion
Clearly, writing before the end of the fi rst term of the Trump 
presidency, it is too early to make a judgment on how historians 
will treat Obama’s legacy. And while even Trump was already 
included in at least one presidential ranking less than two years 
after his inauguration, it is too soon to say how Obama’s time 
in offi ce will look in the round in a generation’s time, when spe-
cifi c policy initiatives have matured or withered and when there 
is a better sense of how the causes he embraced have stood the 
test of time.87 For example, his efforts at promoting LGBT+ 
rights were of some immediate consequence, but were not com-
pletely fulfi lled during his time in offi ce: In the future, however, 
Obama’s leadership on LGBT+ issues, or at least his willingness 
to offer presidential approval to the wider movement, may look 
like a signifi cant turning point that clearly established a direc-
tion of travel, if with some diversions along the way, toward 
a full equalization of rights. Or, more particularly, the change 
in relationship with Cuba might come to be seen as a pivotal 
moment that helped foster a change in the nature of the regime 
in that country in the long term; or it might be seen as a moment 
when the US helped keep in place an unrelenting dictatorship; or 
it might merit no more than a footnote in history books. Fortu-
nately, the aim here is not to make premature judgments about 
how the Obama legacy will be perceived in 2040, but to assess 
how far he was able to turn his central policy goals into some 
sort of legacy and then to look at how much of that survived 
the immediate hostility of his successor. In turn, this will help 
inform us not just about Obama and Trump—riveting though 
that story is—but also about the manner in which presidents try 
to exercise their institutional authority in order to imprint their 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   26 18/08/20   1:30 PM
introduction
27
vision and how easily their efforts can be overturned by a legatee 
with an inimical vision.
This book is an early assessment of an ongoing experiment, 
testing the resilience of a president’s legacy in the context of a 
successor dedicated to unraveling that legacy. At the time of 
writing, we are only 36 months into that experiment. There have 
been signs that explicitly undoing things might prove to be more 
frustrating for Trump than he may have imagined, just as doing 
things in the fi rst place proved so aggravating for the Obama 
administration. Trump’s ability to act to further de-Obamafi -
cation and perhaps even to contemplate a legacy of his own 
will depend on the partisan balance in Washington, DC. The 
November 2018 midterm results suggest further legislative roll-
back of Obama’s legacy, at least the intended legacy, is unlikely. 
Yet, as presidential scholar Andy Rudalevige has charted, the 
Obama administration stretched the scope of the administrative 
presidency in its effort to bypass the legislative process, provid-
ing a precedent and template for Trump. In this context, the 
Trump White House has shown it has the capacity to at least 
halt the direction of travel with regard to LGBT+ rights and, 
even though Congress has not repealed and replaced the ACA, 
the administration has undermined its effective functioning and 
legal challenges persist. And here it is necessary to understand 
the importance of the executive branch beyond the confi nes of 
the Oval Offi ce and the stream-of-consciousness Twitter feed. 
For example, in terms of LGBT+ rights, look closely at the 
actions of the Justice Department and former Attorney General 
Sessions. What instructions were being given out about how rig-
orously to apply Obama-era regulations? With regard to health 
care, how much more fl exibility will Health and Human Services 
(HHS) allow states in terms of the waivers it grants? For exam-
ple, the Obama Health and Human Services refused states per-
mission to include work requirements for people newly eligible 
for Medicaid through the ACA. Or consider how much effort 
HHS is putting into enrolling people into the health care mar-
ketplaces. On the other hand, the Medicaid expansion is prov-
ing popular at the ballot box, as evidenced by the results of 
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statewide referenda. It is more necessary now than ever to look 
beyond shiny distractions and consider the substance.
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A “hard” legacy, under pressure
The fi rst two years of the Obama presidency were ones that 
saw substantive legislative action. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act created a stimulus package that contained some 
long-term legacy-building elements such as the expansion of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, but the most singular aspect of the 
Obama legacy was the Affordable Care Act (ACA). In addition to 
questions about health care coverage and cost, the ACA became a 
fl ashpoint for those concerned with “moral values.” Issues such as 
reproductive rights came to the fore and went beyond the socio-
economic concerns regarding health care provision. While repeal 
of “Obamacare” had been central to wider Republican attacks 
on Obama well before Trump arrived on the political scene, as 
a candidate he eagerly adopted language about the “disastrous” 
ACA. Hence this chapter will examine the aims and achievements 
of the Trump administration, working with congressional Repub-
licans, in relation to further reform of the US health care system. 
Furthermore, in the context of “values” issues the chapter will 
examine the Obama legacy on LGBT+ rights and the extent to 
which the Trump administration was able and willing to pursue 
an agenda promoted by more religious conservative groups to 
undo that legacy. The chapter will also consider the creation and 
subsequent hollowing out of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB).
We have termed these three elements as Obama’s “hard leg-
acy,” as they went a long way toward (or even beyond, in the 
case of same-sex marriage) fulfi lling the administration’s original 
goals. Moreover, in the case of the ACA and CFPB, these were 
accomplishments that came through the legislative process rather 
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then relying on the blunter instruments of executive action. Yet, 
the substantive nature of these achievements did not mean that 
they were invulnerable to future rebuke. As we will explain, the 
ACA was damaged but still very much the law of the land when 
Democrats took control of the House in January 2019. On the 
other hand, the CFPB had survived in appearance but less so in 
substance. The story of LGBT+ rights is somewhat different inas-
much as the most dramatic move in the Obama era came as a 
result of court action. Still, the administration did consistently 
try to expand the realm of LGBT+ rights and history has already 
deemed Obama a champion of the cause, but this aspect of his 
progressive legacy would be tested by the election of a successor 
increasingly indebted to socially conservative supporters.
The Affordable Care Act
There can be little question that the stand-out domestic policy 
legacy of the Obama era was the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
This was the biggest reform of the American health care system 
since the mid-1960s, when President Lyndon Johnson signed into 
law a bill bringing the Medicare and Medicaid programs to life. 
A comprehensive health care reform package had been the “holy 
grail” for Democratic administrations dating back to Harry Tru-
man’s presidency. In addition to the intense efforts of presidents 
Truman and Clinton and the rather more tepid foray into health 
care politics by Carter, the Nixon administration had also tried 
but failed to fi nd a way through the legislative maze that was 
effectively made into a series of dead ends. The purpose here is 
not to re-litigate whether those efforts failed primarily due to the 
institutional fragmentation of US government, the mobilization of 
interest group opposition, the deep-seated cultural fear of collec-
tive social provision or the legacy of racism that was embedded 
into key features of the early American welfare state. These are 
fundamental issues when thinking about the evolution and devel-
opment of US social welfare arrangements, but the focus here is 
on what the ACA did and did not accomplish and the extent to 
which the Trump administration managed to roll the law back 
after years of Republican calls to “repeal Obamacare.”
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The answers to the different parts of these questions are com-
plicated and involve accommodating and reconciling potentially 
contrary perspectives. Firstly, on the one hand, as Vice President 
Joe Biden was caught saying on microphone at the ACA’s signing 
ceremony, this was a “big fucking deal.”1 On the other hand, the 
ACA did contain many compromises to placate potentially hostile 
stakeholders in the health care system and its policy design pro-
vided political opponents with important venues through which 
to continue their opposition in ways that materially limited the 
implementation and hence impact of the law. Second, on the one 
hand, when the Democrats took control of the House of Rep-
resentatives in January 2019, the ACA was still the law of the 
land after two years of unifi ed Republican government, led by the 
Trump administration, had failed to fulfi ll the repeated pledge to 
“repeal and replace” the law; and, with health care playing as a 
winning issue for the Democrats in the 2018 midterm elections, 
that shift in partisan control of the House all but guaranteed 
an end to legislative efforts to repeal the ACA through Trump’s 
fi rst term. Yet, on the other hand, Trump’s Health and Human 
Services had used various administrative means to chip away at 
the functioning of the law.
The story of the enactment of the ACA has been well told 
already, but it is worth remembering some key features of the 
legislative process when judging the actual impact of the law and 
hence the ACA’s true worth as a signature legacy of the Obama 
administration. Firstly, although the White House delegated much 
of the responsibility for drawing up the ACA to congressional 
Democrats, the decision to press ahead with health care reform 
from the very start of the presidency was very much Obama’s 
own. When he arrived in offi ce, faced with an expanding eco-
nomic crisis, there were important voices, including his chief of 
staff Rahm Emmanuel and Vice President Biden, who worried 
that tackling the recession and reforming health care together 
might prove overwhelming. They urged that the economy should 
be the priority.2 Obama, however, insisted that the administration 
and Congress could deal with two major tasks simultaneously.
Secondly, at key points during the process Obama stepped 
in to reinforce the reform effort, including holding a televised 
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“health care summit” in February 2010 at a point when it looked 
like the legislative train had been derailed by the loss of the Dem-
ocrats’ 60 to 40 vote majority in the Senate after the surprise 
election of Republican Scott Brown in a special Senate election 
in Massachusetts in January 2010. Brown’s election came after 
both House and Senate had passed their own version of reform, 
but before a Conference Committee had worked on bringing the 
two bills together for a fi nal up or down vote in each chamber. 
Suddenly, with Republicans now having the numbers for a veto 
in the Senate, a means had to be found that bypassed the Confer-
ence Committee stage. Through his public performance at that 
“summit,” Obama “gave Democrats in Congress the cover they 
needed” to move ahead with a controversial legislative endgame.3 
This involved the House passing the Senate version of reform, 
which could then be signed into law, before a series of “fi xes” 
were enacted to iron out some of the more obvious wrinkles in 
the Senate bill. In order to get these “fi xes” through Senate, Dem-
ocrats controversially turned to the reconciliation process that 
did not allow for a fi libuster.4
Third, even though these manoeuvres did mean that Obama 
had a major bill that he could sign into law, the need to bring 
the legislative process to a close in this way was unsatisfactory 
from both a political and policy perspective. In political terms, 
it allowed Republicans to cry foul over the use of reconciliation 
while simultaneously setting a precedent that Republicans could 
turn to should they get a chance to repeal the law; and from a 
policy viewpoint, it meant that some of the more radical elements 
of the House bill were written out of the equation. The House bill, 
for example, had included a small so-called public option whereby 
a government-run insurance package would compete with private 
insurers. This proposal might well not have made it through the 
fi nal Conference Committee stage, but its absence from the Senate 
bill was indicative of the more moderate and more fundamentally 
piecemeal approach taken by the Senate through 2009, due to the 
need to keep all wavering Democrats and the Independent senator 
Joe Lieberman of Connecticut on board.
Furthermore, the manner in which the ACA folded together a 
vast range of changes, from creating new institutions designed to 
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offer health insurance to low- to middle-income households, to 
expanding the existing Medicaid program, to imposing new regu-
lations on insurers, to putting in place the “individual mandate,” 
meant that there were a variety of grounds on which opponents 
could continue to challenge the law as it was implemented and 
also turn to the courts. And turning to the judicial branch to chal-
lenge the law is what opponents immediately did, as twenty-six 
states and various business interests came together to ask that the 
law be declared unconstitutional. These challenges came together 
in a case known as National Federation of Independent Businesses 
(NFIB) v. Sebelius. The primary focus throughout the case had 
been on the so-called “individual mandate,” which required 
people to buy health insurance if they could afford it. This was 
designed to add an element of collectivism to the private insurance 
market by making sure that healthier people could not choose to 
opt out. In the end, that part of the ACA was ruled constitutional 
by the Court in the summer of 2012, if only by a 5–4 majority, 
crucially allowing the law to stand.
Less attention had been paid to the accompanying challenge 
to the manner in which the ACA effectively compelled states 
to expand their Medicaid programs to cover everyone with an 
income below 138 percent of the poverty line. Medicaid, as a pro-
gram jointly administered and funded by the federal and state 
governments, had an array of different rules and eligibility criteria 
with variations from state to state such that no two states had 
the same regulations prior to the ACA. Moreover, very few states 
allowed able-bodied childless adults access to Medicaid, however 
poor they might be. In fact, despite the shorthand description of 
Medicaid as a program providing health insurance for poor Amer-
icans, fewer than half of the working non-aged poor population 
were covered by Medicaid in 2012.5 The ACA proposed to intro-
duce rules that would establish a new income fl oor of 138 percent 
of the federal poverty level for access to Medicaid for everyone 
regardless of their perceived “moral worthiness.” This was to be 
put in place through a mix of fi nancial carrots and sticks offered 
and waved by the federal government to the states. Firstly, the 
federal government would pay all the costs for new enrolees to the 
program as a result of the expansion for the opening three years 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   42 18/08/20   1:30 PM
a “hard” legacy, under pressure
43
and then 90 percent of costs afterwards, which was a much more 
generous rate of federal disbursement than for regular Medicaid. 
Secondly, any state that did not sign up for the expansion would 
lose all its existing Medicaid funding. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, found that this second aspect equated to unjustifi ed fi nan-
cial pressure.6 Hence the carrot remained, but the stick was gone 
and some Republican-run states made clear that they were allergic 
to carrots.7
Nevertheless, despite the setback over Medicaid and the refusal 
of Republican-controlled states to cooperate with other aspects 
of the ACA, the various measures that made up the ACA were 
gradually implemented over the remaining years of the Obama 
presidency.8 By the time Obama left offi ce the percentage of 
Americans who lacked health insurance coverage stood at 8.7, 
having been 15.5 percent in 2010.9 Some of that decline was due 
to the improved economy, but much was a direct result of the 
efforts in the ACA to signifi cantly reduce the numbers of unin-
sured. Furthermore, people with pre-existing conditions could no 
longer be denied insurance or offered only prohibitively expensive 
packages. It is important to understand that the newly insured 
not only benefi ted from their improved access to medical care but 
also, on an everyday basis, enjoyed the economic security of not 
being constantly haunted by the prospect of an unaffordable med-
ical expense. In short, despite the fact that as Obama left offi ce 
nineteen states had not joined the Medicaid expansion, the ACA 
was a legacy of deep real-world consequence.
The law also, however, left a legacy in political terms that was 
much less appealing to Obama and Democrats, as Republicans 
continued to agitate against “Obamacare” through to the end of 
Obama’s time in offi ce. As Obama signed the ACA, Senator Max 
Baucus of Montana, who as chair of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee had played a key role in steering the law through the Senate, 
told his Republican colleagues that it was time to move on and 
accept what had happened: “Now it is fact. Now it is law. Now 
it is history.”10 From the perspective of the Obama administra-
tion and the wider Democratic Party, that statement proved to 
be hopelessly optimistic. As noted above, legal challenges to the 
ACA started immediately it was signed and Republicans launched 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   43 18/08/20   1:30 PM
obama v. trump
44
political attacks on “Obamacare” through the next four political 
cycles. These were not always successful, but brought real divi-
dends in 2010, contributing to the GOP’s success in federal- and 
state-level elections.11 In fact, despite the evidence of a decline in 
the uninsured rate, the ACA remained underwater in public opin-
ion throughout Obama’s terms in offi ce. The partisan differences 
in perception of the law were stark, but Independents sided with 
the “unfavorable” opinion column, particularly through 2013 
and 2014 as central aspects of the law were rolled out.12
The clearest manifestations of Republican hostility to the ACA 
were repeated votes in the House to repeal all or signifi cant parts 
of the law. These votes were symbolic inasmuch as they were 
never going to actually result in repeal while Obama remained in 
offi ce,13 but they did serve to stoke the conservative political base 
and maintain the impression that the ACA was somehow still ille-
gitimate. And that was certainly the mantra of candidate Trump 
as he emerged into the political spotlight during the fall of 2015. 
In July 2015, in typically bombastic but unspecifi c terms, he said 
of the ACA: “It’s gotta go. . . . Repeal and replace with something 
terrifi c.”14 In the fi nal stages of the campaign he again attacked 
the ACA and promised that he would be the one to correct the 
problems with the country’s health care system:
Together we’re going to deliver real change that once again puts 
Americans fi rst. That begins with immediately repealing and replac-
ing the disaster known as Obamacare. My fi rst day in offi ce, I’m 
going to ask Congress to put a bill on my desk getting rid of this 
disastrous law and replacing it with reforms that expand choice, free-
dom, affordability. You’re going to have such great health care, at a 
tiny fraction of the cost—and it’s going to be so easy.15
The early stages of his presidency saw similar brash promises 
and a neglect of the evidence. Speaking at the Conservative Polit-
ical Action Conference in Washington, DC in February 2017, he 
declared that “Obamacare covers very few people,”16 despite the 
fact that over 20 million people were covered by either the Med-
icaid expansion or the market insurance exchanges that provided 
subsidies for people with household incomes between 100 and 
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400 percent of the poverty level. A few weeks after taking offi ce, 
President Trump met with senior executives from the health 
insurance industry, telling them that he would soon put forward 
a “fantastic plan” that would “be a great plan for the patients, 
for the people, and hopefully for the companies.”17 At almost the 
same time he insisted to a meeting of the country’s governors, 
“We have come up with a solution that’s really, really I think very 
good,” before acknowledging “I have to tell you, it’s an unbeliev-
ably complex subject. . . . Nobody knew health care could be so 
complicated.”18 Beyond the point that everyone involved in, or 
even simply an informed observer to, previous efforts at health 
care reform was very aware of how “complicated” a subject it 
was, it also turned out that the administration and congressional 
Republicans had not come up with “a solution.” In fact, far from 
it, as Republican efforts to “repeal and replace” the ACA fl oun-
dered in Congress over the summer of 2017.
The House did pass a bill, the American Health Care Act, which 
the President greeted by holding a celebration in the Rose Garden 
in the manner typically accompanying an actual signing ceremony.19 
That proper climax to the legislative process did not materialize, 
however, as the Senate could not manage to agree on its own version 
of reform despite multiple iterations of a bill being put to a vote. 
The GOP’s 52–48 majority in the Senate did not suffi ce even though 
the votes were conducted through the reconciliation process, thus 
bypassing a fi libuster and effectively needing only a 50–50 tie that 
would have allowed Vice President Pence to cast the decisive vote. 
In fact, the process not only bypassed a possible fi libuster but also 
disregarded so-called “regular order,” through which each prospec-
tive bill would have been subjected to lengthy committee hearings.
The closest vote was over a motion referred to as “skinny 
repeal.” This bill made little effort to fulfi ll the “replace” part of the 
“repeal and replace” equation, but if passed it would have paved 
the way for a fuller bill to be constructed in a Conference Commit-
tee. Yet, even this proposal was defeated 51–49 in the Senate. Most 
of the focus after this vote was on Arizona Senator John McCain, 
who cast his vote, to gasps in the chamber, with a thumbs-down 
movement. This generated considerable conversation, especially 
given President Trump’s antagonistic relationship with the GOP’s 
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2008 presidential nominee, who had just been diagnosed with ter-
minal cancer. That drama somewhat obscured the fact that the two 
most consistent opponents of their party’s efforts in the Senate were 
Senators Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and Susan Collins of Maine, 
who were amongst the very diminished ranks that could properly 
be regarded as “moderate” within the GOP’s Senate caucus.20
One problem for Republicans in trying to craft a legislative 
package was that the Congressional Budget Offi ce consistently 
scored the emerging proposals as likely to add over 20 million 
to the ranks of uninsured.21 They also struggled to fi nd ways to 
keep in place the very popular aspects of the ACA, most notably 
the protection for Americans with pre-existing conditions, while 
dismantling the other parts of the law due to the manner in which 
the less well-liked aspects effectively sustained the popular ele-
ments. Furthermore, the concerted attacks on the ACA helped 
turn around its fortunes in terms of its public approval. The 
switch should not be exaggerated, but polls moved from show-
ing consistent majorities expressing “disapproval” to consistent 
majorities offering “approval” of the ACA.22
Hence, by January 2019 it was clear that any chance of a leg-
islative repeal of the ACA during President Trump’s fi rst man-
date was gone. In this sense perhaps the most important domestic 
legacy of the Obama presidency was intact. Yet, the story was 
not quite that simple. The ACA remained the law of the land, but 
the Trump administration, primarily through a series of executive 
actions, undermined its effectiveness and also chipped away at 
some of the principles underlying the law. One legislative act came 
in December 2017 as part of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA). 
The TCJA was mostly focused on cutting corporate and individual 
income taxes, but it also reduced the penalty that could be applied 
to people refusing to buy health insurance and thus running foul 
of the “individual mandate” to zero. This was widely described 
as a “repeal” of the mandate, though this was technically not the 
case.23 This move did prompt President Trump to claim,
The individual mandate is being repealed . . . that means Obamacare 
is repealed. Because they get their money from the individual man-
date. . . . So in this bill . . . we have essentially repealed Obamacare 
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and will come up with something that will be much better, whether 
it’s block grants or whether it’s taking what we have and doing some-
thing terrifi c.24
In reality the TCJA did not repeal the ACA and there was no 
movement toward “something terrifi c,” but the move did poten-
tially undermine the stability of insurance markets. This was also 
a potential outcome of the administration’s actions to make it 
easier for individuals to buy cheaper, less comprehensive, short-
term insurance packages that did not contain the array of benefi ts 
mandated by the ACA. This type of change may sound innocuous, 
but in allowing people willing to gamble on their health status the 
chance to opt out of broader insurance packages, it potentially 
undercut the stability of the insurance risk pools covering less 
healthy individuals.25
Other moves potentially reduced the numbers of people signing 
up for insurance via the market insurance exchanges and allowed 
states to toughen access to the Medicaid expansion. In the for-
mer case, there was a downscaling of the outreach to encourage 
individuals to sign up for the marketplace insurance exchanges.26 
With regard to Medicaid, the Trump administration encouraged 
states to request waivers that would demand work requirements 
of Medicaid benefi ciaries. This meant that states could apply a 
degree of conditionality to eligibility to the Medicaid expansion in 
a manner that the Obama administration had explicitly prevented. 
Nevertheless, despite these efforts the ACA did remain the law of 
the land through the opening years of the Trump presidency.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Had it not been for the political battle and policy controversies 
over health care, the arguments over fi nancial reform through 
2009 and 2010 would likely have attracted more notice than they 
did. When President Obama signed the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, better known as Dodd-Frank after its 
chief congressional sponsors Senator Christopher Dodd of Con-
necticut and Representative Barney Frank from Massachusetts, he 
fi nalized the “most sweeping overhaul of fi nancial regulations in 
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the United States since the New Deal.”27 Refl ecting its controver-
sial nature, Dodd-Frank passed Congress very largely along par-
tisan lines, although three Senate Republicans including the near 
nemesis of health care reform, Scott Brown, did support the act.
There were many aspects to the law, which included new regula-
tion of banks and a range of other fi nancial and corporate institu-
tions. Through the legislative process the bill was watered down 
from its original intent,28 but rather than covering all the bill’s fea-
tures we concentrate on the creation of a new, potentially powerful 
government agency that became known as the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau (CFPB). As he signed the Dodd-Frank bill 
Obama spoke of how the CFPB would help Americans who were 
vulnerable to misleading sales pitches from fi nancial institutions:
Now, for all those Americans who are wondering what Wall Street 
Reform means for you, here’s what you can expect. If you’ve ever 
applied for a credit card, a student loan, or a mortgage, you know 
the feeling of signing your name to pages of barely understandable 
fi ne print.
But what often happens as a result, is that many Americans are 
caught by hidden fees and penalties, or saddled with loans they can’t 
afford.
Obama continued that these sharp practices would be checked 
with “protections . . . enforced by a new consumer watchdog with 
just one job: looking out for people.”29 The idea behind the CFPB 
could in fact be traced back to work done by Elizabeth Warren 
and her colleagues in the mid-2000s, when she was a professor at 
Harvard. Warren argued that people should have similar protec-
tions when buying fi nancial products as they would when buy-
ing faulty homeware.30 As manifested by the CFPB, this notion 
looked as if it was to be implemented in a robust fashion by an 
agency with considerable autonomy and a strong remit.
Three aspects of its institutional confi guration reinforced the 
potential powers given to this new agency. Firstly, the CFPB was 
to be funded by the Federal Reserve. This was perhaps problem-
atic given the Fed’s sometime complicity in looking past dubi-
ous fi nancial activities, but it did mean that the new agency was 
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not dependent on congressional funding. Secondly, it was to be 
headed by a director who, once confi rmed for a fi ve-year term, 
was effectively only responsible to the president rather than to 
the legislative branch. Third, its rules were not subject to scru-
tiny by the Offi ce of Information and Regulatory Affairs or the 
Offi ce of Management and Budget.31 These features drew fi re 
from Republican opponents, who protested at the concentration 
of power in the hands of the director, comparing this unfavor-
ably to the broader, board-like organization of existing fi nancial 
regulatory bodies, the Securities Exchange Commission and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Commission.32 Hence, in protest, they 
successfully fi libustered the nomination of Richard Cordray to the 
post of director. Cordray, a former Attorney General from Ohio, 
was Obama’s pick after speculation that he might choose Warren 
to be the fi rst head of the agency sparked controversy. The fi libus-
ter and what followed was indicative of the fraught relationship 
between the Obama White House and congressional Republicans 
and the ill will that could emerge on both sides.
When justifying the fi libuster in December 2011 Senator Lind-
say Graham likened the CFPB’s powers to “something out of the 
Stalinist era” and protested the role of the director as “there’s 
no oversight under this person; he gets a check from the Fed-
eral Reserve. We want him under the Congress so we can oversee 
the overseer.”33 In response, at the start of January 2012, Obama 
appointed Cordray to his post under the guise of it being a recess 
appointment, which could last for two years. This was particularly 
provocative to Republicans who had used technical measures, 
previously employed by Democrats to thwart George W. Bush 
from making recess appointments, to prevent the Senate falling 
into recess over the holiday period. House Speaker Boehner called 
Obama’s action an “extraordinary and entirely unprecedented 
power grab.”34 In June 2014, these Republican complaints were 
backed up by the Supreme Court, which ruled in a unanimous 
verdict that Senate had not been in recess and the appointment 
was void.35 By that point, however, the two sides had managed 
to come to a compromise. In an effort to prevent a stand-off over 
whether to end the fi libuster for a range of presidential appoint-
ments it was agreed that Cordray would be subject to a straight 
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up or down Senate confi rmation vote. As it was, that stand-off 
over the fi libuster for presidential nominations was postponed 
rather than cancelled, but Cordray was confi rmed to take up the 
position of director of the CFPB in July 2013. Elizabeth Warren, 
by now a senator from Massachusetts, celebrated that her plan 
was fi rmly in place: “There is now no doubt that the American 
people will have a watchdog that’s . . . holding fi nancial institu-
tions accountable when they break the rules.”36
While the wider Dodd-Frank regulations did come under some 
criticism from liberals for not being aggressive enough in the reg-
ulation of the fi nancial sector, the CFPB proved to be a robust 
and assertive new agency under Cordray’s leadership throughout 
the remainder of the Obama presidency. It quickly established 
a reputation as an agency that interpreted its remit broadly and 
was prepared to exercise its powers. By the summer of 2014, US 
News and World Report offered the following summary of its 
early actions:
Getting credit card companies to cough up more than $1.8 billion in 
refunds to consumers they had cheated. Directing mortgage lenders 
to limit charges and stop making loans that borrowers can’t afford. 
Cracking down on “last dollar” scams that collect up-front fees from 
fi nancially desperate people for help that is never actually delivered. 
Establishing a consumer complaint database to track fi nancial market 
trends and help consumers get individual problems addressed.37
Under Cordray’s leadership the CFPB returned nearly $12 bil-
lion to 29 million consumers found to have been exploited by 
unscrupulous fi nancial organizations.38 When Cordray announced 
his resignation in late 2017 a Politico Magazine profi le of the 
CFPB described it as having “quietly established itself as the most 
powerful and consequential new federal agency since the Environ-
mental Protection Agency opened its doors nearly half a century 
ago.”39 Hence the CFPB was a substantive legacy. It was a new 
executive branch agency, structured in a manner that empowered 
rather than constrained its leadership.
It turned out, however, that much depended on the ambition 
and nature of that leadership and Cordray’s resignation proved a 
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turning point. Republicans had never reconciled themselves to the 
CFPB’s powers. In September 2014, then congressman Mick Mul-
vaney from South Carolina said in an interview with the Credit 
Union Times that the agency was “a wonderful example of how 
a bureaucracy will function if it has no accountability to any-
body . . . It turns up being a joke, and that’s what the CFPB really 
has been, in a sick, sad kind of way.”40 The party’s 2016 plat-
form described the CFPB as “the worst” part of Dodd-Frank and 
alleged that it was “deliberately designed to be a rogue agency.” 
The platform continued, “Its Director has dictatorial powers 
unique in the American Republic.”41 Given this background, it 
was ominous for the continued effectiveness of the CFPB that the 
person who took over these “powers” from Cordray was Mick 
Mulvaney. Cordray did protest that his chief of staff, Leandra 
English, be acting director until a replacement was confi rmed by 
the Senate, but President Trump nominated Mulvaney, then the 
director of the Offi ce of Management and Budget, to that role and 
it was the President’s wishes that prevailed.
Yet, the Trump administration did not move to abolish the CFPB, 
rather under Mulvaney its activities were signifi cantly curtailed. 
One example of this came when the Bureau dropped an ongoing 
legal case known as Golden Valley. The biggest single source of the 
complaints that CFPB received were in fact about debt collectors, 
but some of its most high-profi le work under Cordray had been its 
pursuit of payday loan companies. Golden Valley, along with three 
other lenders, claimed to be incorporated on an Indian reservation 
in California, even though their operations were run online with a 
base in a call center in Kansas. The claim to be based on a reserva-
tion was important as it meant the company was not bound by state 
rules, allowing Golden Valley to charge extremely high interest rates 
that were banned in some states. The case, which was opened in 
spring 2017 after many months of investigation, was dropped with 
minimal explanation shortly after Mulvaney took over running the 
CFPB.42 A study by the Washington Post found that in the year after 
Mulvaney assumed control of the agency: “Publicly announced 
enforcement actions by the bureau have dropped about 75 percent 
from average in recent years, while consumer complaints have risen 
to new highs.”43
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As he staffed the senior positions of the CFPB with appointees 
whose previous experience was in working and advocating for 
the fi nancial sector, Mulvaney explained the changed philoso-
phy from the Obama–Cordray regime in an email to the agen-
cy’s staff: “We don’t just work for the government, we work for 
the people. . . . And that means everyone: those who use credit 
cards, and those who provide those cards; those who take loans, 
and those who make them.”44 Mulvaney’s argument was that the 
CFPB had over-reached its authority under Cordray and it was 
the case that courts had blocked some of the bureau’s investiga-
tions. Cordray himself explained that he encouraged a mentality 
amongst the agency’s staff that they should push the boundaries 
of their authority: “I’ve never had any qualms about telling our 
people, if we have a case involving things people really shouldn’t 
have been doing, bring the case, right the wrong, and if a judge 
tells us we can’t, fi ne.”45 In another message to the Bureau’s staff 
Mulvaney made clear that this strategy was no longer going to 
prevail: “I intend to execute the statutory mandate of the bureau 
to protect consumers. . . . But we will no longer go beyond 
that mandate.”46 The approach taken under Mulvaney did see 
some open rebellion from CFPB staff who had worked under 
the Cordray regime. Most notably, Seth Frotman, the student 
loan ombudsman, resigned from his post. His resignation letter 
maintained that the CFPB had “abandoned its duty to fairly and 
robustly enforce the law.” Moreover, he explicitly condemned 
Mulvaney’s role in diminishing the agency: “Unfortunately, under 
your leadership, the Bureau has abandoned the very consumers 
it is tasked by Congress with protecting,” it read. “Instead, you 
have used the Bureau to serve the wishes of the most powerful 
fi nancial companies in America.”47
In December 2018 Kathy Kraninger, who had worked under 
Mulvaney at the OMB, was confi rmed by the Senate, over the 
protests of Democrats and consumder advocacy organizations, 
in a 50–49 vote to take over the role of CFPB director.48 In her 
fi rst public speech in her new role Kraninger indicated that she 
would be following Mulvaney’s model of governance as director 
rather than Cordray’s. She emphasized that the CFPB should not 
be judged according to its enforcement actions: “All too often, 
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agencies tend to judge themselves on their outputs. For example, 
how many complaints did they handle, how many cases did they 
bring, how much money did they recover?” Rather, she refl ected, 
it was better to encourage a culture of good behavior amongst 
fi nancial institutions before the event than to challenge them after-
wards for poor behavior.49 Critics, however, might note that there 
was little previous evidence of such a culture of self-improvement 
emerging amongst those fi nancial institutions accused of exploit-
ing the needs of economically vulnerable households.50
Overall, therefore, the story of the creation and institutional 
growth of the CFBP as what we have labeled as “hard legacy” 
during the Obama presidency and the subsequent effort to roll it 
back during the Trump era is an important and interesting one. 
When Obama left offi ce, the CFBP was an agency with both a 
bark and a bite. By the time that Mick Mulvaney moved on to 
become President Trump’s chief of staff after a year as director of 
the agency, its voice was quiet and its fang teeth blunted. Yet, this 
was done through an administrative putsch rather than a legisla-
tive reversal of Dodd-Frank. So while Mulvaney and Kraninger 
diminished the mission of the CFBP as compared to that envi-
sioned by Cordray and Warren, the agency will continue to oper-
ate. In this context this Obama legacy might be temporarily rather 
than permanently moribund, with a future change in leadership 
possibly reinvigorating its appetite for chasing fi nancial rodents. 
Ironically, however, a future Democrat administration and Con-
gress may come to regret the safeguards put in place to protect the 
director’s position should a Trump appointee remain in place, as 
Kraninger is scheduled to do until the end of 2023.
LGBT+ rights
The evolution of gay rights in the US is one of many strands of the 
nation’s wider civil rights struggle. If certain periods are defi ned 
by particular moments of social progress, as the 1960s were by 
African American and women’s rights, then the second decade of 
the twenty-fi rst century was the time when LGBT+ rights fl our-
ished, even if that was not apparent in the opening decade of the 
millennium. Throughout the Bush presidency, the conventional 
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wisdom held that the issue of same-sex marriage in particular was 
a wedge issue that played to the political benefi t of the GOP. Two 
data points were deemed to provide illustration of this. Firstly, 
Republicans were largely united in their opposition to same-sex 
marriage, while the Democratic Party was deeply divided over the 
issue. Secondly, polls showed majorities of the public opposed to 
same-sex marriage. In 2004, polling by the Pew Research Center 
found Americans expressing disapproval of same-sex marriage by 
very nearly a two to one margin.51
Moreover, the notion that same-sex marriage was a winning 
issue for Republicans was strongly reinforced by the events of the 
2004 presidential election cycle. Conservative activists had man-
aged to place initiatives or referendum questions, which effectively 
banned same-sex marriage, on the ballot in eleven states to be 
decided on the same day as the presidential election. In all those 
states the measures were passed and much breathless reporting 
in the days after the election suggested that the issue had boosted 
conservative turnout, helping push Bush over the winning line. 
The Democrat candidate, Massachusetts senator John Kerry, had 
not explicitly supported same-sex marriage but he had been one 
of only fourteen senators to vote against the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA) in 1996. In the immediate aftermath of the elec-
tion former President Bill Clinton, who had signed DOMA in an 
election year despite reservations about doing so, claimed, “the 
gay-marriage issue . . . was an overwhelming factor in the defeat 
of John Kerry.”52 Later analysis questioned just how important 
gay marriage really had been in terms of infl uencing votes in the 
presidential election, but the results of the ballots certainly sug-
gested that promoting same-sex marriage was not a politically 
winning path.53
Yet, by the end of the Obama presidency, that conventional 
wisdom had been turned on its head as same-sex marriage had 
become a constitutional right across the whole country with 
opinion polls showing majority support for that right. In 2015, 
refl ecting a dramatic shift from only ten years earlier, Pew 
reported support for same-sex marriage at 55 percent, compared 
to 39 percent of the population who remained opposed.54 In this 
context, it is perhaps diffi cult to discern whether Obama should 
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be credited with being a leader of events or more a follower. The 
most decisive move came via the Supreme Court in 2015 in the 
case of Obergefell v. Hodges, rather than through legislation or 
executive action, but by that point the President had “evolved” 
to a position of explicit public support for same-sex marriage. 
Moreover, the administration had pushed for legislative action 
to repeal the notorious “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy with 
regard to gays serving in the US military, which had been a com-
pletely unsatisfactory legacy of the Clinton administration. In 
addition, the administration did push for an extension of rights 
for transgender individuals.
Initially, there was little evidence to suggest how dramatically 
opinions and practice were to change under Obama. During the 
2008 campaign, the BarackObama.com website did not make 
explicit reference to supporting gay rights, apart from reference 
to the Employment Non-Discrimination Act and the expansion of 
some hate crime statutes. Whilst these were commendable aims from 
a progressive perspective in themselves, the website did not mention 
the word “gay.”55 A June 2008 CNN/Opinion Research Corpora-
tion poll taken on issue importance for voters put gay and lesbian 
issues at the bottom of the fi fteen-item list. Only 36 percent of those 
polled considered this topic to be extremely or very important. This 
sat in contrast to, for example, the importance of health care or 
education, which 83 percent of those polled considered extremely 
or very important.56 Of those who cited gay rights as an issue of 
importance for them, a majority were McCain supporters. In other 
words, voters who were more likely opposed to the prospect of gay 
marriage tended to prioritize it more highly as a voting item than 
those who were in favor of it.57
Doubtless, Barack Obama had to balance his own views, hopes 
and desires for social change with the demographic and politi-
cal realities that he faced. In the 2008 election, of the 4 percent 
of voters who identifi ed (in exit polls) as gay, 70 percent voted 
for the Democrat candidate.58 Hence, there was a balance to be 
struck between having some appeal to moderately conservative 
voters on the broader question of same-sex rights (for example, 
those who were supportive of gay rights in terms of issues such 
as employment or social discrimination, but not ready to embrace 
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same-sex marriage) while retaining the loyalty of this usually reli-
able, but relatively small, Democratic constituency. Interestingly, 
the Roper Center notes that Obama received less of the gay vote 
in 2008 than the 77 percent that John Kerry had in 2004, though 
the lower profi le of the issue of same-sex marriage in the latter 
election may help explain this difference.59
Obama’s track record on publicly supporting gay marriage 
itself is somewhat patchy, the result, in part at least, of trying to 
toe the line on pushing for progress without moving too far ahead 
of the average Democrat voter. In 2008, 20 percent of those who 
self-identifi ed as conservative in exit polls voted for Obama. This 
was a 4 percent increase on Kerry in 2004 and so there was some-
thing of a balancing act needed to keep this wider constituency on 
board. Even as late as spring 2008, Obama was publicly drawing 
a distinction between his support for civil partnerships and fed-
eral rights for LGBT+ individuals. Both Obama and Biden made it 
clear on the campaign trail the fi rst time around that support for 
gay marriage was not on their to-do list.60 This wasn’t particularly 
surprising, as both men spoke publicly about their Christian faith 
and were up against a popular religious Republican opponent and 
his out-and-proud Evangelical running mate. At this time, only a 
small proportion of states had gay marriage legislation in place 
and it was just a few years since Lawrence v. Texas (2003) had 
struck down the same-sex sodomy law in Texas and elsewhere as 
unconstitutional.61
Yet, during his fi rst term President Obama did edge toward a 
more supportive stance over same-sex marriage and his adminis-
tration took a number of steps to promote same-sex rights more 
broadly. There were a number of key moments, particularly in 
2010–11, when the President spoke publicly about the evolution 
of his own refl ections on gay marriage. He declared that it was 
“something that I think a lot about.”62 Then in May 2012, only 
six months before the 2012 election, he said in interview, “I’ve just 
concluded that—for me personally, it is important for me to go 
ahead and affi rm that—I think same-sex couples should be able to 
get married.”63 At that particular point Obama’s hand had been 
somewhat forced by the manner in which Vice President Biden 
had publicly stated his support for gay marriage on an episode 
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of Meet the Press. After Biden’s announcement there was little 
chance for Obama to continue to obfuscate, though there was 
reporting that some White House aides were frustrated that Biden 
had so unequivocally pushed the matter to the top of the news 
agenda. For his part, Obama commented that Biden’s actions had 
led him to fast-forward his own public statement, but that it did 
refl ect his changed view. He added that the election-year timing 
was hardly opportunistic, since it would “be hard to argue that 
somehow this is something that I’d be doing for political advan-
tage. Because frankly, you know, the politics—it’s not clear how 
they cut.”64
If his “evolution” on gay marriage specifi cally had been some-
what delayed, and perhaps conveniently timed to coincide with 
shifts in public opinion, during his second term President Obama 
did take a more decisive leadership role on LGBT+ issues. More 
broadly, the legacy of his time in offi ce on LGBT+ rights can quite 
literally be described as monumental. Even in its fi rst term the 
administration pushed through a series of important initiatives. 
Most visibly it had revisited the legacy of the last Democrat in the 
White House. Firstly, Clinton’s pledge to allow gay and lesbian 
individuals to serve openly in the US military was fi nally fulfi lled 
as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was repealed via legislation in the lame 
duck session of Congress in December 2010. This was passed 
largely on a party line vote, but with a handful of Republican votes 
giving it an appearance of bipartisanship.65 Secondly, the Obama 
administration argued that the 1996 DOMA, signed by President 
Clinton after passage by hefty majorities in both chambers of Con-
gress, violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment 
and, in February 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder announced 
that the Justice Department would no longer uphold the consti-
tutionality of Section 3 in the Windsor case. This decision should 
be understood not just in terms of its political ramifi cations, but 
also its legal ones. The failure of the executive to defend a statute 
passed by Congress in the courts was not unprecedented, but it 
was highly unusual.66 Subsequently, in the landmark US v. Windsor 
(2013) case, the Supreme Court reached a 5–4 decision that section 
3 of DOMA was unconstitutional under the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.67
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Prior to those actions, in October 2009 Obama had signed 
the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act into law. This bill, which made crimes motivated by animus 
toward people according to their gender, gender identity, sexual 
orientation or disability a federal hate crime, had been stymied in 
Congress a number of times during the Bush years, with the Bush 
administration threatening a potential veto should it reach his 
desk. In contrast, Obama and his attorney general, Eric Holder, 
made clear their desire to see the bill become law. Further, Sec-
tion 1557 of the ACA prohibited any health provider or health 
plan or related entity that was in receipt of federal funding from 
discriminating on the basis of race, age, national origin, disabil-
ity or gender. The administration was clear that gender included 
protections against discrimination on the basis of an individu-
al’s gender identity or on the basis of sexual stereotypes. This 
was codifi ed by a fi nal rule in 2016 that protected gay, lesbian 
and transgender individuals from discrimination in health insur-
ance and care and did not offer a religious exemption.68 In 2012 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
issued the Equal Access Rule, forbidding discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity across HUD’s 
housing programs. In 2016 this was amended to clarify that the 
rule applied to multi-occupancy emergency shelters with shared 
living space.69
Continuing this pattern of incrementally extending LGBT+ 
rights through executive action, in July 2014 President Obama 
issued Executive Order 13672, which implemented safeguards to 
ensure that federal contractors have guarantees against discrimi-
nation on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Here Obama built on and extended the actions of his predeces-
sors, specifi cally President Johnson’s 1965 Order 11246, which 
punished discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex 
or national origin.70 It also chimed with later Order 11478 from 
Richard Nixon in 1969, which added disability and age, and Bill 
Clinton’s 1998 Order 13087, which included sexual orientation.71 
Unsurprisingly, a request was made to the President from 160 faith 
group representatives who asked for religious organizations to be 
exempt from the EO provision.72 In June 2016 Obama designated 
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the creation of the Stonewall National Monument to gay rights, 
the fi rst of its kind in the country.73
As noted, however, the most dramatic expansion of same-sex 
rights came as a result of judicial action in the summer of 2015 
when the Supreme Court, by a 5–4 majority, effectively ruled that 
there was a constitutional right to gay marriage. Clearly, there-
fore, this cannot be seen as a legacy refl ecting the use of presi-
dential power, beyond the fact that Obama’s two nominees to the 
court were part of that majority opinion, but the administration 
had fi led a supportive amicus brief in the case, just as had been 
the case in 2013 when it had supported the move to roll back 
California’s Proposition 8.74 In welcoming the Court’s decision, 
Obama explicitly linked this “victory for America” to the various 
moves that the administration had previously made to expand 
same-sex rights:
This decision affi rms what millions of Americans already believe in 
their hearts: When all Americans are treated as equal we are all more 
free.
My administration has been guided by that idea. It’s why we 
stopped defending the so-called Defense of Marriage Act, and why 
we were pleased when the Court fi nally struck down a central provi-
sion of that discriminatory law. It’s why we ended “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell.” From extending full marital benefi ts to federal employees 
and their spouses, to expanding hospital visitation rights for LGBT 
patients and their loved ones, we’ve made real progress in advancing 
equality for LGBT Americans in ways that were unimaginable not 
too long ago.75
In October 2015, in response to Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
Treasury Department moved to ensure that same-sex spouses 
would be treated the same by law for tax purposes.76 In addition, 
the Social Security Administration took steps to bring entitlement 
for same-sex spouses into line with those for heterosexual mar-
riages. This included health benefi ts.77
It is clear that the prioritization of LGBT+ rights grew expo-
nentially during the Obama years, and not only via the message 
emanating from the White House. Like many other “culture 
wars” issues it gained traction over time, and change came via 
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legislative, judicial and executive avenues. In addition, the issue 
demonstrated how civil rights progress can come from below, at a 
local and state level, and infl uence the federal agenda.78
President Trump on LGBT+ issues
Early on the 2016 campaign trail, anyone trying to second-guess 
the approach candidate Trump would take toward LGBT+ issues 
would have drawn a blank. Historically, the New York billionaire 
did not present as a social conservative. No bastion of progressive 
thinking in his business and entertainment life, nonetheless com-
ments that he made over time as a private individual were captured 
that suggested that he was, at least, not on the same page as his 
more religious GOP rivals. In a 2016 campaign documentary, The 
Choice, creator Michael Kirk argued that in his pre-political life 
Trump had divided the world into “winners and losers,” based on 
their capacity to perform and succeed. Their sexual orientation, in 
Kirk’s view, was irrelevant to him.79 When running against deeply 
conservative Republican opponents in the primaries, candidate 
Trump appeared at the very least neutral on issues pertaining to 
gay rights. The New York Times reminded readers that not only 
was Mar-a-Lago the fi rst private club in the US to admit openly 
gay members, but the president of the pro-gay-rights Log Cabin 
Republicans stated that Trump would be “the most gay-friendly 
Republican nominee for president ever.”80 That was a low bar, but 
the daylight on this issue between the former reality television star 
and, for example, Ted Cruz or Rick Santorum, was clear.
Asked in 2011 about his thoughts on gay marriage, Trump 
responded that his opinion on the matter “was not fully formed.”81 
This was clearly not in line with the traditional GOP position, 
which states that marriage should be between one man and one 
woman.82 Nor did he line up with his fellow GOP candidates for 
the 2016 nomination. Ted Cruz, for example, spoke repeatedly 
about his opposition to gay marriage and his desire to respond 
to the Supreme Court ruling on the matter with a constitutional 
amendment.83
Trump may not have overtly supported marriage equality but 
repeatedly stated that in his opinion, the matter was “already 
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settled.” As president-elect, he told NBC News, “I’m fi ne with 
that.”84 However, gay rights campaigners were more concerned 
about the position of Vice President Pence. Whilst gay marriage 
itself may not have been directly under threat, individual states, 
including Pence’s Indiana, implemented religious freedom bills. 
Barney Frank and others feared that such legislation could be 
used to undermine LGBT+ rights. In the case of Indiana, the 
2015 Religious Freedom Restoration Act signed by Pence was 
met, predictably, with conservative evangelical support and lib-
eral protest.85 The latter included high-profi le organizations and 
individuals such as the (Republican) mayor of Indianapolis and 
Apple CEO Tim Cook. One week later, a subsequent RFRA bill 
was signed, with the intention of offering protection to LGBT+ 
citizens.86 Pence’s Christian Evangelical supporters were deeply 
unimpressed at the move, with one conservative radio host 
declaring that “it was the worst we’ve ever been stabbed in the 
back by a Republican.”87
On the campaign trails, the hot-button issue of public bath-
room use became, momentarily at least, as much of a yardstick 
of voter political affi liation as abortion rights. In April 2016, 
Trump caused surprise by stating in an NBC interview that stu-
dents should use the bathroom they felt most comfortable with, 
including those using the facilities at Trump Tower.88 Again, this 
was far from the GOP party line, and in direct contradiction to 
the ruling in North Carolina on the matter by a Republican gov-
ernor.89 It was clear that Trump’s area of passion and interest 
were far removed from issues around gender and toilets. It is 
reasonable to assume that he did not care. Trump’s attitude was 
grist for the in-party opposition mill, with Ted Cruz accusing him 
of embracing political correctness and sounding like Obama and 
Clinton.90 Even the New York Times was producing articles on 
Trump as the could-be-worse candidate on gay rights.91 Notably, 
in his acceptance speech at the GOP convention, Trump explic-
itly spoke of the terrorist attack at a nightclub in Orlando a few 
weeks earlier as an attack on the LGBT+ community and insisted 
that he would do all he could to protect “our LGBTQ citizens” 
from similar violence. When the convention crowd applauded 
he added, if somewhat incongruously given the subject matter, 
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“I have to say as a Republican it is so nice to hear you cheering 
for what I just said.”92
Nevertheless, on election day in 2016, as was the case in 2004, 
77 percent of the gay vote went to the Democrat candidate. On 
taking offi ce, Trump did not immediately change his agenda or 
rhetoric on LGBT+ issues, yet he won with a majority of the Prot-
estant and Catholic vote (56 percent and 50 percent respectively) 
and his appeal to more conservative religious voters was doubt-
less strengthened by the overt religiosity of his vice president.93
As it is, the Obama-era legacy on same-sex rights has largely 
been maintained, at least in law if not in its progressive spirit. 
Counter-factual speculation has limited value, but a President 
Ted Cruz might have been more explicit in supporting efforts 
to fi nd ways around the Obergefell decision. The administration 
did, however, side with Colorado baker Jack Phillips, who had 
refused to bake a same-sex couple a wedding cake. The Colo-
rado Civil Rights Commission had found against Phillips, but the 
Supreme Court ruled in his favor. White House Press Secretary 
Sarah Sanders announced that the administration was “pleased” 
with the decision after Solicitor General Neal Francisco had 
argued on Phillips’ behalf before the Court.94 Importantly, how-
ever, the Court in fact issued a limited ruling based on the actions 
of Colorado offi cials that created only limited precedent for 
future similar confrontations.
The Obama legacy with regard to transgender rights came 
under more direct attack from the Trump administration. In 
February 2017, the Justice Department dropped its support 
for Obama-era protection of transgender students. The rul-
ing had been instigated during the Obama years in an effort 
to prevent bullying of transgender children. In May 2016, the 
Departments of Justice and Education moved to allow students 
to use bathrooms that corresponded with their gender identity. 
Offi cials in twelve states had vowed to sue the Obama admin-
istration in relation to the bathroom issue. A federal judge in 
Texas ruled to initiate a nationwide injunction on the Obama 
initiative. The day that Jeff Sessions was sworn in, the Justice 
Department withdrew its Obama-era appeal, so as it could “best 
decide” how to proceed with the lawsuit. A few weeks later, the 
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Trump administration withdrew the guidelines entirely. This is 
not a wholesale reversal of Obama’s policy, but clearly a depar-
ture from the path and intention of his predecessor.95 President 
Trump signed an executive action re bathrooms and stated that 
in his opinion, the bathroom issue, like many others, “should be 
decided at state level.” The move met with predictable responses 
from progressives and conservatives. The issue directly affected 
approximately 0.6 percent of the population.96 Despite its nar-
row reach, it had exponential political signifi cance. LGBT+ 
advocates saw the order as a threat to civil rights, whilst conser-
vatives applauded it as a move away from what they perceived 
as Barack Obama’s radical social agenda.
In other moves, mostly below the public radar, the administra-
tion sought to reverse protections for the most vulnerable trans-
gender individuals put in place by the Obama administration. For 
example, in spring of 2019, HUD Secretary Ben Carson proposed a 
rule that would undo some of the intent of the 2012 Equal Access 
Rule. The proposed change would allow homeless shelters to turn 
individuals away on religious grounds and to force transgender 
women to sleep in male quarters.97 Similarly, in May 2019, HHS 
proposed a rule to diminish the protections for transgender people 
under Section 1557 of the ACA. Arguing that the Obama-era rule 
imposed unnecessary regulatory costs, Trump’s HHS sought to 
water down language prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of 
gender identity.98
Conclusion
In this chapter we have looked at what might be thought of as 
some of the most embedded aspects of the Obama legacy. This 
does not refer so much to the amount of time they had been in 
place—by defi nition they were all recent in a historical context—
as to the means by which they had been put in place. The ACA 
and CFPB were the result of legislative action and built on exist-
ing institutions or established new ones to implement their intent 
and by 2017, despite many frustrations in the case of the ACA, 
the consequences of those intentions were evident in both cases. 
Yet, as Patashnik and Zelizer note, new reforms remain at risk in 
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the early stages of their development—especially if they were leg-
islated in a highly partisan fashion as were both the ACA and the 
Dodd-Frank fi nancial reform, which incorporated the creation of 
the CFPB.99
Hence, ACA advocates had reason to be fearful when President 
Trump entered offi ce accompanied by Republican majorities in 
Congress. Furthermore, even without a fi libuster-proof majority 
in the Senate, Republicans could use the “reconciliation” process 
to bring about the end of the ACA. As events unfolded, however, 
it turned out that the complexity of the ACA, which had made 
so many of its benefi ts opaque even to benefi ciaries, helped save 
the law. The White House and congressional Republican efforts 
to repeal the law were stymied as the law proved impossible to 
pull apart without leaving some very clear losers in the process. 
Hence the ACA did remain a substantive legacy of the Obama 
era in a manner that its advocates must have feared would not 
be the case in January 2017, even as the politics and policy sur-
rounding the law remained contested. The continuing confl ict was 
illustrated by ongoing legal actions in mid-2019. One case, Texas 
v. Azar, supported by eighteen state attorneys general and the 
Trump administration, would effectively declare the ACA to be 
unconstitutional because of the way the 2017 TCJA had reduced 
the penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate to 
$0. Though initially regarded as a weak legal argument, this chal-
lenge to the ACA gained momentum after a ruling in its favor by 
a district court judge allowed it to move further up the judicial 
system.100 In other cases, ACA advocates themselves turned to 
the courts to challenge the legitimacy of waivers granted by the 
Trump administration that allowed states to apply work require-
ments to the Medicaid expansion.101
The CFPB also remained alive, but compared to the aggressive 
and interventionist agency that had evolved under the leadership 
of Richard Cordray, by the end of 2018 it had a more zombie-like 
existence. In his analysis of Mick Mulvaney’s reign at the CFPB, 
New York Times journalist Nick Confessore wrote:
Mulvaney’s careful campaign of deconstruction offers a case 
study in the Trump administration’s approach to transforming 
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Washington, one in which strategic neglect and bureaucratic self-
sabotage create versions of agencies that seem to run contrary to 
their basic premises.102
In this context, a future Democratic administration might revivify 
the CFPB and give life to its fangs. Thus this is not a legacy lost 
but one placed on hold, its future fate to be decided.
The Trump administration did not directly try to roll back 
the major expansion of same-sex rights extended by the Supreme 
Court in summer of 2015, but it clearly reversed the direction of 
travel with regard to LGBT+ rights more widely. The manner in 
which the Trump White House had come to rely on the evangeli-
cal wing of the conservative movement and the manner in which 
that appreciation was reciprocated was illustrated as early as 
May 2017 when Johnnie Moore, former vice president of private 
evangelical Liberty University, tweeted: “evangelicals feel right at 
home in the @White House.” This came after Trump had signed 
the Religious Liberty Executive Order.103 It begins by mapping out 
the constitutional legitimacy for the order, and some detail (in six 
sections) of how and why it will occur. There are two key aspects 
to the Order: It instructs the Internal Revenue Service to “not take 
any adverse action against any individual, house of worship, or 
other religious organization” that endorses or opposes candidates 
from the pulpit. Prior to the Order, churches were forbidden from 
directly supporting or opposing a political candidate, and doing so 
would threaten their tax-exempt status. In addition, it instructs the 
Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services 
to consider amending regulations in the Affordable Care Act that 
require most employers to cover contraception in employee insur-
ance plans.104 On the day of the signing, Trump declared, “We are 
giving churches their voices back.”105
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An uncertain “soft” legacy, under fi re
There were areas where the Obama administration’s legacy fell 
short of its bold aims, most notably in relation to the climate 
crisis and immigration. In addition, ambitions to promote free 
trade were only partially fulfi lled. Importantly in the cases of the 
climate crisis and immigration the administration’s attempts to 
push legislative efforts failed even when Democrats controlled 
both chambers of Congress. Immigration reform did later see a 
successful bipartisan, and comprehensive, measure in the Sen-
ate that gathered 68 votes, but the feeling that there was also a 
majority in the House to support reform was never put to the 
test. Speaker John Boehner was not going to let his caucus divide 
so publicly on such a high-profi le issue. The chance of a serious 
legislative effort on climate change effectively ended when the 
GOP took control of the House. Hence, Obama’s attempts at 
legacy-building in these two areas primarily relied on executive 
actions. While falling short of the ambitions expressed in the leg-
islative efforts, these moves, notably the Clean Power Plan (CPP), 
Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA), were of real potential 
signifi cance. That potential, however, was never fully realized as 
the courts stepped in to prevent and delay the implementation of 
the CPP and DAPA even before the Trump administration got its 
chance to reverse them.
The politics surrounding trade policy was even more confusing, 
partially because it was one area where the prevailing high levels 
of partisan polarization broke down somewhat. In particular, as, 
toward the end of his time in offi ce, Obama worked to negoti-
ate the Trans Pacifi c Partnership trade agreement—which was a 
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major multilateral deal involving twelve countries—it looked to 
congressional Republicans as much as to Democrats for support 
in Congress. In the end, the administration did manage to get 
Congress to renew Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) that would 
have given the TPP the chance of an up or down vote in Con-
gress, but the deal itself was never put before Congress for that 
vote while Obama was in offi ce. To further confuse the picture, 
the new Republican president rebuked his party’s positioning 
as the pro-free-trade faction in American politics and promptly 
withdrew the US from the TPP. Hence this chapter will focus on 
Obama’s limited achievements in the areas of climate, immigra-
tion, and trade, looking at the institutional obstacles that blocked 
more radical change and the extent of Trump’s fi erce repudiation 
of the diminished legacy that was put in place.
Climate change policy
The conservation movement in fact dates back over a century 
in US history, but its modern form emerged and gained notable 
traction from the 1960s onwards, specifi cally in relation to air, 
water, soil, and concerns relating to the nation’s nuclear capacity. 
In recent decades, the topic has gone through a number of labeling 
incarnations: discussion of “conservation” and “the environment” 
evolved more recently to focus specifi cally on global warming and 
then climate change as the science increasingly pointed toward a 
man-made crisis.
On the campaign trail, Barack Obama shared his plans for the 
promotion of a “green economy.” This framing of climate change 
in direct connection with the nation’s wealth clearly demonstrated 
his awareness that if these issues were presented as mutually 
exclusive, enthusiasm for his plans would be limited to certain 
sections of the voting population. Relying on support only from 
environmentalists and organic food advocates was not a guaran-
teed path to the Oval Offi ce. Hence, his message was a twofold 
one, promoting the urgency of the green agenda and its benefi t 
to the economy. In October 2008, Obama told Time magazine’s 
Joe Klein that an “Apollo project” for a new energy economy 
was his “top priority.”1 This was a relief to those climate activists 
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who had watched with concern throughout the Bush years as 
that administration failed to prioritize climate change. The 43rd 
president had nailed his environmental colors to the mast weeks 
after he took offi ce in 2001, by announcing his refusal to adhere 
to the Kyoto Protocol.2 Instead, Bush had presented an alterna-
tive emissions reduction plan, which would tie greenhouse gas 
and economic output together. Critics rejected the plans as a “do 
nothing” solution to a serious and growing problem, and the 
administration faced claims of allowing its friends in business to 
get away with little or no regulation.3
As the decade progressed, climate change became an increas-
ingly partisan issue, with many conservatives fi rmly and publicly 
rejecting any connection between changing world temperature and 
weather patterns, and human activity. In addition, the percentage 
of Americans polled who stated that they would prioritize envi-
ronmental considerations over economic growth dropped notice-
ably during the Bush years, after reaching highs of more than 70 
percent in the 1990s. Around the time that Obama was on the 
campaign trail promoting a green economy for the future, public 
opinion polling showed support for prioritizing the environment 
was little more than 50 percent.4 Nevertheless, during the 2008 
campaign the Obama-Biden Energy Plan for America laid out 
a series of ambitious objectives, including creating “fi ve million 
new jobs by strategically investing $150 billion over the next ten 
years to catalyze private efforts to build a clean energy future” and 
introducing “an economy-wide cap-and-trade program to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent by 2050.”5
Whilst the Energy Plan was well received in expected quar-
ters, and Obama was welcomed as the fi rst green president, Team 
Obama had to contend with an American economy in cardiac 
arrest just at a time when they were envisaging health care reform 
and green economy promotion among their expenditure priori-
ties. Subsequently, fi nding $150 billion for long-term clean energy 
plans seemed a low priority to taxpayers facing bank bailouts 
and emergency economic recovery plans. The American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act did contain an “Energy Effi ciency and 
Renewable Energy Research and Investment” section with a price 
tag of $27 billion. Nonetheless, the public swiftly re-prioritized 
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the economy over the environment, and the administration was 
obliged to consider a recalibration of its concerns accordingly.6
Despite this, the new administration maintained its promotion 
of green-collar jobs as a key component of economic recovery. 
This message was crafted to offer a double appeal both to blue-
collar and green voters. President Obama touched on the issue in 
his 2009 inaugural address, and more forcefully in his Earth Day 
speech three months later. In this, he called on American gov-
ernment, business and citizens to take a progressive approach, to 
move toward clean energy and increase effi ciency.7
As ever, however, making this happen was more problematic 
than expressing the hope that it would happen. Writing in 2012, 
John Berg mapped out three institutional channels for action on 
climate change faced by the Obama administration. Firstly, there 
was a binding international agreement option through the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
which the US was still a part of despite having not ratifi ed the 
Kyoto Protocol. Secondly, the President could reach out to Con-
gress with a view to passing greenhouse-gas-reducing legislation. 
The third option was via the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), which could regulate carbon emissions as pollutants.8 
Before long it was apparent that options one and two were prob-
lematic. The 2009 United Nations UNFCCC meeting in Copen-
hagen generated a lot of pre-summit excitement but brought 
about only a rather toothless accord, whereby nations signed up 
to reducing emissions as they saw fi t.9
The legislative route did show some initial promise. The 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 got off to a 
hopeful start in the House of Representatives, with that chamber 
approving the bill by a majority of 219 to 212 in June 2009.10 
The bill did not satisfy all activists, particularly as it relied on 
market-based mechanisms to control the cost of carbon and the 
distribution of future emissions. Although it received strong sup-
port from some environmental groups, other high-profi le NGOs 
such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth criticized the 2009 
Act for not going far enough. That narrative was refl ected in the 
House of Representatives, with more conservative-minded Dem-
ocrats unwilling to sign up to it and those with a strong green 
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agenda disappointed by the watering down that came in the form 
of 400 amendments. Yet with Speaker Nancy Pelosi aggressively 
whipping to get the bill through and the White House pitching in 
to convince wavering members, the “vote marked the fi rst time 
either chamber had passed a bill to address climate change.”11
At this point it looked as if the administration might have found 
a formula for “capitalizing on conservative ideas to achieve lib-
eral policy goals.”12 Still, it was ominous for the bill’s supporters 
that forty-four House Democrats had voted against passage (with 
eight Republicans in support); and the legislative route through 
the Senate was always likely to be even more diffi cult to navigate, 
with Democrats from states heavily reliant on coal for their elec-
tricity production, such as Evan Bayh from Indiana, very wary. 
Initial signs that a bipartisan deal might be struck with fi gures 
such as senators John McCain from Arizona and Lindsay Graham 
of South Carolina proved to be misleading as conservative cli-
mate change skepticism hardened. McCain quickly dropped out 
of negotiations as he came under threat of a primary challenge in 
his bid for re-election in 2010, but Graham did work with Senator 
John Kerry of Massachusetts through to April 2010 before the 
effort at compromise fell apart. In June 2010 President Obama 
acknowledged that the Senate process had stalled: “the votes may 
not be there right now, but I intend to fi nd them in the coming 
months.” In his detailed account of these events the journalist 
Ryan Lizza commented, “He never found them, and he didn’t 
appear to be looking very hard.”13 In the end, Capitol Hill offered 
a legislative cul-de-sac. Even though aspects of Obama’s climate 
change agenda progressed in the early “honeymoon” period of his 
administration, using his party’s majority in Congress, his plans 
were largely foiled. The “shellacking” that the Democrats took in 
the 2010 midterm elections ensured that congressional progress 
on this complex and thorny issue ground to a standstill.
Nevertheless, Obama did remain committed to pushing climate 
issues onto the political agenda, though this was mostly delayed 
until after he had won re-election as the Obama campaign agenda 
for 2012 was clearly focused on jobs and economic growth. There 
was little mention of his green agenda the second time round. 
Clearly voters had other priorities, with the percentage listing the 
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environment as “very important” actually declining in the course 
of Obama’s fi rst term.14
Newly liberated from re-election constraints, Obama was in a 
position to move forward with his mandate. In his 2013 inaugural 
address he declared, “our obligations as Americans are not just 
to ourselves, but to all posterity. We will respond to the threat of 
climate change, knowing that the failure to do so would betray 
our children and future generations.”15 In his 2015 State of the 
Union address, he insisted “no challenge—no challenge—poses a 
greater threat to future generations than climate change.”16 Yet, 
that speech came shortly after Republicans had gained a Senate 
majority. As Meg Jacobs notes, this meant that James Inhofe from 
Oklahoma would become chair of the Senate Energy and Envi-
ronment Committee only two years after he had published a book 
titled The Greatest Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy 
Threatens Your Future.17 In the circumstances, it was not surpris-
ing that Obama’s second-term efforts focused more on execu-
tive action and empowering the EPA than on pushing legislation 
through Congress.
The administration did follow up on the rhetoric of the inaugu-
ral by putting forward the 2013 Climate Action Plan. By now the 
focus was very much on the third of Berg’s channels, as the admin-
istration turned to the EPA and its authority to regulate carbon 
emissions as a pollutant in the same way as toxins like mercury 
and arsenic.18 Once again, the President’s launch speech was full of 
eloquent vision. As before, some environmental groups applauded 
loudly, but others rued what they perceived as a too-little-too-late 
approach.19
In retrospect, Obama’s climate change efforts grew as the 
administration years rolled by. Rather than achieving big and fast 
in those heady “new New Deal” days, the 44th president appeared 
to gather environmental steam, particularly during his second 
term. One attempt to establish a signature aspect of Obama’s 
green legacy was the 2015 Clean Power Plan (CPP), aimed at low-
ering the carbon dioxide emissions from power generators by 32 
percent over twenty-fi ve years, bringing levels back to those of 
2005. After two years of preparation, Obama referred to the plan 
as the “single most important step that America has ever made in 
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the fi ght against global climate change.”20 It remained to be seen 
how durable this step actually was. Immediately upon its release, 
the CPP was challenged by twenty-four states’ attorneys general, 
who maintained that it went beyond the EPA’s remit: “The fi nal 
rule is in excess of the agency’s statutory authority, goes beyond 
the bounds set by the United States Constitution, and otherwise is 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance 
with law.”21 In February 2016, by which point twenty-nine states 
along with various industry groups were challenging the legiti-
macy of the CPP, the Supreme Court stepped in to issue a stay 
on the implementation of the CPP, pending a decision by the US 
Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit, where the case 
was being heard. The New York Times reported that the deci-
sion “was unprecedented—the Supreme Court had never before 
granted a request to halt a regulation before review by a federal 
appeals court.”22
Another attempt by the administration to leave a signature 
green legacy was America’s commitment to the Paris Climate 
Change Accord. It was clear before the November 2015 event took 
place that the President intended to circumvent Senate scrutiny 
of the agreement. When asked by a reporter if Congress should 
have access to the protocol, White House spokesman Josh Earnest 
replied, “I think it’s hard to take seriously from some Members 
of Congress who deny the fact that climate change exists, that 
they should have some opportunity to render judgment about a 
climate change agreement.”23
Inevitably, such an admission by the administration brought 
howls of derision from opposing quarters, along with accusations 
of imperial behavior. It was not entirely unusual for a president 
to suggest bypassing the legislature when signing up to a major 
international agreement. Obama was clearly mindful of history 
repeating itself, as the president bringing home a grand interna-
tional vision only for it to be foiled by domestic opposition.24 The 
Paris Agreement targets were signifi cant, yet modest when con-
sidered in the context of the scientifi c evidence underpinning the 
extent of anthropomorphic climate change. Nonetheless, without 
the US on board, there was no doubt that its signifi cance would 
be undermined and the impetus for other big polluters to get on 
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board would inevitably be diminished. The Obama administra-
tion submitted its plan to the UNFCCC in March 2015, outlining 
its emissions target reduction. The goal was to reduce greenhouse 
gas output by 26 percent to 28 percent by 2015.25 A 2015 New 
York Times/CBS poll showed that two-thirds of the US pub-
lic supported their country signing up to a binding agreement. 
Unsurprisingly, opinions were divided along partisan lines.26
Since the rapid growth of the environmental movement in the 
1960s, the Democrats have always appeared to be the major party 
most capable of handling the climate change issue and offering 
appropriate solutions. Research by Forbes magazine have found 
this to be the case since 1971, and especially so in the 2016 elec-
tion, with Hillary Clinton leading in polls on the issue and many 
GOP voters not simply downplaying climate change as an issue, 
but positively hostile to the policy direction of Obama’s green 
economy initiatives.27 It seemed fi tting, then, that only a few 
weeks into his presidency Donald Trump signed Executive Order 
13787 to undo his predecessor’s Clean Power Plan.28
This was one refl ection of Trump’s embrace of climate change 
denialism. His own personal twist, expressed in 2012, was to 
blame the Chinese for perpetuating the “global warming” hoax.29 
In 2016, his campaign trail rhetoric was fi ery and uncompromis-
ing. Trump spoke to and for those who did not believe that cli-
mate change was a priority, or that it was human-made. Two key 
promises of his stump speech were to withdraw America from the 
Paris Climate Accords, and to cancel the nation’s spending to the 
UN for climate-related matters.30
This chimed well with Trump’s “America First” mantra, 
which promoted the needs and priorities of the nation above 
those of the international community. However, climate change 
progress needs collective action in order to succeed, and Trump’s 
position was a major blow to international climate fi nance. Rhe-
torically channeling—consciously or not—a Republican prede-
cessor, his “Contract with the American Voter” included seven 
action plans to protect the nation’s workers. He pledged to act 
within 100 days to “cancel billions in payments to UN climate 
change programs and use the money to fi x America’s water and 
environmental infrastructure.”31
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The US coal industry has been in serious decline for decades, 
and the job losses and social dysfunction that have accompanied 
this have brought profound challenges to communities that his-
torically depended on mining and associated employment. More 
than two-thirds of industry jobs have disappeared since the 
1980s.32 After eight years of perceiving a liberal president’s “War 
on Coal,” seeing the GOP candidate brandishing placards claim-
ing “Trump Digs Coal” meant that some voters were attracted to 
Trump on the basis of his promises to bring back coal and rein-
vigorate the sector. Trump spoke directly to coal miners, telling 
them to “get ready, because you’re going to be working your asses 
off.”33 The day after the election, coal stock prices soared as their 
green energy counterpart tanked.34
President Trump also promptly withdrew the US from the 
2015 Paris Agreement, joining Syria and Nicaragua as non-
participants.35 His quip, “I was elected to represent the citi-
zens of Pittsburgh, not Paris,” was catnip to blue-collar 
voters concerned about their jobs and the wider economy.36 
A Forbes magazine headline captured the mainstream media 
mood in response to President Trump’s decision to withdraw 
the US from the agreement. Stating that “America is Offi cially 
the Only Nation on Earth to Reject the Paris Agreement,” it 
pointed out that even North Korea, not known for its adher-
ence to international norms, had signed up.37 The respective 
mayors of Pittsburgh and Paris, meanwhile, co-authored an 
op-ed piece in the New York Times, which noted among other 
commitments that “Pittsburgh is one of nearly 250 cities in 
the United States, representing 56 million Americans, whose 
mayors have committed to honor and uphold the goals of the 
Paris Agreement.”38
This defi ance, however, ran into the hard reality that the 
President set the national agenda and his cabinet picks for the 
key posts related to climate change issues were clear evidence 
that even the incremental moves made by the previous admin-
istration were to be reversed where possible and at least halted 
from making further progress. Trump’s choice for secretary of 
energy was former Texas governor Rick Perry, a man who had 
proposed in his aborted bid for the 2012 GOP nomination that 
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the department should be abolished. Newsweek offered some 
insight into Trump’s selection, describing Texas as “the sort of 
unregulated, small government, tort-reformed, low-tax state 
that provides a model for what the United States would look 
like at the end of a Trump presidency.”39
Meanwhile, over at Woodrow Wilson Plaza, Scott Pruitt was 
appointed as head of the Environmental Protection Agency, despite 
having no formal scientifi c or environmental training. As attor-
ney general of Oklahoma, Pruitt had (unsuccessfully) sued the 
EPA fourteen times; with ties to the oil and gas industries, he was 
known as a vocal critic of Obama’s climate change agenda. Even 
as the World Health Organization warned that global warming 
is “among the greatest health risks of the twenty-fi rst century,” 
Pruitt told CNBC that he did not think that carbon dioxide was 
a primary contributor to global warming.40 In July 2018, when 
Pruitt was forced to step down following numerous allegations of 
unethical behavior, he was replaced by Andrew Wheeler, a former 
lobbyist for the coal industry. Trump’s climate change plans and 
relevant staffi ng choices demonstrate that the US has taken a sig-
nifi cant step away from its previous, if halting, direction during 
the Obama years.
In the summer of 2019 the New York Times reported that the 
Trump administration had, or was in the process of, rolling back 
eighty-three federal environmental protections.41 On the other 
hand, just as the Obama administration found itself stymied by 
the courts, so legal challenges slowed the pace of deregulatory 
change. While acknowledging that the rollback of environmental 
protections was real, the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, 
based at Columbia University, reported in summer 2019: “The 
Trump Administration is losing on climate in the courts. More 
than two and a half years into the Trump Administration, no cli-
mate change-related regulatory rollback brought before the courts 
has yet survived legal challenge.”42 In the early days at least, some 
of these setbacks for the Trump team resulted from sloppy legal 
preparation in the rush to get things done.43
It is also worth noting how liberal states and cities such as 
Pittsburgh could try to exert their power in ways that disrupted 
the deregulatory agenda, bringing opposition to the Trump 
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administration from unexpected quarters. Most signifi cant was 
California with its huge economic clout. An illustration of the 
state’s determination to use that leverage came with efforts to 
improve fuel effi ciency in the auto industry. The Obama admin-
istration had issued a rule saying that cars and trucks needed to 
average 43 miles per gallon by 2025. In an illustration of the 
diffi culty in actually drawing up these regulations, the EPA had 
announced its intent to apply such a rule in 2012, but it was 
not fi nalized until the fi nal week of Obama’s time in offi ce in 
a scramble to get it done before Trump’s arrival in the White 
House. Automakers did not like that proposal, but then they did 
not cheer when the Trump administration removed the imper-
ative for an annual improvement in fuel effi ciency standards. 
This concern for increased effi ciency may not have been purely 
altruistic: Car makers were concerned by the possibility of a seg-
mented US market, as California promised to continue to unilat-
erally enforce the Obama-era standard. The likely lengthy legal 
battle between the federal government and California over the 
latter’s right to enforce its own rules threatened disruption to an 
industry that was also concerned about its image with respect to 
climate change. Hence in April 2018 the Auto Alliance urged the 
EPA to reconsider and lay out new rules, if less stringent than 
those set in January 2017, for demanding continued improve-
ments in fuel effi ciency.44
Furthermore, whilst a climate skeptic in the Oval Offi ce was 
clearly signifi cant, some of America’s most infl uential tech giants, 
Apple, Facebook, Google, IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon, stated 
that they planned to make efforts to meet the Paris Accord require-
ments even without a steer from the federal government.45 By June 
2017, eleven states along with Washington, DC and Puerto Rico 
had joined the United States Climate Alliance (USCA). The USCA 
is one of a number of groups set up in order to ensure that areas, 
cities, and groups within the US maintain adherence to the Paris 
deal.46 So just as Obama had found it diffi cult to engage all the for-
ward gears in his administration’s efforts to act on climate change, 
so also the actions taken by President Trump’s administration did 
not mean that all the ongoing initiatives to pursue a green agenda 
were slammed into reverse.




Throughout the Obama era and the opening years of the Trump 
presidency, the tension between the notion of America as a coun-
try built on an ideology of immigration and the fear of the pre-
vailing culture being under threat by alien people and their values 
was on clear display. This tension took its most crystalized form 
in the debate about how to handle illegal immigration, which 
remained at the forefront of America’s political conversation. 
In a nation of immigrants, the issue of what to do about the 
estimated 11 million individuals residing illegally is a perennial 
bugbear for politicians and voters.47 Most agree that the system 
is defective and something must be done, but there the consensus 
ends. On one side, pro-immigrant advocates call for a path to 
citizenship for “undocumented aliens,” while those opposed to 
them demand rigorous enforcement of the law and deportation 
of “illegal immigrants.” Furthermore, the disagreement is not 
only about what policy should be, but extends to the question of 
which branch of government should set that policy.
In 2016 immigration ranked highly as a key voter issue, along 
with the economy and terrorism.48 Candidate Trump was highly 
adept at honing his campaign message to address those with 
border security concerns, refl ecting that the issue was far from 
resolved despite the Obama administration’s actions. As Obama 
left offi ce, neither the immigrants’ rights groups nor the restric-
tionists were satisfi ed. In fact, Obama’s efforts at immigration 
policy reform had followed a similar trajectory to the administra-
tion’s moves on climate regulation. As legislative moves proved 
largely unproductive and pressure from outside groups for action 
grew, Obama turned increasingly to executive action to achieve 
his objectives, with those actions getting a mixed reception in the 
courts. In the end, Obama’s legacy with regard to immigration 
was an uncertain one both in terms of its message and its lasting 
effect. Trump’s message, by contrast, was unambiguous, although 
translating it into policy would not prove to be so simple.
On August 25, 2008, addressing the Democrat Party Conven-
tion, Barack Obama declared that America’s current immigra-
tion system “has been broken for too long.” When addressing 
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the topic his rhetoric was constructive, including terms such as 
“humane,” “welcoming,” “generous,” and “fair,” though he also 
spoke about the need for the US to be tough and practical in rela-
tion to rolling out comprehensive reform.49 Like his Republican 
opponent, Obama supported the need for improved border secu-
rity. On a number of immigration-related issues, the candidates 
did not differ signifi cantly, but John McCain’s position hardened 
as the campaign progressed, culminating in him distancing him-
self from a bill that he had helped to draft only a year earlier. 
That bill—the 2007 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, 
which would have granted amnesty in some form to millions 
who resided illegally in the US—made little progress despite clear 
support from President Bush.50 This was a manifestation of how 
Republicans, whatever the party leadership might wish, were 
taking a more clearly restrictionist approach, and this was their 
stance in the 2008 campaign. As it was, on election day 2008, 
Obama fared well with the 9 percent of the voting population 
that was Latino: He took 67 percent of the vote, to McCain’s 31 
percent. The youth vote more overtly favored the Democrat, with 
71 percent support. Even in Florida, with its Cuban-American 
population more likely to tilt Republican, Latinos turned out to 
support the Democratic nominee.51
During the campaign Obama had promised that he would 
introduce a comprehensive immigration plan during his fi rst year 
in offi ce. He specifi cally stated: “I cannot guarantee that it’s going 
to be in the fi rst 100 days. But what I can guarantee is that we will 
have in the fi rst year an immigration bill that I strongly support 
and that I’m promoting and that I want to move that forward as 
quickly as possible.”52 Yet the fi rst year passed with no sign of an 
immigration bill. This was partially due to the need to recalibrate 
his policy priorities in order to manage the Great Recession. There 
was some consensus, even among Latinos, that the economy and 
health care reform were higher priorities for the administration 
than immigration reform.
However, if the pressures of the recession could be used to 
explain the delay in a push at comprehensive immigration reform 
including a path to legalization, the early emphasis on enforce-
ment and the levels of deportation were unexpected. Immigration 
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advocates dubbed Obama the “Deporter in Chief” as more than 
2.5 million illegal immigrants were forced via immigration orders 
to leave the US during his time in offi ce.53 It was the case, however, 
that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel were 
directed by Obama to focus more sharply on “felons, not fami-
lies,” and on average, approximately 90 percent of those deported 
in any given year had a criminal record. Specifi cally, gang members 
and lawbreakers were prioritized. Overall, the deportation fi gure 
is higher than the combined number of those deported from the US 
in the twentieth century. For comparison, two million illegal immi-
grants were deported during George W. Bush’s time in offi ce.54 But 
if this record of deportation seems an odd legacy for the admin-
istration, it is important to recognize, as John Skrentny explains, 
that “an enforcement fi rst strategy” was a means to “gain cred-
ibility for legalization.”55
As things turned out, however, that strategy paid no legisla-
tive dividends. There were two points at which it looked as if 
important steps might be taken, but in both cases congressio-
nal institutional fragmentation proved insurmountable. Firstly, 
in the lame duck session of Congress at the end of 2010, the 
House passed the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors Act (DREAM Act), giving legal status to some undocu-
mented immigrants who had arrived in the US as children, by 
a vote of 216 to 198.56 The measure failed in the Senate, how-
ever, when it only gained fi fty-fi ve votes in an effort to beat 
a fi libuster. That number did include three Republicans, so if 
the Democrats had stuck together they could have carried the 
day, but fi ve Democrats voted against the wishes of President 
Obama and the congressional leadership. Republican Senator 
Jeff Sessions from Alabama, well known for his hawkish views 
on immigration, commented: “This bill is a law that at its fun-
damental core is a reward for illegal activity.”57 Few would have 
predicted it at the time, but Sessions was to become President 
Trump’s fi rst attorney general and hence a key fi gure in driving 
immigration policy.
Secondly, in 2013, a bipartisan group of eight senators 
drafted a document with the intention of transforming US 
immigration law.58 Two months later, in June 2013, the Senate 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   90 18/08/20   1:30 PM
an uncertain “soft” legacy, under fi re
91
voted 68–32 in favor of what was described at the time as “the 
most monumental overhaul of US immigration laws in a gen-
eration.” The vote included the support of fourteen Republi-
cans.59 The bill proposed a path to citizenship for many living 
illegally in the US that would take thirteen years, as well as 
stronger border enforcement and measures to deter employers 
from hiring illegal immigrants as workers. At that point there 
was some optimism that something similar could be delivered 
in the House despite it being under Republican control, as it 
seemed likely that there was an overall majority in the chamber 
to proceed with a reform bill. That was not to be the case, how-
ever. Speaker Boehner was willing to contemplate a deal, but 
he did not want the legislation to pass on the basis of a minor-
ity of Republicans allying with nearly all Democrats to form a 
majority in a manner that would violate the so-called “Hastert 
rule.” According to this principle, a majority of the Republican 
majority needed to support a bill before leadership would move 
it to the fl oor.60
The diminishing chance that the Republican majority would 
take up a bill to follow up on Senate action was dealt a severe 
blow in June 2014, when House Majority Leader Eric Cantor lost 
in a primary in his Virginia district to a little-known challenger, 
Dave Brat. If not entirely accurately, “in the post-mortems, the role 
of immigration reform quickly hardened into conventional wis-
dom,” as Cantor had been open to some smaller-scale reforms.61 
Speaking shortly after Cantor’s defeat, President Obama railed 
against what he saw as the GOP’s intransigence and partisan 
game-playing:
Our country and our economy would be stronger today if House 
Republicans had allowed a simple yes-or-no vote on this bill or, for 
that matter, any bill. They’d be following the will of the majority of 
the American people who support reform. Instead, they’ve proven 
again and again that they’re unwilling to stand up to the Tea Party in 
order to do what’s best for the country. And the worst part about it 
is a bunch of them know better.62
These words, however, carried no weight and the Senate bill 
came to nought.
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Obama had in fact turned to executive action prior to the 
failure of the 2013–14 legislative package to get through Con-
gress when he pushed through a version of the DREAM Act 
in 2012. The Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals program 
(DACA) granted a two-year renewable legal status for undocu-
mented immigrants currently under the age of thirty-one,who 
had lived in the US for at least fi ve years, having arrived in the 
US while they were younger than sixteen. They also needed to 
have graduated from high school or served in the military, and 
be free from a criminal record. At the time it was estimated that 
1.5 million might benefi t from DACA.63 Obama’s actions were 
commonly referred to as an “executive order,” but this is mis-
leading, as DACA took the form of a direction to the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security about which groups to prioritize 
for deportation—in short, Obama claimed to be using existing 
powers rather than creating new ones. He also acknowledged: 
“It’s not a permanent fi x. This is a temporary stopgap measure 
that lets us focus our resources wisely while giving a degree of 
relief and hope to talented, driven, patriotic young people.”64 
For critics, this claim carried little weight; they insisted that 
the President had done an unconstitutional end run around 
Congress.65
Conservative anger over DACA, however, was overshadowed 
two years later in November 2014 (shortly after the midterm 
elections), when Obama, frustrated by developments in Congress 
and under increasing pressure from immigrants’ rights activists, 
used executive authority to announce a package labeled Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA). This was a signifi cantly 
more expansive move than DACA, affecting an estimated 5.5 
million people. The Department of Homeland Security described 
how “within the confi nes of the law” the administration had 
identifi ed measures it could implement “to increase border secu-
rity, focus enforcement resources, and ensure accountability in 
our immigration system.”66 In reality it was the second of these 
clauses that was at the heart of the policy, as DAPA declared 
that people who were not priorities for removal—identifi ed as 
those who had entered the US prior to 2014, with no criminal 
record, and had children who were now either citizens or lawful 
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residents—would be allowed to apply for effective temporary 
legal status, including the capacity to work. When laying out his 
reasons for proceeding with DAPA, Obama again lamented how 
the House had stymied reform.
I worked with Congress on a comprehensive fi x, and last year, sixty-
eight Democrats, Republicans, and independents came together to 
pass a bipartisan bill in the Senate. It wasn’t perfect. It was a compro-
mise. But it refl ected common sense. . . .
Had the House of Representatives allowed that kind of bill a 
simple yes-or-no vote, it would have passed with support from both 
parties, and today it would be the law. But for a year and a half 
now, Republican leaders in the House have refused to allow that 
simple vote.
Obama acknowledged that some people had a genuine concern 
about what high levels of immigration might mean for American 
society, but he went on to make what might be described as the 
“moral” case for his actions: “Are we a nation that accepts the 
cruelty of ripping children from their parents’ arms? Or are we 
a nation that values families, and works together to keep them 
together?”67
These words did not assuage his critics and twenty-six 
states, led by Texas, promptly launched legal action to chal-
lenge Obama’s authority to act in this manner. House Speaker 
Boehner had outlined likely Republican opposition in the sum-
mer of 2014 when he insisted that any further executive action 
on immigration after DACA would reinforce Obama’s “legacy 
of lawlessness.”68 Furthermore, Republican opponents pointed 
to the many times that President Obama had himself referred to 
his limited powers to reform the immigration system through 
executive action. For example, when asked in February 2013 
what he could do to prevent families being split apart, Obama 
explained:
[T]his is something I’ve struggled with throughout my presidency. 
The problem is that I’m the president of the United States. I’m not 
the emperor of the United States. My job is to execute laws that are 
passed, and Congress, right now, has not changed what I consider 
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to be a broken immigration system, and what that means is we have 
certain obligations to enforce the laws that are in place, even if we 
think in many cases the results may be tragic.69
Later that year, in September, he rationalized the DACA 
package, but added, “if we start broadening that, then essen-
tially I would be ignoring the law in a way that I feel would 
be very diffi cult to defend legally.”70 As it was, the adminis-
tration maintained that DAPA structured deportation priorities 
and did not offer a permanent path to legalization for illegal 
immigrants, hence staying within the boundaries of presiden-
tial authority. Crucially, however, the courts agreed more with 
Obama’s earlier statements about the limits of his authority 
than with the later attempt to rationalize the administration’s 
actions. First a US District judge in Texas imposed an injunction 
against the implementation of DAPA, with that decision upheld 
by in November 2015 by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Next, the administration appealed to the Supreme Court. After 
an expedited hearing in the case, known as Texas v. United 
States, the Supreme Court effectively sided with Texas after a 
4–4 decision, issued with no explanation of its rationale. Presi-
dent Obama bemoaned the outcome: “I think it is heartbreak-
ing for the millions of immigrants who made their lives here, 
who’ve raised families here, who hope for the opportunity to 
work, pay taxes, serve in our military, and fully contribute to 
this country we all love in an open way.”71
In the end, Obama’s legacy on immigration was mixed. The 
record rate of forced removals from the country did not per-
suade immigration skeptics that his administration could be 
trusted to enforce border protection as part of a comprehensive 
reform package, and in this context internal Republican Party 
dynamics prevented the House from taking up the Senate’s 2013 
bill. The turn to executive action did mean that about 750,000 
people got temporary legal status through DACA; but DAPA, 
which would have benefi ted many more, never came into force. 
As it was, immigration did take center stage in the 2016 elec-
tion, but not in the manner that immigrants’ rights activists 
would have hoped for.
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Of all the colorful campaign rhetoric employed by candi-
date Trump, he sounded more authentic on some topics than 
others—and immigration was one area in which his rhetoric 
seemed real. His message on the issue was clear: too many immi-
grants were detrimental to the country, and in order to Make 
America Great Again, dramatic steps should be taken to tighten 
the nation’s porous borders. This was a key plank of his candi-
dacy from the very moment he announced his bid for the presi-
dency. His startling announcement speech, with its vilifi cation 
of Mexican immigrants, contained a statement of what was to 
become his campaign rallying cry: “I would build a great wall, 
and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me, and I’ll 
build them very inexpensively. I will build a great great wall on 
our southern border and I’ll have Mexico pay for that wall.”72 
His supporters did not seem to mind when he played fast and 
loose with the numbers—for example, claiming in 2016 that 
there were over 30 million illegal immigrants in the country. In 
fact, estimates showed that number had reduced by about one 
million since the economic collapse, which had dissuaded many 
from entering the US.73
Once in offi ce, President Trump moved to implement his 
agenda. It did become quickly evident that Mexico was not 
going to pay for the wall, and the administration then strug-
gled to fi nd the funds. Despite his party having a congressional 
majority, Trump lost the fi rst round of the funding battle. The 
White House request for a starting amount of $1 billion, the 
estimated cost of building one mile of wall, was rejected. None-
theless, the Department of Homeland Security began soliciting 
proposals with the intention to carry out a series of pilot cases 
on the border before proceeding more widely. By 2019, the wall 
had become a major political football between the Democrat-led 
House of Representatives and a president determined not to lose 
face. The resulting confl ict led to the longest government shut-
down in the nation’s history.74
In the aftermath of that stand-off, President Trump declared a 
national emergency and claimed the authority to use other federal 
funds to pay for the wall. Unsurprisingly, Democrats immediately 
responded with accusations that Trump was acting beyond his 
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authority. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California and Senate 
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer from New York issued a state-
ment saying: “The president’s actions clearly violate the Congress’s 
exclusive power of the purse, which our Founders enshrined in 
the Constitution.”75 Furthermore, Congress responded with a 
resolution rebuking this declaration in votes in both chambers 
that included twelve Senate Republicans. In turn, this saw Trump 
issue the fi rst veto of his presidency.76 The battle then moved to 
the courts.
During his opening thirty months in offi ce President Trump 
developed a meme whereby he talked of the Democrats as being 
in favor of “open borders,” tweeting, for example, in June 2016: 
“Too bad the Dems in Congress won’t do anything at all about 
Border Security. They want Open Borders, which means crime. 
But we are getting it done, including building the Wall!” The same 
week he said, “Democrats want Open Borders, which equals 
violent crime, drugs and human traffi cking.”77 For all this fi ery 
language, however, Trump did seem initially uncertain about 
whether to overturn DACA, which was Obama’s most signifi cant 
legacy with regard to providing legal status to undocumented 
immigrants. As Trump entered offi ce, around 700,000 people had 
taken advantage of the temporary protections offered by DACA. 
This number was not as high as the original predictions, but it 
still meant that for many individuals who had come forward to 
the authorities to acknowledge their undocumented status, the 
stakes with regard to the longevity of the program were extremely 
high. Refl ecting his hesitancy, in September 2017 Trump tweeted: 
“Does anybody really want to throw out good, educated and 
accomplished young people who have jobs, some serving in the 
military? Really!”78 Yet, that month the administration moved to 
end the program when pressured by Republican state attorneys 
general to do so.
At this point, though, what should have been a relatively 
straightforward process was undermined by administrative incom-
petence. When revoking the Obama administration’s actions, the 
Department of Homeland Security provided minimal rationale 
for doing so beyond asserting that the original decision to intro-
duce DACA had been unlawful. This left open the possibility that 
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a court might fi nd that DACA had been lawful, and therefore the 
revocation was not lawful. Crucially, if the revocation had been 
accompanied by a policy explanation, the grounds for challenging 
the move would have been considerably reduced. Led by, amongst 
others, the University of California (whose president was former 
Obama Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano), a range 
of plaintiffs argued that the Trump Department of Homeland 
Security action was not based on proper reasoning and would 
cause undue harm. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs. It acknowledged that a 
proper reasoning would have left the Trump administration on 
much fi rmer ground, while questioning “the cruelty and waste-
fulness of deporting productive young people to countries with 
which they have no ties.”79 Thus DACA lived, or perhaps limped, 
on—at least until the Supreme Court heard the case as part of its 
2019–20 docket.
Trade policy
Prior, at least, to the presidency of Donald Trump, trade policy in 
recent decades had become notable for the difference between the 
rhetoric embraced by “out” party presidential candidates and the 
practice of those candidates once they became White House incum-
bents. That is, campaign expressions of skepticism about the ben-
efi ts of trade and declarations about how American workers should 
be protected against unfair competition from abroad gave way 
to executive branch efforts to promote free trade agreements and 
secure congressional authorization for those agreements. Further, 
and again prior to Trump, the tension between campaign protec-
tionism and pro-trade agreement in governance was most evident 
in the Democratic Party, as it was the Democratic base, with labor 
unions to the fore, that most protested new trade deals. For example, 
the fact that NAFTA had been negotiated largely by a Republican 
administration before being assertively pushed toward congressio-
nal ratifi cation by Bill Clinton confused partisan loyalties; but it was 
notable that Clinton ended up with more Republican votes support-
ing his position in both chambers of Congress, despite their then 
Democratic majorities.80
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Certainly, if with important caveats, Obama’s 2008 campaign 
and his subsequent presidency fi t both the patterns outlined above. 
Firstly, his initial criticism of existing trade pacts gave way to the 
promotion of trade agreements from the Oval Offi ce. Secondly, 
even in the highly partisan atmosphere that prevailed through-
out his presidency, on trade it was a case of a Democratic presi-
dent looking to secure Republican congressional votes as much 
as those from his own party. As we will see, Trump undid both 
of these patterns as he carried his campaign skepticism into the 
White House and upended the Republican Party through his deci-
sions, even if his actions in offi ce did not match the extraordinary 
bombast of his campaign promises. Crucially, in the context of 
our study, he rapidly pulled the US out of the embryonic Trans 
Pacifi c Partnership, which had been a signifi cant last-gasp, but 
unconsummated, legacy from the Obama administration.
Throughout his presidential campaigining in 2008, Obama’s 
negative narrative on trade was at its sharpest in the Democratic 
nomination battle with Hillary Clinton. Just prior to the Demo-
cratic primary in Ohio, Obama attacked Clinton for her previous 
support for the NAFTA deal signed by President Bill Clinton.
One million jobs have been lost because of NAFTA, including nearly 
50,000 jobs here in Ohio. And yet, 10 years after NAFTA passed, 
Senator Clinton said it was good for America. Well, I don’t think 
NAFTA has been good for America—and I never have.81
Furthermore, both Obama and Clinton attacked proposed agree-
ments with South Korea and Colombia. Yet, candidate Obama, 
when he thought he was off camera, also expressed his frustration at 
the manner in which free trade policies had become an easy target for 
those Americans disappointed by the loss of manufacturing jobs, and 
at the failure of elites to match their rhetoric about restoring well-
paid work to those communities with effective action. Speaking to 
an audience at a fund-raising event in San Francisco just prior to the 
Pennsylvania primary, he refl ected on how working-class Americans 
had reacted to their economic woes: “[I]t’s not surprising then they 
get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who 
aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment 
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as a way to explain their frustrations.”82 When these comments were 
reported, most of the commentary focused on the disparaging tone in 
which Obama talked of “guns” and “religion,” but the reference to 
understandable, but by implication misguided, anti-trade sentiment 
suggested that the attacks on Clinton over NAFTA were more about 
public theater as a role in the Democratic primary battle than about 
how he viewed the merits of a free trade agenda. And that interpreta-
tion was borne out by Obama’s time in offi ce.
The administration’s record was not unambiguous. For exam-
ple, “in early September 2009, the administration imposed a 
35 percent import fee on certain Chinese low-cost tyres.”83 Leo 
Gerard, President of the United Steelworkers enthusiastically 
welcomed that decision:
The International Trade Commission recommended sanctions under 
“Section 421” four times before Obama took offi ce. Nothing was 
done. The result was closed American factories, lost American man-
ufacturing jobs, diminished American dreams. Not this time though. 
Not this president. Obama showed he’s made of tougher stuff. By 
placing tariffs on imported Chinese tires, President Obama put him-
self in the line of fi re for the jobs of US workers, for the preserva-
tion of US manufacturing and, ultimately, for the stabilization of the 
US economy.84
Furthermore, the administration was aggressive in defending US 
interests before the World Trade Organization, presenting twenty-
fi ve cases for arbitration. Overall, however, it is fair to summarize 
the Obama administration as pursuing a free trade agenda, while 
trying to persuade skeptics within Democratic ranks that trade 
liberalization could be compatible with maintaining labor protec-
tions and improving environmental regulation.
In December 2010 the administration agreed changes to the free 
trade agreement with South Korea that had originally been nego-
tiated by the Bush administration. Similarly, there were tweaks 
to the previously negotiated bilateral agreement with Colombia, 
with both agreements duly ratifi ed by Congress. The White House 
marked these deals with little fanfare, refl ecting the fact that a 
majority of Democrats had voted against their passage.85
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It was the TPP, though, which came to defi ne Obama-era 
trade policy. The administration’s efforts need to be understood 
in the context of the rather fuzzy nature of the balance of power 
between the executive and legislative branches over which of 
them has the higher authority in determining trade policy. The 
Constitution affords the president “the authority to negoti-
ate international agreements, including free trade agreements 
(FTAs), but the Constitution gives Congress sole authority over 
the regulation of foreign commerce and tariffs.”86 Through to 
the 1930s Congress set tariffs, but in the post-war world the 
executive branch became increasingly involved in the negotia-
tion of major trade deals, which would then go to Congress for 
ratifi cation. If this relationship was going to work, it became evi-
dent that Congress would need to vote on any deal in its entirety 
rather than debating and casting votes on any negotiated agree-
ment on a line-by-line basis. Hence, one critical feature of getting 
Congress to ratify free trade agreements was the need for an up 
or down vote on any package—rather than letting Congress pick 
apart a deal, approving some parts but not others in a way that 
would make negotiations with other countries impossible for the 
executive branch. Since 1974, Congress has periodically granted 
the executive authority to negotiate on the basis that any agree-
ment would be subject to a straight vote. This so-called fast track 
or trade promotion authority was renewed in 1979, 1988, and 
2002. Obama’s fi rst battle with regard to TPP was to renew that 
authority once again. Here the normal partisan battle lines were 
redrawn and Obama worked with the congressional Republican 
leadership to secure that authority as most Democrats sought 
ways to block the maneuver.
In fact, in early June 2015 it looked as if the opposition to 
granting TPA had won the day. In a bizarre move, House Dem-
ocrats voted against extending Trade Adjustment Assistance 
(TAA), a program designed to help workers displaced by new 
trade patterns, which liberals and their union allies had come 
to accept as a “consolation prize” that came alongside TPA.87 
This vote against TAA was a parliamentary tactic to prevent a 
bill passing through Congress that Obama could sign. By the 
end of the month, however, as it became clear that the White 
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House and Republican leaders would go ahead with a stand-
alone TPA bill, enough Democrats relented, so allowing TPA and 
TAA to go through. Notably, it was Republicans who provided 
the strongest endorsement of this legislation. For example, the 
chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch of 
Utah, talked of a “critical day for our country” as TPA was “the 
most important bill we’ll do this year.” In contrast, Sander Levin, 
the ranking Democrat member on the House Ways and Means 
Committee, protested the outcome and promised that he would 
“work harder than ever to bring about a real confrontation” on 
trade agreements.88 And, if organized labor had praised Obama 
for his earlier action against China, union leaders were furious 
about the TPP negotiations. At one point, in an effort to stop 
the granting of TPA, the AFL-CIO PAC froze its donations to 
Democratic members of Congress.89 The opposition to TPA did 
gain some concessions; for example, to allow for full transpar-
ency, any trade deals could not be considered by Congress for 
two months after they had been negotiated. As the New York 
Times reported at the time, such a “delay will most likely push 
any consideration of the Pacifi c accord well into the presidential 
election season,” which was likely to be a “diffi cult political envi-
ronment” for debating a major trade package.90 That description 
turned out to be a considerable understatement.
As the negotiations over TPP neared their end in late fall 
2015, Obama tried hard to sell the agreement. He asserted that it 
refl ected “America’s values,” and that it would encourage trade 
while maintaining protections for American workers and the 
environment:
This partnership levels the playing fi eld for our farmers, ranchers, 
and manufacturers by eliminating more than 18,000 taxes that 
various countries put on our products. It includes the strongest 
commitments on labor and the environment of any trade agree-
ment in history, and those commitments are enforceable, unlike in 
past agreements. It promotes a free and open Internet. It strength-
ens our strategic relationships with our partners and allies in a 
region that will be vital to the 21st century. It’s an agreement that 
puts American workers fi rst and will help middle-class families 
get ahead.91
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These arguments, however, were very much running against the 
tide in the electoral sea of 2016. On the Democratic side, as Hillary 
Clinton found herself under challenge from Senator Bernie Sanders 
of Vermont, the pressure grew on her to renounce the deal she had 
previously described as setting “the gold standard in trade agree-
ments to open free, transparent, fair trade, the kind of environment 
that has the rule of law and a level playing fi eld.”92 This statement 
was made during her time as secretary of state in 2012, well before 
the fi nal agreement was reached. At that time it was not predictable 
that four years later she would be competing closely for the nomi-
nation of her own party against perhaps the most left-wing member 
of the Senate, who had a history of skepticism toward international 
trade agreements; to be followed by a general election campaign 
against a Republican who was even more strongly motivated by 
protectionist sentiments. As it was, Obama did keep trying to push 
for a congressional vote on TPP throughout the campaign, but to 
no avail.93 Hence, this agreement, which did include more worker 
and environmental protections than previous iterations of trade 
deals and which might have acted as a bulwark against China’s 
expansive aggressive trade practices, proved to be only the fl imsiest 
of legacies.94
It is unclear how a President Clinton would have treated TPP. 
It seems quite conceivable that she would have walked back 
from her walk back, perhaps after securing a tweak or two to 
the text, and then pressed for congressional ratifi cation. Presi-
dent Trump, however, stuck to his campaign guns and quickly 
withdrew the US from the agreement. Along with his long-time 
antipathy to some forms of immigration, Trump had in fact also 
been a consistent critic of free trade deals, maintaining that the 
US was constantly outdone in those deals allowing other coun-
tries to benefi t at the US’s expense. From the 1980s onwards he 
had spoken out against trade agreements; this is exemplifi ed by 
his hostility to NAFTA, which can be dated back to the time of 
the agreement’s ratifi cation in 1993. In October that year, at an 
event where former presidents Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, and 
George H. W. Bush all spoke in favor of ratifying the deal then 
being debated by Congress, Trump was one of the voices against 
the deal. Trump’s speech was not kept as an exact transcript, but 
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newspaper reporting at the time included him saying specifi cally 
of NAFTA, “It’s a no-brainer. . . . The Mexicans want it, and 
that doesn’t sound good to me,” along with the more general 
refrain that “We never make a good deal.”95
Trump’s opposition to trade agreements was central to his politi-
cal persona in 2016. In an op-ed piece in USA Today during the 
primary campaign in March 2016, candidate Trump explained 
his view that the “American worker is being crushed,” and con-
tinued by arguing that “One of the factors driving this economic 
devastation is America’s disastrous trade policies.” Further, this 
“situation is about to get drastically worse if the Trans-Pacifi c 
Partnership is not stopped.”96 Citing data from a left-wing think 
tank with ties to organized labor, the Economic Policy Insti-
tute, the piece took specifi c aim at Ohio governor and rival for 
the nomination John Kasich as well as senators Marco Rubio of 
Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas. This populist break from conserva-
tive orthodoxy on the benefi ts of trade liberalization did not cause 
too much concern amongst Republican primary voters, and while 
congressional Republicans did not join this particular Trumpian 
chorus, protests against his anti-trade rhetoric were ineffective and 
it mattered little that some of his claims about the negative conse-
quences of the TPP were directly refutable.97
The death knell for US participation in the TPP came in the 
fi rst week of the Trump presidency, when he signed a presiden-
tial memorandum instructing the US Trade Representative to 
inform the other nations that the US “withdraws as a signatory 
of the TPP and withdraws from the TPP negotiating process.”98 
Since the deal had not yet come into effect, Trump’s actions did 
not immediately change any trading relationships; yet, as CNN 
reported at the time, the move “ends all hopes for a deal Obama 
wanted as a major part of his legacy.”99 If Obama had hoped to 
persuade people across the spectrum that trade agreements could 
be achieved in a way that benefi ted both business and workers, 
he failed in this task. Further to Trump’s action, and reinforcing 
how Obama had ended being out of step with political time on 
trade, Senator Sanders, established as a leading voice of the liberal 
left, issued a statement saying that he was “glad the Trans-Pacifi c 
Partnership is dead and gone.”100




Writing about Obama’s efforts on climate just as Trump came 
into offi ce, Meg Jacobs refl ected on how “Obama maneuvered 
within the confi nes of the politically possible” and attempted to 
use executive powers forcefully; but in the end: “Executive action 
without political support will probably prove a thin reed on which 
to build a lasting legacy.”101 These words proved prescient not 
only with regard to climate policy but also immigration reform, as 
institutional fragmentation undermined Obama’s capacity to act 
decisively. On climate and immigration, even at the time of maxi-
mum possible institutional opportunity, with Democrat majorities 
in both chambers of Congress, Obama’s efforts were thwarted.
Importantly, on climate change issues and immigration reform 
the increased level of partisanship did not mean that all Demo-
crats were on board with the administration’s initiatives. On 
health care, if accompanied by many agonies throughout the pro-
cess and grudging concessions to individual senators such as Ben 
Nelson of Nebraska, the administration and congressional leader-
ship managed to maintain enough unity within the congressional 
caucus through 2009 to achieve legislative outputs. In contrast, 
a few hold-outs in the Senate in 2009 and 2010 helped undo the 
climate bill and the DREAMers Act.102 The later effort at com-
prehensive immigration failed despite generating bipartisan sup-
port in the Senate. In this case, House Speaker Boehner placed the 
imperative on maintaining the appearance of unity in his caucus. 
The 2016 Republican presidential primary and the rise of Donald 
Trump demonstrated that the GOP’s base rejected the direction 
taken by the Bush administration and the advice in the party’s 
own post-mortem on the 2012 election.
Under President Trump the direction of policy on climate 
and immigration was decisively reversed, with the Republicans 
doubling down on their climate change denialism and immigra-
tion restrictionism. Here Obama’s tepid legacy was overturned, 
though the courts delayed some of the measures and offered a 
limited protection to DACA benefi ciaries, at least through 2019. 
The politics of trade remain more confused, with party lines still 
blurred. The GOP, previously the more reliable party of free trade, 
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found its stance scrambled by the Trump administration. As it 
was, TPP was easy to reject since, like the Paris climate accord, it 
had not actually come into effect. More generally, despite actual 
and threatened tariff wars with China and the European Union, 
the Trump administration has been more circumspect in its 
actions than suggested by candidate Trump’s promises of massive 
tariffs against imported goods. On other hand, it was also clear 
that President Trump was not going to stick to the path heading 
toward trade liberalization that had been followed by occupants 
of the White House dating back well before Obama.
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4
America and the world
Understanding specifi c presidential legacy in foreign affairs can be 
problematic. Sometimes a major event can be identifi ed with a par-
ticular president; for instance, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 
was very much the result of decisions made in the George W. Bush 
White House. But such self-contained cases are unusual, and even 
in that instance the tensions between Washington, DC and the 
Saddam Hussein regime pre-dated Bush. The escalation, if not the 
origins, of US involvement in the Vietnam War make the descrip-
tion of that confl ict as “Johnson’s war” understandable, yet even 
here the reality is less than clear-cut as the US intervention can be 
traced back to the Kennedy and even Eisenhower administrations.1 
Moreover, the ebb and fl ow of the international context makes 
the potential gap between pre-White House campaign promises 
and the outcomes that emerge once a candidate has shifted to be 
president particularly great. Presidents may be surprised by how 
diffi cult it is to put domestic campaign promises into action, but 
the problems of legislating in Washington are generally more pre-
dictable, if not necessarily more resoluble, than the curveballs that 
can be thrown by international developments. As he waited to take 
offi ce in early January 2001 George W. Bush would have been frus-
trated to be told legislative inertia would mean that Social Security 
reform would not be part of his legacy—but he would surely have 
been astonished to have been told that his time in offi ce would be 
defi ned by terrorist attacks to be committed nine months later, and 
that as a consequence he would authorize a military deployment 
that would be ongoing beyond his successor.
Moreover, even more than in domestic policy and politics 
presidential claims of achievement can be mocked by subsequent 
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developments, as acutely seen with George W. Bush’s very premature 
declaration on May 1, 2003 that “Major combat activities in Iraq 
have ended,” with a “Mission Accomplished” banner in the back-
ground.2 Bush’s legacy with regard to Iraq proved to be very differ-
ent than he had anticipated on that day and, as described below, it 
turned out that Obama too misjudged the nature of the confl icts and 
power dynamics in that country. Further, much of any president’s 
legacy in foreign policy is likely to be a series of ongoing commit-
ments rather than fi nished articles and however much a successor 
may wish to disentangle from those commitments it can sometimes 
be diffi cult to do so as a form of path dependency kicks in. Hence, 
while foreign policy legacies can be quite different than a president 
may have anticipated, so rolling back existing US commitments can 
be problematic, however much a new occupant of the White House 
might despair at the quagmire left to them.
From bending history to “We’re America”
The historian Jeremi Suri has noted how Obama entered offi ce 
offering “a liberal internationalist vision—emphasizing multilat-
eralism, negotiation and disarmament,” in contrast to the projec-
tion of hard military power that had characterized the presidency 
of George W. Bush.3 In two major set-piece speeches in the fi rst 
year of his presidency Obama elaborated on how important it was 
to put aside stereotypes and increase cooperation between nation-
states, even those who were traditionally wary of one another, in 
order to solve global problems. First, in what became known sim-
ply as the “Cairo speech” in June 2009, President Obama stated 
his determination “to seek a new beginning between the United 
States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual inter-
est and mutual respect.”4 Then in December 2009, when accept-
ing the Nobel Peace prize, Obama explained why he thought it 
necessary to engage diplomatically with even those governments 
that violated the norms of the liberal international order:
I know that engagement with repressive regimes lacks the satisfying 
purity of indignation. But I also know that sanctions without out-
reach—condemnation without discussion—can carry forward only 
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a crippling status quo. No repressive regime can move down a new 
path unless it has the choice of an open door.5
It is also important to understand how Obama’s emergence 
onto the national political stage was framed by the idea that he 
was a critic of the US’s reliance on its military strength. Perhaps 
ironically, given that Hillary Clinton went on to become President 
Obama’s fi rst secretary of state, their differing views on the role 
of the US in world affairs was critical to Obama’s victory over 
Clinton in the race for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomi-
nation.6 Specifi cally, Obama’s consistent opposition to the war in 
Iraq gave him traction against Clinton amongst activist Democrats 
when she appeared to be the odds-on favorite for the party’s presi-
dential nomination in late 2007.7 Yet despite this anti-war stance 
being a key building block to Obama’s political identity as he came 
onto the national political scene, this positioning should not be 
over-interpreted. The Nobel speech also included a bold assertion 
of the benefi ts of American power: “The United States of America 
has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades 
with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms.”8
So, as described by Martin Indyk et al., Obama may have 
entered offi ce aiming “to bend history’s arc in the direction of 
justice and a more peaceful, stable world,” but this ambition was 
tempered in practice by “innate realism and political caution.”9 
Over time, that caution led to debate over whether the admin-
istration had a distinct “doctrine” or indeed any clear guiding 
philosophy. This debate was fueled by Hillary Clinton’s (post-
State Department) remark complaining about the lack of a quick 
decision to support the anti-Assad forces in Syria: “great nations 
need organizing principles, and ‘Don’t do stupid stuff’ is not an 
organizing principle.”10 Within the administration there was 
frustrated pushback against Clinton’s commentary, with senior 
advisors to the president noting that Clinton might heed how the 
Iraq invasion should have “taught Democratic interventionists 
like Clinton, who had voted for its authorization, the dangers of 
doing stupid shit.”11
Hence, Obama’s worldview was one that embedded pragma-
tism as much as idealism, as refl ected in his professed admiration 
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for Brent Scowcroft, George H. W. Bush’s National Security Advi-
sor.12 Jeffrey Goldberg refers to Obama’s foreign policy perspective 
as that of a “Hobbsean optimist”; that is, someone who under-
stands that the world is a messy and violent place but calculates 
that most people are better than they are bad.13 One aspect of this 
pragmatism was Obama’s acknowledgment that US power was in 
relative decline, at least inasmuch as the draining wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, along with the economic woes that he had inherited, 
meant that a strategy of “multilateral retrenchment” was neces-
sary, with US allies taking on an increased responsibility for main-
taining the rules base of the liberal international order.14 Yet, if 
this was a strategy, it is not clear what it meant in terms of the 
Obama presidency establishing and leaving a legacy; nor was it a 
framework likely to appeal to a successor proclaiming the virtues 
of “America First,” who was committed to a build-up of the US 
military and a renewed assertion of American power.
In fact, during the campaign, candidate Trump suggested that 
not only would he reject the policies of his predecessor, but he 
wanted to disrupt the established liberal international order. 
Some saw this as a reason to celebrate, especially as Obama had 
“bequeathed to his successor an entire world in disarray.”15 Others 
saw Trump’s casual talk of the value of alliances, his disinterest in 
the importance of a multilateral rules-based order, and his appar-
ent dismissal of the value of US internationalism as a threat to 
“the core convictions of the postwar US global project.”16 In inter-
views with senior White House offi cials in the Trump administra-
tion, Jeffrey Goldberg cited one exchange in the following manner: 
“‘Obama apologized to everyone for everything. He felt bad about 
everything.’ President Trump, this offi cial said, ‘doesn’t feel like he 
has to apologize for anything America does.’” This attitude was 
memorably encapsulated in the phrase, “The Trump Doctrine is 
‘We’re America, Bitch.’ That’s the Trump Doctrine.”17
Such apparently stark contrasts between an Obama worldview 
and a Trumpian perspective, however, can make analysis seem 
simpler than it is. In reality, seeking to provide some insight on 
Obama’s legacy and its meaning with regard to the US’s role in 
world affairs and the extent to which President Trump effectively 
reversed that is an intellectually fraught task. Should US actions 
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in Afghanistan from 2009 through to the end of 2016 be seen as 
Obama initiatives, or are they better understood as efforts to man-
age an extended Bush legacy passed on again, in January 2017, to 
President Trump? On the other hand, there are sometimes foreign 
policy initiatives that can clearly be identifi ed with a president 
and that their successor can choose to revoke; a prime example 
is Obama’s commitment to a nuclear deal with Iran, and Trump’s 
rejection of that deal. In this chapter, therefore, we think through 
what can reasonably be seen as Obama-era policies and assess 
how they fared under the eye of President Trump.
On taking offi ce in 2009, the key priorities for the incoming 
Obama administration—at least as articulated during the cam-
paign by the then candidate—were to draw down from Iraq 
and Afghanistan and work toward improving US relations with 
nations unsettled by the “War on Terror” and the tensions caused 
by the sometimes abrasive approach taken during the Bush years. 
This drawdown was not simply a goal for its own sake, but 
refl ected a desire to refocus the priorities of US foreign policy, to 
be manifested by the “pivot to Asia.” Further, if the Obama direc-
tion of travel was toward a more limited and pragmatic world 
role, there were also signs of willingness to reach out to America’s 
traditional adversaries with overtures to Iran, Cuba and Burma 
to come. Yet it turned out that not everything could be resolved 
by diplomacy, and even if wary of new interventions the Obama 
administration found itself drawn into using the US military’s 
capacity in Libya. Together with the expanded use of drones, the 
Libyan intervention showed an administration certainly prepared 
to fl ex its muscles and assert the primacy of the executive branch 
in foreign affairs.
The Asia pivot
Writing in the fall of 2011, Secretary of State Clinton noted that 
the Obama administration had invested its energies, in efforts 
“spanning the entire US government,” in developing its relations 
across the Pacifi c region. She acknowledged that this had often 
been a “quiet effort” that did not grab the headlines, but was 
underpinned by an understanding that “the future of geopolitics 
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will be decided in Asia, not in Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United 
States will be right at the center of the action.”18 She referenced 
the signifi cance of the fact that her fi rst overseas visit as secretary 
of state, in February 2009, was to Asia (she was the fi rst secre-
tary to do this since Dean Rusk in 1961). Clinton’s destinations 
included Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and China, in addition 
to demonstrating US support for and accession to the ASEAN 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. One key departure from the 
Bush years in terms of style, if not quite substance, was to “show 
up” at Asian events. There had been a notable absence during the 
Bush years of key offi cials in attendance at gatherings such as the 
ASEAN meetings.19 The essential characteristics included empha-
sis on multilateralism, diplomacy and development. A crucial 
strand of this was the desire to tie emerging powers into the world 
order that the Western powers had shaped in the post-World War 
II years.20 
It was this range of actions by administration offi cials that led to 
the presentation of Obama as America’s fi rst “Pacifi c President”—
but this was in truth hardly the case, as others before him had 
made similar overtures, not least Richard Nixon. In a 2016 Foreign 
Policy essay, Michael Green at the Center for International and 
Strategic Studies argues that the Asia pivot had substance but was 
not as “new” as the administration claimed, since it relied on con-
tinuing and building on foundations laid by the Bush administra-
tion, including the Trans Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) agreement and 
embracing the G-20. There were some practical outreach aspects 
to the pivot. These included Obama joining the East Asia Sum-
mit, establishing the US-ASEAN summit, and a more sustained and 
coordinated focus on economic issues. In previous years, economic 
links had been more sporadic and US attention in the region was 
often taken up with security- and terrorism-related matters. Green 
argues that US relations with all countries in the region improved 
in the post-2009 Obama years, with the exception of the politically 
unstable Thailand. From a regional perspective, this warming may 
have occurred in part at least due to the unnerving rise of China, 
and so increasingly robust links with the US were one sensible 
means of response. Nonetheless, President Obama stated his com-
mitment to supporting China’s “core interests” in Asia, which was 
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disconcerting for some. After the change in Chinese leadership, it 
was soon apparent that Xi Jinping was a tougher counterpart than 
his predecessor. Soon, Xi’s China began to assert itself overtly in 
the region, and the Obama administration announced new military 
deployments to Australia.21 In this context, former Obama staffer 
Ben Rhodes pointed out that the term “pivot” had been carefully 
chosen in order to signal an assertive strategy (rather than sounding 
like the US was in retreat or had to make either/or choices about 
where to be).22 In 2012, Secretary of Defense Panetta announced 
that 60 percent of US naval forces would be deployed in the Pacifi c 
by 2020, rather than the 50/50 (Atlantic) split that was in place 
at the time.23
This illustrates how the pivot was complicated by relations with 
China and the ongoing question of whether to treat that nation as 
a potentially co-operative partner or as a hostile rival. As a candi-
date in 2008 Obama had refrained from the standard pattern of 
the “out party” China-bashing employed by candidates Clinton in 
1992 and Bush in 2000, but part of the thinking behind the pivot 
was to look at the region with less of a focus on China.24 And, 
initially, the emerging strategy was interpreted by Chinese lead-
ership as “nothing but a containment policy aimed at China.”25 
Obama’s fi rst visit to China, in November 2009, was not a success, 
at least in public relations terms. In his 2016 memoir, Believer, 
David Axelrod recounts how this visit to a “fi erce, sophisticated 
and sometimes unscrupulous competitor” played out. The senior 
advisor to the president mapped out the administration’s incentive 
for an outreach initiative to a country he referred to as “a very 
complicated piece of business.” Even the individual interactions on 
the trip were stilted: American jokes were lost in translation, and 
freeform interactions such as Obama had requested caused con-
cern among hosts who preferred scripted conversations with pre-
prepared answers.26 Matters did improve subsequently, although 
missteps and misinterpretations of each other’s motives meant that 
as Obama’s time in offi ce drew to a close, “the US-Chinese security 
relationship and the Asia-Pacifi c region in general are far more 
tense today than they were at the start of 2009.”27
Assessing how this stands as legacy, therefore, is complex. 
Clearly, such a foreign policy priority adjustment, away from the 
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long-standing alignment with Europe, was a shift—geopolitically, 
strategically, and bureaucratically. Eyebrows were raised among 
America’s traditional allies, but more regarding practical than 
intellectual concern as they worried whether suffi cient resources 
existed to facilitate an East and West focus.28 It was a strategy 
underpinned, in the words of Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary 
for East Asia and the Pacifi c, by the assumption that “the lion’s 
share of the history of the 21st century is going to be written in 
Asia.”29 The term “congagement” was used to describe the Obama 
administration’s policy mix of realist ideas of “containment” and 
liberal ideas of “engagement.”30 As time moved on, the pivot was 
recast as a “rebalance” to make it sound less assertive and the New 
York Times journalist Mark Landler, who covered the Obama 
administration extensively, offered qualifi ed praise refl ecting that 
regardless of the “name, the policy was a rare example of over-the-
horizon thinking by an administration that, in other parts of the 
world, seemed to lurch from crisis to crisis.”31
Yet, perhaps the most concrete manifestation of the strategy 
by the end of the Obama era was the Trans Pacifi c Partnership, 
viewed as the future “linchpin” of the US vision for trade in the 
region and as a counterweight to China’s economic power; and 
the fate of that agreement remained uncertain, not ratifi ed by 
Congress, when Obama left offi ce. As described in Chapter 3, it 
was an agreement disavowed by both candidates Trump and Clin-
ton in 2016 and was promptly abandoned by President Trump. 
As well as refl ecting Trump’s rejection of existing trade deals, the 
move also refl ected his distrust of the types of multilateral interna-
tional agreements pursued by the Obama administration.
Beyond this big picture, it is worth refl ecting on the Obama 
administration’s efforts to re-integrate Burma into the interna-
tional community as an example of how an apparent success 
story and positive legacy can turn sour. As Burma showed some 
signs of moving away from military rule in the direction of 
democracy, the US moved toward loosening of existing trade 
sanctions. On an Asia-Pacifi c tour in November 2011, the Presi-
dent announced that Hillary Clinton would visit Burma.32 Send-
ing a secretary of state for the fi rst time in fi fty years to one 
of the world’s most repressive countries was, in the words of 
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Freedom House director David J. Kramer, “a pretty big deal.”33 
The president spoke of leading in Asia on human rights issues, 
encouraged by the “fl ickers of progress” evident in Burma’s 
actions.34 He built a personal rapport with Aung San Suu Kyi, 
in part when she visited Washington, DC in 2012 to receive her 
Congressional Gold Medal. The same year, the US eased previ-
ously crushing sanctions as a reward for Burma’s efforts toward 
democratic progress. The two leaders met again a number of 
times, including when Obama visited the long-isolated nation in 
October 2016.
By the fall of 2017, however, claims of progress toward democ-
racy and respect for human rights in the country looked consider-
ably more problematic as the Rohingya crisis made international 
headlines, with the United Nations describing the military offen-
sive in Rakhine province as a “textbook example of ethnic cleans-
ing.”35 Ben Rhodes, who served as Deputy National Security 
Advisor for Strategic Communications, was known for his some-
times controversial approach to dealing with rogue nations—that 
is, to engage with them and then work toward persuading them to 
change their behavior. Rhodes had been instrumental in encour-
aging the President to take this approach with Burma, with the 
loosening of sanctions as rewards for diplomacy-related improve-
ments.36 According to Rhodes, if the Rohingya crisis had occurred 
on Obama’s watch, the President would have been in regular touch 
with Ang San Suu Kyi in an effort to keep the fl edgling democratic 
process on track.37 And it was the case that the Trump administra-
tion stood relatively askance from events. As former US ambas-
sador to Burma (2012–16) Derek Mitchell told the Washington 
Post, “there is not the kind of strong interest in the White House 
as there used to be.”38 Vice President Mike Pence called on the 
United Nations to take “strong and swift action” to end the vio-
lence against the Rohingya Muslims, but there was limited pressure 
applied directly.39 Yet Rhodes’s argument seems more of an effort 
to rationalize the investment, and subsequent disappointment, in 
the leadership of Ang San Suu Kyi rather than a serious effort to 
suggest that the Trump administration’s disengagement explained 
why, two years after Obama left offi ce, the “democratization” of 
Myanmar had to be deleted from Obama’s CV.
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As noted above, when she explained the reasoning behind 
the “pivot,” Secretary Clinton directly referenced Iraq, indicat-
ing that this was not where the US’s long-term strategic interests 
should be prioritized.40 That did not mean, however, that the 
Obama administration was going to be able to deal quickly and 
effectively with its inheritance from the Bush years and move on 
from the confl ict in Iraq and the wider Arab world. In the fol-
lowing section, we examine the Obama administration’s legacy 
in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. These cases provide an examination of 
how the Obama White House dealt with the legacy of the defi n-
ing decision of the Bush administration and how it responded 
to two international crises that burst into the open on its watch, 
with an intervention justifi ed on humanitarian grounds in one 
case but a policy of “wait and see” adopted in the other, even 
as a brutal confl ict left a huge toll of death and population 
displacement.
Iraq
Obama’s policies toward Iraq, the drawdown of US forces, and 
the subsequent rise of ISIS make up a complex story, and one 
that illustrates the folly of making premature claims about the 
effects of decisions taken in very uncertain environments. Obama 
had campaigned on a withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, but in 
fact when he arrived in offi ce that was already an existing com-
mitment as a consequence of the Status of Forces Agreement 
with Iraq, which had been signed by US and Iraqi representatives 
in mid-November 2008. This agreement stated that US forces 
would leave Iraq by the end of 2011. The agreement was fulfi lled, 
although throughout 2011 there was debate in both Washington 
and Baghdad about whether a force numbering between 10,000 
and 24,000 should remain. The US ambassador to Iraq was 
amongst those urging that a presence numbering several thousand 
should be maintained in the country, but as the Iraqi government 
would not concede that US forces be exempt from Iraqi law, no 
agreement was reached.41
The withdrawal of US forces, however, far from marked the 
end of American actions in Iraq as turmoil, notably in the shape 
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of ISIS, continued to roil that troubled country. By the summer of 
2014 Obama had authorized US air strikes against ISIS in Iraq as 
the threat from that terrorist organization came into clearer view. 
Although he insisted, “As Commander in Chief, I will not allow 
the United States to be dragged into another war in Iraq,” the 
actions he took made it clear that his legacy was to be a complex 
one, far from refl ecting a straightforward implementation of his 
2008 campaign promise.42 In September 2014 Obama took the 
further step of authorizing air strikes against ISIS targets in Syria, 
with the White House issuing a statement that it would “welcome 
action by the Congress that would aid the overall effort” while 
noting that it did not believe it needed approval to extend the 
scope of the battleground.43
Famously, according to Donald Trump when speaking at 
a campaign rally in Florida in August 2016, one of Obama’s 
legacies was ISIS itself, as Trump asserted of the then President: 
“He’s the founder of ISIS,” adding that the group “honors” 
him.44 Trump’s comments were clearly for performance rather 
than a serious contribution to the foreign policy debate; but the 
rise of ISIS, and the renewed US engagement in Iraq and expan-
sion of action against the terrorist group into Syria, illustrate 
the diffi culties of trying to judge a presidential legacy in inter-
national affairs at any fi xed point in time. They also highlight 
the danger for a president of making grand claims that soon 
unravel. Speaking to David Remnick of the New Yorker in early 
2014, Obama, in what Remnick described as an “uncharacter-
istically fl ip analogy,” spoke of al Qaeda’s spin off groups in 
the following terms: “The analogy we use around here some-
times, and I think is accurate, is if a jayvee team puts on Lakers 
uniforms that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant.”45 Obama later 
denied that he had been referring to ISIS with this comment, but 
it was a denial that carried little credibility.46 As Obama’s presi-
dency drew to a close, the US-backed forces battling against ISIS 
in Iraq and Syria were making headway and recapturing terri-
tory that had been claimed as part of the “caliphate,” but the 
fi ghting was ongoing as he left offi ce.47 Moreover, ISIS-inspired 
terrorism was witnessed in the US as well as in Europe, roiling 
domestic political stability.48
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Libya
In her examination of Obama’s foreign policy, Donette Murray 
notes how the intervention in Libya fi tted with the administra-
tion’s preference for mitigating human rights abuses when it 
could do so in a quite particular way: “In short, the administra-
tion judged that there were good reasons why the international 
community should act—both moral and practical—and these 
were reinforced by a belief that they could act.”49 The admin-
istration’s actions in some ways came to be characterized by the 
phrase “leading from behind,” a phrase used by an advisor to 
the president.50 This was meant to convey that the administration 
recognized that an overly bullish attitude from the US in the inter-
national arena could be alienating, especially in the aftermath of 
the Iraq invasion. With specifi c regard to Libya it also seemed 
to refl ect how Obama committed to action in the wake of the 
lead taken by the British and especially the French. Yet, this is 
a little misleading, for although the French and British took the 
lead in proposing to the UN that a no-fl y zone be established—
with the US initially reluctant to support this idea—when Obama 
did come on board, the administration then overtook its allies in 
proposing a wider mission involving a formal military interven-
tion. Obama’s personal involvement, and the degree to which this 
represented a bolder move than some in the administration were 
comfortable with, was illustrated by the decision to act against 
the advice of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.51 On the other 
hand, the President was clear about setting strict limits of what 
that intervention would comprise. Air strikes were not to be a 
stepping stone to further mission creep, with a sharp admonish-
ment that there would be “no boots on the ground.”52
In the very short term, this action was perceived a success. 
Writing in early 2012, Ivo Daalder, who was US Permanent 
Representative to NATO, and James Stavridis, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe and Commander of the US European Com-
mand, commended the operation in Libya as a “model interven-
tion.” Led by the US, they added, the NATO “alliance responded 
rapidly to a deteriorating situation that threatened hundreds of 
thousands of civilians rebelling against an oppressive regime. It 
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succeeded in protecting those civilians and, ultimately, in provid-
ing the time and space necessary for local forces to overthrow 
Muammar al-Qaddafi .”53 Speaking in October 2011, shortly 
after the death of Qaddafi , Obama refl ected on what was seen 
as a successful intervention: “Without putting a single US ser-
vice member on the ground, we achieved our objectives, and 
our NATO mission will soon come to an end.” The president 
acknowledged “diffi cult days ahead” but added, “the United 
States, together with the international community, is commit-
ted to the Libyan people. . . . And now, we will be a partner as 
you forge a future that provides dignity, freedom and opportu-
nity.”54 If not quite Obama’s “mission accomplished” moment, 
this was a premature judgment on the future of Libya, at least in 
the medium term, and the commitment to help secure stability 
in that country proved to be less meaningful than it might have 
sounded. Similarly, Daalder and Stavridis, while urging NATO 
to learn the value of acting together and sharing responsibilities 
from the Libyan experience, made minimal reference in their 
article to either the US’s or NATO’s role in Libya once Opera-
tion Unifi ed Protector was over.
As it turned out, the legacy of the Libya intervention was much 
more institutionally complex, politically damaging for the admin-
istration, and fraught for Libya itself than these happy preliminary 
assessments came close to understanding. Firstly, the conduct of 
the military action itself prompted questions about whether the 
administration had bypassed the Congress and a possible invoca-
tion of the War Powers Resolution. The administration dismissed 
this idea on the grounds that NATO forces and drones were the 
primary means of action, meaning that there was minimal risk 
of US casualties.55 In justifying the refusal to consult Congress, 
Harold Koh, a legal advisor to the State Department who had 
been a sharp critic of what he had described as the Bush admin-
istration’s undue expansion of executive authority, insisted: “We 
are not saying the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional or 
should be scrapped or that we can refuse to consult Congress. We 
are saying the limited nature of this particular mission is not the 
kind of ‘hostilities’ envisioned by the War Powers Resolution.”56 
The New York Times editorial page, while urging support for the 
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intervention itself, described this line of reasoning as one that 
“borders on sophistry.”57 Whatever the merits of the rationale 
produced by the White House, it was a justifi cation that created 
a precedent that would likely be welcomed by future presidents 
looking to continue controversial actions without asking for con-
gressional approval.58
Secondly, the fate of Libya after Qaddafi ’s ouster very quickly 
turned sour, destabilizing that country with effects that in turn 
destabilized the administration and in fact continued to haunt Sec-
retary Clinton during her ill-fated 2016 presidential bid. It turned 
out that the coalition of countries that had come together to pre-
vent Qaddafi ’s forces from attacking those protesting the regime, 
and that had in the end helped overthrow that regime, had made 
few plans for the consequences of its actions. Alan Kuperman, 
making the case that it would have been better not to intervene at 
all, argued in 2015,
In retrospect, Obama’s intervention in Libya was an abject failure, 
judged even by its own standards. Libya has not only failed to evolve 
into a democracy; it has devolved into a failed state. Violent deaths 
and other human rights abuses have increased several fold. Rather 
than helping the United States combat terrorism, as Qaddafi  did dur-
ing his last decade in power, Libya now serves as a safe haven for 
militias affi liated with both al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS).59
Obama took a different lesson about the merits of the interven-
tion, but acknowledged that post-intervention developments had 
been highly problematic. When asked in April 2016 what had 
been the “worst mistake” of his time in offi ce, Obama replied: 
“Probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think was the 
right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.”60 As Dominic Tierney 
points out, this meant that the Obama administration’s record in 
Libya and its strategy for a sustainable post-intervention frame-
work were fl awed in the same way that the Bush administration’s 
planning had been in Iraq.61 The cost in American blood and trea-
sure was signifi cantly less, and there was no legacy of an ongo-
ing military commitment, but Libya was left with little effective 
internal authority and a collapsed political system. This does not 
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mean that the bloody events in Libya were caused by the interven-
tion, as there was clearly already an incipient civil war develop-
ing; nor even that the intervention made things worse.62 But if 
the aim was to demonstrate that it was possible, in tightly con-
strained circumstances, to act in a humanitarian fashion without 
needing to worry about what happened next, then a legacy of the 
Libyan intervention was to suggest the folly of such an optimistic 
approach. Clear evidence of the failure in Libya came in the sum-
mer of 2016 when President Obama authorized air strikes in the 
city of Surt to combat the growing presence of ISIS in the city.63 
These strikes were conducted at the behest of the UN-backed 
Libyan government, but that was a government with little capac-
ity to police its own borders.
Syria
Obama’s actions, in keeping America distant from the confl ict in 
Syria, were apparently in accord with public sentiment, with polls 
showing majorities disagreeing with the idea that the US had a 
responsibility to act. There was some evidence that the numbers 
shifted when the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons were 
factored into questions, but not in a decisive fashion.64
Defending his administration’s actions, or inactions, with 
regard to Syria, Obama explained:
It is very diffi cult to imagine a scenario in which our involvement in 
Syria would have led to a better outcome, short of us being willing 
to undertake an effort in size and scope similar to what we did in 
Iraq. And when I hear people suggesting that somehow if we had 
just fi nanced and armed the opposition earlier, that somehow Assad 
would be gone by now and we’d have a peaceful transition, it’s magi-
cal thinking.65
Whatever the merits of this argument, Obama’s opponents, 
and even some normally supportive voices, felt that the White 
House had diminished America’s credibility by not enforcing its 
proclaimed “red line” in August 2013. That line had apparently 
been drawn a year earlier when, toward the end of a wide-ranging 
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twenty-minute briefi ng with the White House press corps, Obama 
had replied to a question about what action the administration 
proposed to take with regard to the deteriorating situation in 
Syria and the Assad regime’s chemical weapons stockpile by say-
ing the following:
We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other 
players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a 
whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being uti-
lized. That would change my calculus. That would change my 
equation.66
When, therefore, in August 2013, compelling evidence 
emerged that the Assad regime had used chemical weapons that 
resulted in the deaths of nearly 1,500 people, the pressure on the 
administration to act increased.67 Even some senior fi gures who 
had previously been skeptical of the merits of US action, such 
as Joint Chief of Staff Marty Dempsey, urged a military strike.68 
Yet, as the United Kingdom’s parliament prohibited Prime Min-
ister David Cameron from translating his support for strikes into 
actual military action and close Obama ally German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel advised caution, Obama decided that he would 
seek congressional authorization for strikes.69 This authoriza-
tion would remove any doubt about the constitutionality of the 
strikes and also mean that there was shared ownership of any 
long-term downside. Congress, however, never voted on the mat-
ter and those who felt that the US needed to back up its appar-
ently unequivocal words with action were left frustrated. As it 
was, the move away from ordering the strikes was very much 
Obama’s own decision, taken alongside fellow skeptic and Chief 
of Staff Denis McDonough, to the surprise and consternation 
of the senior foreign policy team.70 In an essay that was largely 
favorable to Obama’s conduct of foreign policy, Gideon Rose, 
editor of the journal Foreign Affairs, disparagingly commented 
on how this episode unfolded: “fi rst casually announcing a major 
commitment, then dithering about living up to it, then frantically 
tossing the ball to Congress for a decision—was a case study in 
embarrassingly amateurish improvisation.”71
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By 2016, however, Obama saw this decision to step back from 
strikes against Syria in 2013 as one of his best:
I’m very proud of this moment. . . . The perception was that my cred-
ibility was at stake, that America’s credibility was at stake. 
And so for me to press the pause button at that moment, 
I knew, would cost me politically. And the fact that I was able to 
pull back from the immediate pressures and think through in my 
own mind what was in America’s interest, not only with respect 
to Syria but also with respect to our democracy, was as tough a 
decision as I’ve made—and I believe ultimately it was the right 
decision to make.72
Others have defended the fi nal decision, if not the decision-
making process, by pointing to the manner in which the US’s step 
back gave space for a Russian initiative that led to the organized 
removal of more chemical weapons from Syrian soil than would 
possibly have been achieved by limited air strikes.73 In April 2014 
Obama noted, “My job as Commander in Chief is to deploy 
military force as a last resort,” before adding that many of his 
critics advocated military action without thinking through the 
consequences and that what had transpired with regard to Syria’s 
chemical weapons illustrated the benefi ts of restraint, as “it turns 
out we’re getting chemical weapons out of Syria without having 
initiated a strike.”74 Three months after this, Secretary of State 
John Kerry went as far as to claim: “Russia has been construc-
tive in helping to remove 100 percent of the declared chemical 
weapons from Syria.”75 However, it was not long after Obama 
left offi ce that the limits of these claims became evident as in April 
2017 Assad’s forces unleashed a sarin gas attack on the town of 
Khan Sheikhoun.76 The eradication of the Assad regime’s chemi-
cal weapons stockpile was manifestly not a legacy that Obama 
left to his successor.
As Obama’s presidency drew to a close two former advisors to 
his National Security Council noted how events in Iraq and Libya 
had soured the ground for liberal interventionists and “under-
mined any American willingness to put values before interests.” 
Yet, they added the administration had developed a “clear Syria 
policy,” which involved air strikes against ISIS forces operating 
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in the country and a continued effort to reach a negotiated set-
tlement that would see the removal of Assad from power. They 
acknowledged that this was “frustrating” and that efforts toward 
the latter goal had proved “unsatisfying,” but it remained the only 
“sensible course of action.”77 In this view, therefore, Obama’s leg-
acy was the least bad of a series of bad possibilities, although it 
neglected to refl ect on the role the administration had played in 
creating an environment so unfavorable to intervention through 
its ill-thought-out actions in Libya.
When assessing Obama’s legacy with regard to US policy 
in the Middle East, it is important to distinguish retrenchment 
from disengagement and also to understand retrenchment in a 
broader historical timeframe than a comparison with the mid-
2000s. According to Derek Chollet, a former special assistant to 
Obama and a senior director at the National Security Council, 
when Obama decided against direct intervention he was not moti-
vated by a desire to disengage, but acting out of a recognition that 
there was not an American solution to every problem. Moreover, 
despite the withdrawal of the US ground forces from Iraq, the 
“military footprint” in the region at the end of the Obama presi-
dency remained “quite signifi cant” as “even if you set aside the 
capabilities we have in theater to fi ght the ISIL campaign, more 
military men and women are deployed in the Middle East than 
before 9/11 in terms of our maritime and air presence.”78 Some 
commentators took a dimmer view. Krieg, for example, offers a 
damning verdict on the Obama legacy in the Middle East, noting 
how the efforts to use surrogate forces and technologies rather 
than acting more directly had led to a “loss of control and over-
sight, the inability to shape confl icts directly and the failure to 
develop sustainable and reliable long-term strategies for US 
national interests” that “undermined the position of the United 
States as the leading power in an increasingly apolar world.”79
What does seem clear is that in the three cases of Iraq, Libya, 
and Syria, Obama’s fi nal legacy at the end of 2016 was one that 
no incoming president could explicitly embrace or repudiate in a 
comprehensive fashion. There were ongoing military operations 
against ISIS and related terrorist groups that would continue in 
one form or another along with political and diplomatic efforts 
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to broker ceasefi res and increased governmental stability. Barring 
a major intervention, there was little that Trump and his admin-
istration could do that would explicitly change the direction of 
these policies. One difference was that President Trump did prove 
prepared to use military force in response to clear evidence that 
the remaining chemical weapons had been employed as a weapon 
against civilians. In April 2018, acting with French and British 
forces, the US launched 105 missiles against targets in Syria. This 
was in fact the second strike, following the deployment of fi fty-
nine missiles in April 2017. Then Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis explained the increased volume of the second strike:
Clearly, the Assad regime did not get the message last year. . . . This 
time, our allies and we have struck harder. Together, we have sent 
a clear message to Assad, and his murderous lieutenants, that they 
should not perpetrate another chemical weapons attack for which 
they will be held accountable.80
Yet, it is important to understand that these actions by the 
Trump administration, while enforcing Obama’s “red lines” in 
a manner that Obama did not, represent only a limited rollback 
of the wider Syria policy. There was little follow-up to these 
strikes and no suggestion that the US commit a major force to 
help overthrow the Assad regime. Yet, as Alex Ward points out, 
the fact that the Trump administration could authorize these mis-
sile strikes without that leading to a wider US involvement does 
undermine Obama’s rationalization of his actions.81
Iran
It is diffi cult to think of any aspect of the Obama legacy more 
categorically rejected by his successor than the Joint Comprehen-
sive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known more informally as the Iran 
Deal. Implementation day was scheduled for January 16, 2016, 
the anniversary of the Shah’s departure into exile. The JCPOA 
was a signal achievement of collective foreign policy by the US 
and key allies (Russia, France, China, the UK, Germany, and the 
EU).82 Whilst the deal faced domestic political resistance in the 
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US, including from some Democrats who were sympathetic to 
Israeli concerns about the trustworthiness of the Iranian regime, it 
did not meet with meaningful bureaucratic opposition and made 
“tremendous sense technologically.”83 The decision by President 
Trump to withdraw the US from proceedings was immense, both 
symbolically and substantially.
In January 2009, Barack Obama came to power thirty years 
after the US-backed Shah was forced to fl ee Iran. Ever since the 
Islamic religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile 
two weeks later in February 1979, US–Iranian relations had 
veered between non-existent and overtly hostile. On the 2008 
campaign trail, Obama had visited Israel and the West Bank. 
During a press conference he talked about the “game-changing 
situation” that a nuclear Iran would be, stating that “the world 
must prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.”84 On the 
other hand, his suggestion that he would meet with the Iranian 
leader without fi rst setting down preconditions, refl ecting the idea 
that it was worth at least trying to engage with hostile regimes, 
drew criticism. On entering the Oval Offi ce, President Obama 
stated that he wanted a new emphasis on respect in the conduct 
of US–Iranian relations.85 In addition, he agreed that his fi rst 
television interview as president would be with Arab television 
network Al Arabiya in February 2009.86 This good-will gesture 
came during a period when Iran was considered to be noncom-
pliant with its Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, as noted by the UN 
Security Council in 2006. As a result, Iran had been instructed 
to suspend its enrichment programs. The prospects for meaning-
ful talks improved with a change in political leadership in Iran 
that saw President Ahmadinejad replaced by President Rouhani, 
the latter having a reputation as a more moderate fi gure. In Sep-
tember 2013 a historic phone call, hailed as a signifi cant dip-
lomatic breakthrough, took place between Presidents Rouhani 
and Obama; they discussed efforts to reach agreement over Iran’s 
nuclear program. It was the fi rst time leaders of the two countries 
had spoken for over thirty years.87
Evolving from the 2013 Joint Plan of Action after two years of 
tense, highly technical and dense negotiations, the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action was created in Vienna on July 14, 2015, by 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   135 18/08/20   1:30 PM
obama v. trump
136
six world powers (China, France, Russia, UK, US, and Germany, 
often referred to as the P5+1) and Iran. The American negotia-
tors were always aware that any agreement could not be submit-
ted to the Senate as a treaty for ratifi cation, as there was zero 
chance of getting the supermajority needed for such confi rmation. 
The team were surprised, however, by the actions of Republican 
Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas, who penned an open letter to 
the Iranians baldly stating that any measure forced through as an 
executive action could be easily reversed by a future president. As 
it was, the US side used this as leverage to persuade the Iranians 
that they were taking political risks and they were at the limits of 
what they could offer.88 The strength of domestic opposition was 
revealed in September 2015 when a Republican resolution in the 
Senate to reject the executive agreement was supported by a clear 
majority, but fell short of breaking a Democratic fi libuster by two 
votes. Hence, while Obama celebrated “a victory for diplomacy, 
for American national security, and for the safety and security of 
the world,” it was evident that the longevity of American partici-
pation in this deal was highly contingent on short-term political 
developments.89
The plan came into effect from January 16, 2016,90 but was a 
target throughout the year for candidate Trump, who repeatedly 
referred to the JCPOA deal as “one of the worst deals ever,” and 
labeled Iran as one of the biggest state sponsors of terrorism around 
the world.91 This chimed with the view of many in his adopted 
party and he polled well on his promise to take the US out of 
the deal.92 The nature of the deal called for regular recertifi cation 
from the US, and in October 2017 President Trump announced 
that he would not again certify the agreement. In an address 
from the White House, Trump talked through the evolution of 
the “fanatical regime” with its “murderous past and present,” 
outlining his reasons for distancing himself from “one of the 
worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever 
entered into.” Then, in May 2018, the White House announced 
the US’s formal withdrawal. Later in that month, Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo gave a speech at the Heritage Foundation 
outlining the administration’s frustration with Iranian behavior 
more widely in international affairs and denouncing the JCPOA 
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as fl awed and unworkable, as well as only offering a delay, rather 
than an end, to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In reference to the previ-
ous administration, Pompeo stated that “strategically, the Obama 
administration made a bet that the deal would spur Iran to stop 
its rogue state actions and conform to international norms.” He 
continued, “that bet was a loser with massive repercussions for 
all of the people living in the Middle East.”93 In his 2019 State of 
the Union remarks, President Trump reminded the nation that his 
administration “had acted decisively to confront the world’s lead-
ing state sponsor of terror: the radical regime in Iran” and put in 
place the “toughest sanctions ever imposed on a country.”94
President Trump’s decision to walk away from the JCPOA 
angered not only Iran, but also the other partners in the P5+1. 
The three western allies, France, Germany, and the UK, all lob-
bied to maintain this part of Obama’s legacy and even sought 
ways to keep the agreement functioning without the US.95 The 
Trump administration’s repudiation of the pleas of its traditional 
allies was not perhaps intended as an explicit implementation of 
the “We’re America, Bitch” doctrine, but the indifference shown 
to wider international opinion was indicative of a worldview 
quite different from that held by the preceding administration. It 
is diffi cult to establish a precise Obama legacy with regard to the 
somewhat intangible question of America’s role as what might be 
termed a collaborative actor in the world, but it is worth briefl y 
refl ecting on the interaction between the US and international 
institutions during the Obama era to get some measure of how 
those relationships shifted in tone from January 2017 onwards.
The US and international organizations: NATO
Obama might be viewed as the least Atlanticist president in Amer-
ica’s post-war history. On his watch US troop numbers in Europe 
were reduced to 30,000. That is, according to Major General 
Robert Scales, less than the amount of police in New York City.96 
Moreover, while never publicly hostile to NATO, the Obama 
administration did let its resentment about perceived shortfalls 
in European spending on defense be known. During the Obama 
years, the US continued to be the dominant global military power, 
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one which continued to underwrite Europe’s security long after 
the continent had regained its post-World War II composure. 
Only four of NATO’s European partners met the agreed defense 
expenditure of 2 percent of GDP.97 Nevertheless, whilst Obama 
did shine a light on the inequality in NATO contributions, he 
also, not least in his fi nal speech to NATO in 2016, highlighted 
“what will never change.” In other words, he reinforced America’s 
“unwavering commitment” to Article 5, pledging each member 
state to consider an armed attack on one as an attack on all mem-
ber states in Europe or North America.
In contrast, fi rst as candidate and then as president, Trump 
openly and consistently questioned NATO’s purpose and effi -
ciency, calling it “obsolete” and calling out member states for not 
shouldering their share of the economic costs. This latter criticism 
echoed the Obama administration but was expressed in a much 
more aggressive tone. Embracing his moniker as the “Disrupter in 
Chief” at the 2018 summit, Politico reported that the President 
“disorientated NATO leaders” with a “whiplash performance” 
including overt criticism of members for not meeting their spend-
ing targets.98 In early 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten-
berg told Fox News that “the clear message from Donald Trump 
is having an impact.”99 The practical manifestation of this was 
that NATO allies promised to bring forward planned increases in 
defense spending. In Trumpian terms this was a win for the Presi-
dent and could be explained by the sharper elbows and implied 
threats that the Trump administration was prepared to employ 
in contrast to the ineffectual diplomatic pleading of the Obama 
era. The cost was frayed relationships and a loss of trust amongst 
key allies—notably Europe’s economic powerhouse, Germany—
with the tensions barely concealed at the February 2019 Munich 
Security Conference.100
The United Nations
The United States is the most powerful member and the largest 
contributor to the United Nations. In a pattern exacerbated during 
the George W. Bush administration, Republicans tended to per-
ceive the UN with some suspicion (as they do many international 
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organizations), viewing it as a potential threat or curb to American 
global power. That skepticism, however, is not universally shared, 
with most data that has been gathered illustrating how, overall, 
the majority of Americans polled were more supportive of the UN 
than not.101
In a broad expression of his foreign policy thoughts in a July 
2008 speech at the Ronald Reagan Building in Washington, DC, 
candidate Obama outlined the grave challenges facing not only 
the United States but the world in the early twenty-fi rst century. 
As he mapped out his vision it was abundantly clear that he was 
addressing a nation weary of war and international engagement. 
This acknowledged, he called for a new era of international 
cooperation. Speaking about the United Nations, he referred to 
its role in amplifying rather than constraining American values, 
and in addition he called for UN reform, “so that this imperfect 
institution can become a more perfect forum to share burdens, 
strengthen our leverage, and promote our values.”102 In a similar 
vein, in a September 2009 address to the UN, President Obama 
reiterated his administration’s move away from the unilateral 
positions sometimes taken by the Bush administration and toward 
a more multilateral approach to common challenges including cli-
mate change, peace and nuclear non-proliferation,103 even if only 
limited progress was ever made toward these goals. In contrast, 
speaking to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Trump 
claimed in 2016 that the UN “is not a friend of democracy.” In 
addition, he dismissed the UN for “utter weakness and incompe-
tence.” Over time, he accused the organization of being a talking 
shop and of being no friend to America.104
Some insights into Obama’s perception of the UN can be gleaned 
from his choices of US ambassador. Susan Rice and later Samantha 
Power were on a notably different diplomatic page to Bush appoin-
tee John Bolton.105 Bolton’s language with regard to the UN was 
overtly derisive. As it was, despite Trump’s sometimes apparently 
dismissive approach to the UN and its world role, the choice of for-
mer South Carolina governor Nikki Hailey to be US ambassador to 
the UN was relatively uncontroversial. As with his NATO-related 
campaign rhetoric, President Trump walked back to some extent 
from the most infl ammatory aspects of his earlier UN criticism.
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Ending the Cold War? Relations with Cuba
If the Iran deal was the Obama administration initiative directly 
repudiated by the Trump administration that generated the most 
international attention, also of consequence was the loosen-
ing but then quasi-closing of US relations with Cuba. As Mark 
Landler recounts, the outreach to the Cuban regime was very cen-
tered around Obama himself rather than the wider foreign policy 
team.106 With relatively little media focus on the ongoing negotia-
tions, with the Vatican acting as a mediator Obama caused some 
surprise in December 2014 when he announced that the two coun-
tries would resume diplomatic relations. The following month the 
administration announced a series of measures designed to “facili-
tate travel” as well as allowing more remittances to be returned to 
Cuba and allowing US “fi nancial institutions to open correspon-
dent accounts at Cuban fi nancial institutions.”107 Then, in March 
2016, Obama became the fi rst US president to visit Cuba in nearly 
ninety years. While there, he declared: “I have come here to bury 
the last remnant of the Cold War in the Americas.”108 Republi-
cans in Congress made it clear that they opposed revoking trade 
sanctions, but initial polling suggested majority support for the 
administration’s moves.109 And at fi rst it seemed as if candidate 
Trump was more in tune with the White House than Republicans 
on Capitol Hill, but in September 2016, campaigning in Miami, he 
said that he would try to undo Obama’s actions. He explained that 
“all the concessions that Barack Obama has granted the Castro 
regime was done through executive order, which means they can 
be undone and that is what I intend to do unless the Castro regime 
meets our demands.”110
When Trump took offi ce the promise to reverse the easing of 
relations was vociferously supported by some leading Republi-
can fi gures, notably Florida senator Marco Rubio, but there was 
counter-pressure from businesses hoping to develop new markets. 
For example, by “2017, ports in Virginia, Alabama, and Missis-
sippi had signed agreements with Cuba to explore opportunities 
for increasing trade.”111 These negotiations saw limited progress, 
but for the fi rst two years of the Trump presidency the actions 
taken to explicitly reverse the increase in commercial activity were 
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limited. The most evident change was the surge of Americans 
visiting Cuba via cruise ships and eventually, in June 2019, the 
administration took a decisive step by effectively banning cruise 
ships from stopping at Cuban ports. In a statement explaining the 
decision, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross maintained: “Cuba 
remains communist, and the United States, under the previous 
administration, made too many concessions to one of our histori-
cally most aggressive adversaries.”112 Prior to this, US diplomatic 
staff in Havana had been cut to a minimum following a bout of 
unexplained sickness amongst diplomats stationed there,113 but 
diplomatic relations were at least formally maintained.
Conclusion
One theme that commentators mulled over at the end of the 2000s 
was whether the combination of the hit to the US economy infl icted 
by the 2008 recession and the seemingly endless loss of blood 
and treasure fi ghting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had left the 
nation facing a long-term decline of its relative power, or at least 
its political capacity to exert its power.114 In this context, while 
not explicitly using the language of decline, Obama did talk of 
rebalancing long-term priorities, with an emphasis on “mov[ing] 
beyond today’s wars, and focus[ing] our attention and resources on 
a broader set of countries and challenges.”115 In real-world terms 
that shift in priorities was supposed to be manifested by the “pivot 
to Asia.” The administration certainly showed a commitment to 
turn this rhetoric into some sort of tangible reality, but relations 
with China were a constantly complicating factor, with the admin-
istration caught between seeing China as primarily friend or foe. In 
this light, the TPP should not just be seen as a trade agreement but 
as a pact to bring together a dozen economies, including Japan as 
well as the US, in a manner that challenged China’s growing eco-
nomic and political ascendancy.116 President Trump’s subsequent 
withdrawal of the US from TPP was not designed to empower 
China, but in undoing several years of negotiation that decision 
diminished any immediate legacy of the “pivot.”
In addition to a proposed strategic rebalancing of US priori-
ties, Obama’s 2008 campaign also proposed that, as president, he 
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would meet with US adversaries, without pre-conditions if nec-
essary. These suggestions had been denounced by opponents as 
naïve and were fulfi lled with more caution than that campaign 
message suggested, but the dealings that did take place bore some 
fruit, at least on the terms and conditions that the administra-
tion set for itself. As Obama left offi ce, Burma seemed back in 
the fold of “respectable” nations, some important channels had 
been opened to Cuba, and the JCPOA had brought to a successful 
climax an angst-ridden multi-party international negotiation. In 
a counter-factual world, a Hillary Clinton presidency would very 
likely have seen a further embedding of this legacy. The Iran deal 
would have been sustained so long as Iran stuck by its commit-
ments and perhaps more progress would have followed in devel-
oping relations with Cuba. Events in Burma followed their own 
brutal dynamic, but given Clinton’s personal investment as secre-
tary of state in bringing the country back into the international 
fold, it seems likely at least that there would have been a serious 
effort to intervene as the situation deteriorated. As it was, in the 
real world of a Trump presidency, the resilience of those initiatives 
proved limited.
Further, Obama’s hopes of freeing the US from the ongoing 
confl icts across Iraq and Afghanistan did not fully materialize. 
The nature of the confl icts, especially in Iraq, changed, but simply 
downsizing the US presence did not end the political and military 
entanglement. The problems were captured by the administration’s 
sometimes fl oundering response to the Arab Spring. In an article 
that largely lauded the decisions made by Obama, the political 
scientist Marc Lynch refl ected on the irreconcilable contradictions 
the administration faced in its dealings in the Middle East:
Obama’s approach to the Arab uprisings was both visionary and 
incoherent. The administration sympathized with the aspirations 
of the protesters and hoped to encourage democratic transitions. 
But it struggled to grasp the fact that the old order under attack 
was a US-backed regional order, defended by US allies concerned, 
above all, with keeping themselves in power. The right side of his-
tory, on which Obama hoped to place the United States, may have 
appealed to American values, but it viscerally challenged American 
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interests.117 In this context any legacy was likely to be unsatisfactory. 
Helping dispose of a tyrant in Libya did not lead to political stability 
in that country, yet standing relatively aside as another hung on to 
power in Syria brought no end to the chaos.
In the end, the Obama administration may have tried to 
minimize doing “stupid stuff,” but that has a limited capacity 
to leave a distinctive legacy. For President Trump the ends were 
at least straightforwardly defi ned, manifested by the language 
of “America First” and an embrace of Jacksonian principles. 
Obama’s foreign policy decisions were far from inconsequential, 
but many of the consequences were not fully played out when he 
left offi ce: And perhaps the two most Obama-like initiatives to 
negotiate complex multilateral settlements to complex problems, 
the JCPOA and the TPP, were also conceivably the two most 
prominent examples of legacy rollback.
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The issues that we have considered so far have revolved around 
different, if sometimes sprawling, policy domains, and the respec-
tive capacities of the Obama and Trump administrations to imple-
ment and undo a variety of policy initiatives. This chapter and the 
next will somewhat move away from that formula and will refl ect 
on the manner in which presidents Obama and Trump exercised 
their presidential powers. As we have already explained, it is far 
from simple to make defi nitive judgments about the legacy imprint 
of presidential actions, even in relatively tangible policy areas. 
That diffi culty is heightened with regard to assessing the inevi-
tably singular manner in which individual presidents wield their 
authority. Even presidents that mostly snugly fi t Skowronek’s cat-
egory of “articulation,” who look to build on their predecessors’ 
political and policy foundations, will look to establish their own 
brand of executive leadership and individual political identity. 
A hypothetical President Hillary Clinton would very likely have 
furthered Obama’s agenda in many of the areas where we have 
instead looked at President Trump’s efforts at reversal, but she 
would also have employed different skills and set a different tone 
than Obama in terms of applying the powers of the offi ce. Hence, 
the fact that President Trump has been quite a different leader 
from Obama is not surprising. On the other hand, for even the 
most casual observer, the gulf between the rhetorical styles of the 
two men and their means of communication is quite extraordi-
nary. We will catch up with that aspect of their presidencies in the 
next chapter. Here we focus on how they exercised their powers 
of offi ce and dealt with the many obstacles hindering the effective 
application of those powers. In doing so we focus on the process 
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of nominating and securing the confi rmation of justices to the fed-
eral judicial bench, the manner in which the two administrations 
managed the inevitable scandals affl icting any modern presidency, 
and how they conducted the nation’s foreign policy.
The judicial branch
One of the key opportunities a president sometimes gets to shape 
the country’s future is with their nominations for places on the 
federal bench. The long-term importance of this power is at its 
most public and politicized when a Supreme Court vacancy arises. 
In his Senate confi rmation hearings after being nominated to the 
Court by President George W. Bush, John Roberts demurred from 
the notion that justices should be likened to partisans. Instead, he 
insisted, “judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; 
they apply them.”1 And often the justices will be in agreement on 
how to apply the rules in cases where the political stakes are low, 
but the prevailing conventional wisdom as Obama entered offi ce 
was that he would be dealing with a divided Court. This involved 
four justices inclined to fi nd their way to a liberal answer and 
four more likely to alight on a conservative alternative in those 
cases that had a clearer ideological dividing line, leaving Justice 
Anthony Kennedy as the more idiosyncratic median fi gure.
The importance of Kennedy was manifested in an extremely 
high-profi le manner in the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling of 2015, 
which granted a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. This 
right can legitimately be seen as a legacy of the Obama era, even 
though it resulted from the Court’s actions rather than directly 
from the executive branch. Whilst the President himself had dem-
onstrated some caution, initially at least, with regard to laying 
out his own position on gay marriage (something he was roundly 
criticized for by activist groups), the same-sex marriage ruling is 
considered a substantial part of his legacy.2 Despite Obama’s fi rst 
election and early-days public position of being opposed to gay 
marriage, it was clear to anyone who had watched closely that 
this was more of a strategic than a personal stance. He was at 
pains to avoid alienating the large number of African American 
Christian voters who supported him but were overtly opposed to 
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same-sex marriage. David Axelrod’s 2015 memoir Believer con-
fi rmed this, and the President’s chief political strategist outlines 
how Obama was encouraged to “evolve” his position over time, 
thereby avoiding a sudden shock for the socially conservative 
among his supporters.3 By the time the Court took up the case 
Obama had fully “evolved” on the matter, but it was Kennedy’s 
vote that was critical, with four liberals voting in favor of the 
civil rights issues and four conservatives against. As was so often 
the case, the decision of swing justice Anthony Kennedy was cru-
cial, and in this instance he sided with the liberals effectively to 
declare that same-sex marriage was a constitutional right. The 
court ruling chimed with the progressive agenda of the Obama 
administration.
On the other hand, this perspective on the Court’s dynamics 
was an oversimplifi cation, as sometimes the Court’s alignments 
could be constructed differently. It was Roberts, not Kennedy, 
who provided the critical fi fth vote to uphold the Affordable Acre 
Act in 2012. Yet, a president’s Supreme Court picks are a key part 
of their legacy and, whatever the disclaimers about seeking the 
best-qualifi ed candidates, those picks are guided by ideological 
preference. A president who successfully nominates one or more 
justices to the Supreme Court gets the chance to help preserve not 
only key aspects of their own legacy that might come under legal 
challenge over time, but also to lean the court in one direction 
or another on critical issues, including such perennial political 
controversies as abortion rights, the scope of affi rmative action 
policies and the meaning of the Second Amendment. On the other 
hand, the Court’s capacity to rebuke the executive branch has 
been witnessed numerous times. One famous example of this 
came in 1952 when President Truman, trying to avert a strike in 
the steel industry during the Korean War while also attempting 
to maintain good relations with organized labor, issued Executive 
Order 10340. This gave the Secretary of Commerce the power to 
take control of the steel industry. In June 1952, however, in a 6–3 
decision, the Supreme Court ruled this an unconstitutional act.
Perhaps the most famous (or even notorious) example of a 
president attempting to impose executive branch authority over 
the judicial branch came with Franklin Roosevelt’s 1937 court 
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packing plan.4 Some scholarship has questioned the extent to 
which that episode is correctly seen as an explicit power grab, 
but as public opinion and the Senate turned against FDR’s plan, 
even that giant of presidential authority was defeated.5 This is a 
complex story, and FDR’s frustrations with the Court’s decisions 
with regard to key pieces of New Deal legislation were lessened 
by the “switch in time that saved nine,” leading the President to 
refl ect that he might have lost the battle in 1937, but he had won 
the war. Alternatively, it has been argued that the fractures in his 
political coalition that were exposed as a result of the plan did 
not properly heal, diminishing the capacity for further decisive 
progressive legislation.6
Whatever view is taken of the long-term consequences of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s effort in 1937, the episode does clearly illus-
trate the institutional limits of a president’s power to short-circuit 
the nomination and Senate confi rmation process, with these lim-
its very evident again in 2016. In fact, there is no institutional 
mechanism that guarantees a president will get the chance to fi ll a 
court vacancy, which left one-term president Jimmy Carter bereft 
of even that chance to leave a stamp on the future. Moreover, 
there have been cases when presidents have not got what they 
expected from their nominees. Notably, President Eisenhower’s 
appointment of Earl Warren did not meet his expectations of a 
chief justice who would lead the court toward a conservative 
agenda. During his sixteen years on the bench Warren ruled in 
favor of outlawing school segregation and his Court was respon-
sible for numerous other progressive decisions.7
In response, Eisenhower reportedly lamented that the nomi-
nations of Warren and William Brennan to the Court were his 
two biggest mistakes. At that time, however, nominations were 
not based simply on the ideological positions of potential jus-
tices; Eisenhower picked these two men with wider political 
deal-making in mind rather than because he had good reason 
to expect them to be faithful conservatives.8 More recently, 
and in the era in which Supreme Court nominations were rec-
ognized as not just political but highly ideological, George H. 
W. Bush nominated David Souter to the court. Bush’s chief of 
staff, John Sununu, had advised the President that Souter would 
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be a reliable conservative, but this was decidedly not the case.9 
Alongside wholly unanticipated developments such as these, 
there have been surprise choices. Arch-conservative President 
Reagan nominated the Court’s fi rst female justice, and Sandra 
Day O’Connor was notably moderate in her conservatism.10 In 
order to understand the importance of each individual justice 
and hence the consequence of each presidential pick, it is worth 
refl ecting on how one of Reagan’s nominees, Robert Bork, was 
blocked by Senate, which fi nally led to Justice Anthony Kennedy 
fi lling that vacant place on the court. Bork’s record suggested 
that he would have been a very conservative voice but, while 
Kennedy did often side with the conservative wing of the court, 
he was a more liberal vote on the hot-button culture war issues 
of abortion and same-sex rights.
As it was, Souter’s example did mean that future Republican 
administrations were much more rigorous in their vetting of jus-
tices to ensure that there were no repeats, making it much more 
likely that a modern president will successfully gravitate toward 
a choice of justice that chimes at least broadly with his world-
view. Bill Clinton was in fact somewhat disinclined to participate 
too actively in the selection of judges to the federal bench,11 stat-
ing that he wanted “a judge with a soul.”12 In addition, Clinton 
declared that his only criteria for nomination was a candidate’s 
stance on abortion, though in the context of post-Roe America this 
was hardly an incidental qualifi cation; this red-hot political issue 
had become, and remains, the litmus test for any Supreme Court 
nominee. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration did not view the 
Supreme Court as a vehicle for social change. As Joe Klein stated, 
“it’s enough to put people of demonstrated quality on the bench. 
We’ve gone across gender, race and national origin lines. And that 
is a legacy the president is proud of.”13 Such an approach was not 
continued during the George W. Bush years. The 43rd president 
moved quickly in announcing that he would no longer consult 
with the American Bar Association on prospective nominees, as 
his predecessors had done. Instead, the White House would look 
to the explicitly conservative Federalist Society for advice and 
guidance.14 The Bush choices of John Roberts and Samuel Alito 
were well received by social conservatives, along with virtually all 
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the other 325 federal bench justices that took their seat on Bush’s 
watch.15 Yet even Bush found his presidential authority rebuked 
when he initially nominated White House counsel Harriet Miers to 
replace the retiring Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court. 
In this instance, the skepticism of senior congressional Republi-
cans to endorse Miers was reinforced by the Federalist Society’s 
objections and her nomination did not move forward.16
As a Senator, Obama made his opposition to the Roberts and 
Alito nominations clear at the time. In both cases he acknowl-
edged the intellectual accomplishments and capacity of the candi-
dates but highlighted his concerns with regard to their respective 
voting records. Coming down on the side of those with power 
would be a problematic aspect of their respective tenures, as he 
argued from a liberal perspective.17 During the campaign Obama 
had spoken of his preference for justices with “empathy to under-
stand what it’s like to be poor, or African American, or gay, or 
disabled, or old,” provoking Republicans into responding that 
judges should apply the law as it was written rather than through 
the lens of their own experience.18 But Obama did not view the 
Courts generally as a means of bringing change, and his admin-
istration was slow off the mark with regard to fi lling positions 
on the federal bench.19 Nevertheless, it was not long after enter-
ing the Oval Offi ce that he got his own opportunity to appoint a 
justice to the highest court. With a gender imbalance of eight men 
to one woman, a female nomination was likely and, for many, 
a welcome development. The appointment of Sonia Sotomayor, 
then serving on the US Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, in 
August 2009 offered an undeniable shot in the arm for the admin-
istration, and the Latina’s liberal credentials were evident from 
the outset. Her nomination had led to a further round of debate 
about the importance of “empathy,” as she had previously noted 
how her decision-making was likely to some degree to be “based 
on my gender and my Latina heritage.”20 In the end, however, she 
was confi rmed by 68 votes to 31.
One year later, President Obama’s second Supreme Court 
choice, Elena Kagan, the administration’s Solicitor General, was 
approved. Some of Obama’s more liberal supporters were initially 
disappointed, as they had hoped for a bolder pick even though the 
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nominee was a known Democrat. As it was, Kagan was explicit 
about her partisan preferences during her confi rmation hearings, 
but insisted that this would not affect her capacity to judge impar-
tially.21 Her nomination was confi rmed by 63 votes to 37.
Such rapid changes of personnel offer a reminder of the sub-
stantial and sustained reinforcement that a president can acquire 
via other branches of government. The arrival of two justices 
within a brief period also undid any assumptions that the Roberts 
Court was a static entity. Yet, with these two choices Obama did 
not really have the chance to alter the overall ideological balance 
of the Court. While the two retiring justices, David Souter and 
John Paul Stevens, had both been nominated by Republican presi-
dents, both were fi rmly in the liberal wing of the Court on those 
issues that divided the justices along mostly predictable ideological 
lines. The unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February 
2016, however, seemed to offer Obama a chance to change the 
make-up of the Court in a more profound manner as Scalia, if not 
the most deeply conservative member of the Court, had over the 
years provided perhaps the Court’s most assertive, and often intel-
lectually robust, line of conservative reasoning. Replacing Scalia 
with a more liberal line of jurisprudence would have involved a 
rebalancing of a central institution of American governance. This 
would have been a legacy of substance and would have provided 
liberals with some comfort given their losses across so many of the 
country’s elected institutions during the Obama years.
What happened after Scalia’s death, however, laid bare the 
extent to which the Court was perceived to be, and was, a politi-
cal institution. It also showed that the electoral setbacks suffered 
by the Democratic Party, notably the Republican takeover of the 
Senate in the 2014 midterm elections, had consequences beyond 
legislative stalemate. The deeply partisan environment resulted in 
President Obama’s March 2016 nomination of the moderate Mer-
rick Garland being stonewalled for the remainder of the Obama 
term. In the immediate aftermath of Scalia’s death, Congressional 
Republicans made clear their determination to avoid facilitating the 
scale of legacy reinforcement that would come with an extra liberal 
on the Court. This saw an explicit power play by Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, who made plain that the 
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Senate would not begin hearings on Garland’s nomination, never 
mind bring things to a vote. When announcing Garland’s nomina-
tion Obama made it clear that his choice had been infl uenced by a 
desire to pick a nominee who had previously garnered bipartisan 
praise for his work: “It is tempting to make this confi rmation pro-
cess simply an extension of our divided politics. . . . But to go down 
that path would be wrong.”22 That appeal carried little weight. In 
the summer of 2016, McConnell bragged: “One of my proudest 
moments was when I looked Barack Obama in the eye and I said to 
him, ‘You will not fi ll this Supreme Court vacancy.’”23
It is also important to understand that Republican obstruction-
ism with regard to judicial nominees extended beyond Garland’s 
fate. The Supreme Court is, by defi nition, at the top of the fed-
eral judicial system, but the circuit and district courts also make 
many critical decisions, with the judges on those courts also nomi-
nated by the executive branch and confi rmed by the Senate. The 
Pew Research Center’s analysis revealed that 324 of the Obama 
administration’s nominees were confi rmed to those courts, bring-
ing a considerably greater degree of diversity to the make-up of 
the federal bench. Of the successful nominees, 208 were white, 
58 black, 31 Hispanic, and 18 Asian, with a further 9 non-white 
judges appointed. Thus 36 percent of these appointments were 
non-white, compared with 24 percent under President Clinton 
and 18 percent under President George W. Bush. Moreover, this 
increased diversity extended to gender, with 42 percent of Obama-
era appointees being female compared to 28 percent under Clinton 
and 22 percent for Bush.24
The process of confi rming nominees in the Senate, even for 
these positions below the Supreme Court, had, however, become 
increasingly fractious. Through to the end of 2014 Democrats 
enjoyed a Senate majority but the GOP had used its power to 
fi libuster executive nominations, including some for positions on 
the federal bench. Democrat frustration came to a head in late 
2013 as Republicans delayed the confi rmation of three Obama 
nominees to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. In November 2013, then Senate Majority Leader Demo-
crat Harry Reid from Nevada broke with decades of precedent 
to end the capacity of a minority to fi libuster judicial nominees 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   161 18/08/20   1:30 PM
obama v. trump
162
for positions below the Supreme Court. In the short term, this 
manoeuvre boosted the rate at which Obama nominees got con-
fi rmed. In 2014 eighty-nine judicial nominations were confi rmed, 
making it the most productive year of the Obama presidency in 
this regard.25 Yet, while those lifetime appointments should be 
viewed as part of the Obama legacy, the Democrats’ tactics came 
with a long-term price tag. During the Senate debate in November 
2013, then Minority Leader McConnell warned his opponents 
that they had broken an institutional norm in a manner that could 
leave them vulnerable to a future change in the partisan balance 
of power, and he accurately predicted: “We look forward to hav-
ing a great election in 2014.”26
Reid’s actions centered on Senate procedure, but the New 
York Times reported that Obama “applauded” Reid’s initiative. 
At the time Obama’s words were slightly more nuanced than 
suggested by that description, as he focused on the behavior of 
the Senate GOP, noting, “today’s pattern of obstruction, it just 
isn’t normal,” rather than explicitly celebrating how the dimin-
ishing of the fi libuster would have the effect of facilitating the 
passage of his executive branch choices.27 Yet, he did refl ect on 
how Senate obstructionism was preventing him from fulfi lling 
his constitutional duties and fi lling not just judicial seats but a 
variety of posts throughout the administration. As presaged by 
McConnell’s comments, however, the 2014 midterm elections 
did empower the Republicans in Senate as well as the House and 
the fi nal two years saw obstructionism with regard to Senate con-
fi rmation of judicial nominees reach new heights. In his fi nal two 
years in offi ce, Obama managed to get only two circuit court 
and eighteen district court judges confi rmed. This compared to 
totals of sixty-eight and seventy-three for George W. Bush and 
Bill Clinton respectively, remembering that they also faced a 
Senate controlled by the opposite party.28
Moreover, as McConnell organized resistance to Obama’s judi-
cial nominees the make-up of the courts, and most obviously the 
Supreme Court, came to be an important theme on the 2016 cam-
paign trail. As candidate Trump became the surprise Republican 
nominee, he soon realized the currency of a possible conservative 
court appointment. The Federalist Society listed twenty-one names 
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as potential contenders and at some rallies, Trump went so far as 
to say that even if voters had reservations about him, they should 
still vote him in because they would get the conservative justice they 
so desperately wanted.29 The media was full of coverage of those 
on the religious right who struggled with Trump’s own character 
and actions, not least around the time of the “Pussygate” tapes. 
Social conservatives drew comfort from two sources, one of which 
was Mike Pence as the devout Christian vice presidential candidate. 
The other was the list of Federalist Society suggestions to replace 
that “Schwarzenegger of jurisprudence,” Antonin Scalia.30 Naming 
potential Supreme Court justices in this manner during a campaign 
was unprecedented, but proved to be an effective strategic move in 
what was often a disorganized campaign.
It is diffi cult to quantify precisely how much impact this had 
on voting behavior, but there is evidence that the prospect of fi ll-
ing Scalia’s seat was a more powerful motivating factor for con-
servatives than liberals.31 Certainly, Scalia’s death, which seemed 
like an unexpected opportunity in early 2016 for Obama to shift 
the balance of the Supreme Court and hence extend his legacy, 
ended up becoming an important organizational tool for candi-
date Trump to keep hold of part of the conservative coalition that 
might have looked askance at the Republican nominee’s personal 
lifestyle. In short, some religious Trump supporters were will-
ing to make what some described as a Faustian deal in order to 
maintain a post-Scalia conservative balance on the court.32 Some 
liberals also used the benefi t of hindsight to argue that President 
Obama should have predicted how McConnell would behave and 
hence used his nominating power to put forward a candidate who 
would appeal to the party’s base support, rather than “a mid-
dle-aged, white male centrist,” and championed this nomination 
on the basis of “ideological grounds” rather than “procedural 
norms.” Such a strategy would not have persuaded McConnell, 
but just might have made it “easier to mobilize the Democratic 
base in outrage” throughout the election cycle.33
Whatever the merits of second-guessing Garland’s nomination, 
once Trump took offi ce, the list of twenty-one he had announced 
during the campaign was shortened to eight, and forty-nine-year-
old Neil Gorsuch was chosen. At this point, under existing Senate 
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rules, it was still possible to fi libuster a Supreme Court nominee, as 
Reid’s manouver in 2013 had left that norm in place. In what was 
perhaps an unsurprising move in the circumstances, McConnell, 
with his party holding a majority of 52 to 48, moved to revoke that 
norm, preventing the Democrats from holding Gorsuch hostage. 
As a regular churchgoer, married to his college sweetheart, this 
constitutional originalist and social conservative could hardly have 
contrasted more to the president that nominated him. Illustrat-
ing the exaggerated reaction that Supreme Court news can cause, 
those less enamoured with the Trump win and Gorsuch appoint-
ment demonstrated their concerns for future bodily autonomy by 
stocking up on contraceptives. Such a knee-jerk reaction was not 
unusual, as was demonstrated when gun enthusiasts stocked up 
after both Obama victories.34 Liberal dismay, however, was raised 
a further notch when Trump was fortunate enough to be provided 
with a second Supreme Court nomination opportunity within six-
teen months of taking offi ce. In June 2018, eighty-two-year-old 
Anthony Kennedy announced his retirement from the court after 
thirty years of service. The departure of this Reagan appointee, 
considered by so many to be the key swing justice between the 
two polarized groups within the court, was viewed as potentially 
game-changing. Not only did it mean that gay marriage and 
other relatively “new” developments might be under threat, but 
also more embedded political thorns such as Roe v. Wade. Even 
before his absence it was clear that state-level political actors were 
attempting to tighten abortion rights and on the campaign trail 
Trump promised his base that he would appoint pro-life justices. 
The potential threat to Roe v. Wade is a perennial concern for 
progressives; hence there are laws on the books in eight states that 
preserve a woman’s right to an abortion should the 1973 ruling 
be overturned.35
With Kennedy’s retirement, President Trump browsed his Fed-
eralist Society list of names for a second time. In July 2018 he 
settled on Brett Kavanaugh as his nominee. In its reporting, the 
New York Times described Kavanaugh as “a politically connected 
member of Washington’s conservative legal establishment,” with 
his nomination likely to stir an “epic confi rmation battle” given 
the high stakes of “potentially cementing the court’s rightward 
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tilt for a generation.”36 Using the 2007 Epstein model, Nate 
Silver’s 538.com website predicted that if placed on the Supreme 
Court, Kavanaugh would sit ideologically to the right of Samuel 
Alito and Neil Gorsuch, but would likely be less conservative 
than Clarence Thomas. This conclusion was based not only on 
the voting record of the individual but also the ideological posi-
tion of the president who appointed him, along with those of the 
relevant senators and related actors.37 One consequence was that 
Chief Justice Roberts would become the new median voice on the 
Court. On many issues where Kennedy had ruled with the con-
servatives, such as campaign fi nance, business regulation, voting 
cases, gun rights, religious liberty and the like, this would not shift 
the likely opinions from the Court. Elsewhere, however, shifting 
the median point from Kennedy to Roberts was potentially hugely 
signifi cant—and not just with regard to abortion rights. Other 
areas in the spotlight included capital punishment and solitary 
confi nement, religious anti-discrimination law, and possibly gay 
rights and race-based affi rmative action.38
As it was, Kavanaugh’s confi rmation battle was “epic,” though 
not for the reasons initially expected. As the confi rmation hear-
ings proceeded, it was evident that Republican senators were likely 
to stay on board. There was considerable focus on the isolated 
pro-choice Republican senators, notably Susan Collins and Lisa 
Murkowski, who had bucked their leadership before over repeal-
ing Obamacare; but it looked as if McConnell had held his caucus 
together. Then, however, allegations that Kavanaugh was guilty of 
sexual assault when in high school emerged. Further allegations 
of sexual misconduct by Kavanaugh as a university student also 
became public. For his part, Kavanaugh strongly denied all the 
allegations. President Trump stood by his man, defending Kavana-
ugh’s integrity and then, at a rally in Mississippi, mocking one of 
the accusers. In the end, with the allegations remaining unproven, 
the Senate confi rmed Kavanaugh by a 50 to 48 vote.39
Beyond the Supreme Court, the Trump administration proved 
very effective at getting nominees to the rest of the federal bench 
confi rmed. When Obama left offi ce there were 112 vacancies on 
the federal bench. This number compared with fi fty-three vacan-
cies when Obama entered offi ce, with that disparity refl ecting the 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   165 18/08/20   1:30 PM
obama v. trump
166
effectiveness of Republican obstructionism over the last quarter of 
Obama’s time in offi ce.40 Trump taunted his predecessor: “When 
I got in, we had over 100 federal judges that weren’t appointed. 
I don’t know why Obama left that. It was like a big beautiful pres-
ent to all of us. Why the hell did he leave that. . . . Maybe he got 
complacent.”41 By mid-September 2019, 150 Trump nominees 
had been confi rmed to lifetime positions on the federal bench, 
compared to ninety-six for Obama at a similar point in time. 
President Trump tweeted a New York Times report to note the 
landmark: “This week, the Senate passed a milestone in con-
fi rming the 150th Federal Judge of Mr. Trump’s Administration 
to a lifetime appointment, far outstripping Barack Obama’s 
pace and fulfi lling pledges by Mr. Trump and Mr. O’Connell to 
remake the Federal Judiciary . . .”42 The extent to which this had 
changed the overall political complexion of the federal bench 
should not be exaggerated, since 60 percent of the judgeships 
that had been fi lled by Trump nominees by that stage replaced 
previous Republican nominees. Nevertheless, between January 
2017 and July 2019 the percentage of judges appointed by a 
Republican president had risen from 41 to 52 percent. More-
over, all but one of Trump’s nominees had been members of the 
Federalist Society at some point.43 One further clear difference 
between Obama and Trump was in the demographic make-up 
of their nominees. While less than 40 percent of federal judges 
appointed by Obama were white men, that number jumped 
back up to 70 percent under Trump.44
As discussed in the next chapter, President Trump con-
founded expectations of how a president should behave on an 
almost daily basis. One of the ways in which he defi ed conven-
tion was to explicitly attack judges when they made decisions 
he did not like. Barely two weeks into his presidency, Trump 
responded furiously when a federal judge put a temporary halt 
to the hastily imposed ban on people arriving into the US from 
seven Muslim majority countries. Trump tweeted, “The opinion 
of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement 
away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!”45 At 
the end of 2018, Trump’s continued critiques brought rebuke from 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Roberts. Trump had 
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attacked a decision from the Ninth Circuit as a “disgrace” and 
labeled the presiding judge as “an Obama judge.” This prompted 
Roberts to retort that it was wrong to refer to “Obama judges or 
Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. What we have is an 
extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing their level best to 
do equal right to those appearing before them. . . . The indepen-
dent judiciary is something we should all be thankful for.”46 There 
was, however, little subsequent evidence that Trump had taken 
this reprimand to heart.
This overt presidential hostility to decisions taken by the judi-
cial branch was not, however, unprecedented. George W. Bush, 
for example, had made clear his frustration when the Supreme 
Court ruled that detainees in Guantanamo Bay did have some 
legal protections. Yet, it was President Obama who elevated criti-
cism of the court to a new level when, in January 2010, in his State 
of the Union address, he rebuked the Supreme Court’s decision 
in the case of Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission. 
Obama prefaced his critique of that decision, which undid the 
McCain-Feingold campaign fi nance reform act, by acknowledg-
ing “all due deference to the separation of powers,” but his words 
were perceived as especially provocative given that several of the 
justices were in the audience. Justice Samuel Alito, who was part 
of the majority in that case, was widely reported to have mouthed 
“not true” in response to Obama’s comments.47 Nevertheless, 
even if Obama had already made clear that criticisms of the judi-
ciary were quite within bounds for a president, Trump’s consistent 
attacks had a potentially more corrosive effect. As explained by 
Russell Berman,
The tangible impact of Trump’s attacks on the judiciary has been more 
limited than some initially feared. . . . It has . . . responded to . . . legal 
defeats as the system intended—through appeals within the federal 
courts themselves. But little by little, tweet by tweet, Trump is contrib-
uting to a shift in how the judiciary is perceived as an institution, from 
one prized for its independence from the partisan brawl to one that’s 
no less political than its sister branches of government.48
It might be said that Trump’s refrains simply echoed a sup-
pressed reality about how the courts often seemed to work, with 
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justices regularly managing to fi nd a way to their initially pre-
ferred conclusion. Even so, his disregard for the norms of presi-
dential rhetoric was striking and perhaps helps to explain why 
his administration so quickly and often found itself accused of 
substantive, as well as symbolic, wrongdoing.
Scandal management
One key test of a president’s leadership style is how they respond 
when their administration is hit by scandal. This almost inevitable 
occurrence obliges the Oval Offi ce resident to utilize their political 
and communication skills, not least in managing the issue-associ-
ated fallout. Barack Obama’s bold claim that “We’re probably 
the fi rst administration in modern history that hasn’t had a major 
scandal in the White House,” has been repeatedly challenged.49 
It is clear that events perceived to be scandalous occurred on his 
watch.50 However, one indisputable fact remains: During his eight 
years in the Oval Offi ce, no special prosecutor was appointed to 
investigate high-level executive wrong-doing. Even some of Presi-
dent Obama’s detractors acknowledged his character traits. In his 
memoirs, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was highly critical 
of his Commander in Chief. Nonetheless, he clarifi ed his position 
in relation to the President as an individual, stating that he was 
“a man of personal integrity.”51 In an interview at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, former senior advisor to President Obama David 
Axelrod pointed out that the administration had had “no major 
scandals” since coming to power in 2009. He credited the ban on 
revolving door politics for this, stating that the situation under the 
Obama regime was “light years” away from that of his predeces-
sors.52 This was not a legacy continued by his successor.
On January 21, 2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 
13490. This stated that full-time non-career presidential and vice-
presidential appointees were barred after leaving the administra-
tion from “lobbying” an executive branch offi cial “covered” by 
the Lobbying Disclosure Act or any non-career SES appointment 
for the remainder of the administration.53 Additionally, all senior 
offi cials subject to the statutory one-year cooling-off period on 
lobbying and advocacy communications to their former agencies 
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were required to abide by such cooling-off periods for two years.54 
When President Trump took offi ce in 2017, he signed Executive 
Order 13770.55 Announced with fanfare as part of his “drain the 
swamp” initiative, Trump’s order on managing undue special 
interest infl uence was notably similar to the one it superseded. In 
due course, the Trump administration received a range of criti-
cism for not adhering to its own ethics rules, including a series 
of formal complaints from government watchdog group Public 
Citizen.56 As it turned out, this was the least of President Trump’s 
ethics violation worries. Following in the footsteps of every leader 
(save Obama) since Richard Nixon, he was obliged to contend 
with that most unsettling of challenges to presidential power, a 
special prosecutor investigation. The nation had experienced a 
welcome hiatus from this lengthy and expensive process during 
the Obama years, but that is not to overlook the ongoing scandal 
allegations made against the 44th president at a time when fake 
news and the distortion of truth was on the rise.
Undermining the presidency: Benghazi
Throughout President Obama’s eight years in offi ce, there were 
regular calls from opposition politicians and hostile media for his 
impeachment. Motivations ranged from pressuring him to release 
his birth certifi cate to rage at his decision to stop defending the 
Defense of Marriage Act.57 In the vast majority of these instances, 
hyperbole outweighed meaningful rationale and the efforts came to 
nothing. Yet there were episodes when some mud at least did stick, 
and the term “Benghazi” is probably one that is most synonymous 
in the public mind with scandal in relation to the Obama admin-
istration. However, of the usual associated ingredients, be they 
infl uence peddling, corruption, greed, sex, or a novel interpretation 
of the law, none were present in this scenario. In fact, the events 
behind the scandal clamor were more serious and grave than the 
routine misbehaviors that leading political actors pursue.
On September 11th 2012, four Americans, among others, 
were killed in two separate attacks on the US consulate and the 
nearby CIA compound in the Libyan city of Benghazi. The story 
was one of chaos and drama with a tragic outcome. Information 
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surfaced immediately that those on the ground in Benghazi had 
been requesting additional security but to no avail. Republicans 
cried foul and claimed that the administration was involved in 
a cover-up of its incompetence.58 Amongst those killed was US 
Ambassador Chris Stevens, who was the fi rst ambassador to be 
murdered in service since 1979. This directly involved then Secre-
tary of State Hillary Clinton, and critics understandably wanted 
to understand why American personnel had been left so perilously 
in harm’s way.
Furthermore, the timing of the attacks inevitably made them 
a major political fl ashpoint, coming as they did less than two 
months before the 2012 elections. Initially the administration 
stated that the situation had occurred as a result of an infl am-
matory video posted online, and US Ambassador to the UN 
Susan Rice declared as much in a television interview fi ve days 
later.59 Republicans were clearly, and justifi ably, unhappy with 
this explanation, immediately claiming that a more likely reason 
was the administration’s failure to manage the security situa-
tion in Benghazi and even manage its policy in the region. As 
it was, the State Department’s own Accountability and Review 
Board reported that “Systemic failures and leadership and man-
agement defi ciencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the 
State Department . . . resulted in a Special Mission security pos-
ture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate 
to deal with the attack that took place.”60 Certainly the fi rst 
response from the White House had been misleading, however 
unintentionally, and the issue became increasingly politicized 
as the President’s opponents took the opportunity to castigate 
him for failing to protect American diplomats in a volatile loca-
tion and then lacking a transparent response when the diffi cult 
questions were asked. No less than ten investigations ensued, 
including those conducted by House and Senate Committees. 
Reports were duly produced, in a bitterly partisan environment. 
Not for the fi rst time involving a Clinton, a crisis moment was 
presented as a liberal cover-up of the truth or a vast right-wing 
conspiracy, depending on the source. In the end, none of the ten 
investigations produced evidence to support claims of corrup-
tion or a concerted cover-up made against the administration.61 
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The incident did hurt Rice’s chances of succeeding Clinton as 
secretary of state, and a potentially bitter confi rmation fi ght in 
the aftermath of her television performance saw her withdraw 
from consideration for the post.62
While identifying causal factors to explain the 2016 presiden-
tial election result—which had huge implications for the resilience 
of Obama’s legacy—is not a task for this book, it is important 
to refl ect on how the murder of Ambassador Stevens and three 
other American personnel in Benghazi was politically damaging 
to Hillary Clinton for the next four years. Whatever the truth of 
what happened in the US Special Mission on that brutal day, the 
immediate response of the State Department to the fi rst killing of 
a US ambassador since 1979 was, at the least, open to conten-
tion. Secretary Clinton’s role and efforts to provide security to the 
Ambassador would provide fodder for Republican congressional 
investigations for a considerable period.63 Of the numerous inves-
tigations, perhaps the noisiest was the House Select Committee 
on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi. 
This held its opening hearings in September 2014, fi ling its fi nal 
report in December 2016.64
In his memoir, Ben Rhodes describes how disorientating he 
and his colleagues found the conspiracy theories to be, and how 
odd the realization was that whatever the administration claimed, 
there were those who simply would not believe them. The term 
“Benghazi” became “an accusation that seemed to mean every-
thing and nothing at the same time, shifting from one conspiracy 
theory to the next.”65 The story signifi ed a growing trend in which, 
according to Rhodes, “the truth had become irrelevant.”66 The 
bogus scandal demonstrated how material found in the darker 
corners of the internet made its way into reports by higher-profi le 
media sources such as Breitbart and Fox News. This, along with 
other “fake news” stories, as they would become known, would 
increasingly undermine the executive’s ability to govern. White 
House staffer Derek Chollet decried what he saw as the “shame-
less and cynical way that Obama and Clinton’s critics used the 
Benghazi attacks to score political points with their rank and 
fi le” in order to undermine the US in its world role.67 Despite 
this challenge, and the catalogue of other accusations leveled 
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against President Obama, one fact remained. The Obama White 
House did not have to contend with the enormous strain and 
potential depletion of power that comes with a special prosecu-
tor investigation.
Nevertheless, since the Watergate era scandal management 
had become and remains a core component of presidential power. 
There is a pattern of sorts with the evolution of presidential scan-
dal management, and this can often be more damaging than the 
original misdemeanour. From sexual indiscretion to electoral and 
executive impropriety, most modern presidents have had to run 
the gauntlet of an independent external investigation that oper-
ates with an elastic remit and bottomless funding. For a brief 
period at least, observers may have been forgiven for wondering 
if the prosecutor-free Obama administration had fi nally broken 
the post-Watergate mould. It had not.
The Mueller investigation
Donald Trump was a mere sixteen weeks into the job when Special 
Counsel Robert Mueller was appointed to investigate the possibil-
ity of meddling by a hostile foreign power in the 2016 election. 
As a result, the 45th president was deprived of any meaningful 
opportunity to experience a pre- and post-special prosecutor era 
of his administration. If the achievements of the fi rst 100 days 
are the currency of the next, then the Trump administration was 
robbed of this potential benefi t in part at least by the hyper-focus 
on the special counsel appointment and relentless speculation 
relating to what he would uncover. Hence, outcome aside, every 
day that the Mueller investigation continued increased the politi-
cal damage done to the President. Such harm can occur in parallel 
with a president’s popularity, as was the case in this instance. The 
Mueller investigation may have damaged the President’s power, in 
that his reputation and international standing were impacted, but 
it did not negatively sway his supporters. His voter base remained 
unconditionally loyal, choosing to embrace the “witch hunt” 
narrative to explain the investigation. The president’s detractors 
already had a low opinion of him, which was not altered by the 
Mueller probe.68
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When considering damage control options, presidential advi-
sor Steve Bannon refl ected on how Bill Clinton had managed the 
extraordinarily intrusive investigation conducted by Kenneth 
Starr. When interviewed, Bannon stated his admiration for how 
the Clintons corralled the issue by building a legal and communi-
cations wall around it and distancing themselves from it. In Ban-
non’s view, this was the optimum way forward in the face of such 
an existential threat to a president’s power. Compartmentalizing 
the problem allowed the executive to remain functional and carry 
on with its agenda of running the country.69
In 2018, Donald Trump pardoned Lewis “Scooter” Libby of 
crimes he was convicted of by special counsel Patrick Fitzgerald, 
appointed during the George W. Bush years. The two had never 
met and the President justifi ed his decision on the basis that he 
believed Libby had been unfairly treated by the special counsel.70 
The pardon was granted in April, the same month that former FBI 
director James Comey, who had appointed Fitzgerald in 2003, 
released a book highly critical of President Trump’s behavior.71 
At that point, the Robert Mueller investigation was almost a year 
into its task and the President, in a norm-busting move, demanded 
that “the Department of Justice look into whether or not the FBI/
DoJ infi ltrated or surveiled” his campaign at the behest of the pre-
vious administration.72 Such a direct intervention by a president 
was unprecedented, as was the use of the platform from which he 
made the request. For the 45th president, Twitter was the com-
munication tool of choice. Perhaps unavoidably, Deputy Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein asked the Department of Justice inspec-
tor general to follow up on the President’s request.73
It is diffi cult to overstate the signifi cance of Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller’s appointment and investigation. On May 17th 
2016, the former FBI director and Marine Corps platoon com-
mander began his independent inquiry into possible US election 
meddling by a foreign government. The probe included Donald 
Trump’s presidential campaign, with a remit to search for poten-
tial collusion with (Russian) election interference. At the time, 
President Trump tweeted that Mueller’s appointment would “hurt 
our country.”74 There is little doubt that Team Trump, if not the 
man himself, was mindful of where such an investigation could 
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lead. Pundits were swift to roll out the Watergate comparisons, not 
least because within Mueller’s fi rst month on the job, Trump asso-
ciates were publicly discussing the President’s desire to fi re him.75 
It is possible that President Trump, new to the job and to politics, 
with his light grasp of history, may not have realized the abuse of 
power connotations that such a threat embodied. When Richard 
Nixon decided to have Watergate special prosecutor Archibald 
Cox fi red in 1973 he led the nation toward a constitutional crisis, 
taking a dramatic further step toward his own political downfall. 
As was the case in both instances, the President could not fi re the 
special counsel directly. He could order his Attorney General to 
do so, and if faced with a resignation, he could ask the Deputy 
Attorney General, and then the Solicitor General. In the context 
of Watergate, Nixon fi nally had his bidding done by the third 
in line, Robert Bork; the decision was declared illegal by the US 
Supreme Court a fortnight later.
Twitter rants aside, President Trump refrained from enacting 
his own Saturday Night Massacre, and the Mueller probe rum-
bled on. By the time the investigation was completed in spring 
2019, Mueller’s team had charged thirty-four individuals and 
three companies.76 Over time, the level of public support for the 
investigation remained steady. Approximately halfway through 
the process, 61 percent of those polled in March 2018 by Pew 
stated that they were “very” or “somewhat” confi dent that Muel-
ler’s probe would be fair. The number saying that they were not 
very confi dent (19 percent) and not at all confi dent (18 percent) 
tallied with Trump’s average poll ratings of 40 percent from the 
same time period.77 A Washington Post/ABC poll taken a month 
later resulted in a higher support of 69 percent for the Russia 
probe. This increase may be explained by the especially dramatic 
developments relating to the investigation in April 2018, when 
the home and offi ce of President Trump’s personal lawyer Michael 
Cohen were raided by the FBI. The poll took place as the alleged 
payback of $130,000 to adult entertainer Stormy Daniels was 
under scrutiny, and the public clearly drew a distinction between 
investigation of election fraud and hush money for a 2006 affair. 
Of those polled, 70 percent supported Mueller investigating 
the former and 58 percent the latter.78
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The scope of the special counsel’s suite of investigations inevi-
tably meant that a swift conclusion was unlikely. The White 
House clearly thought so too, despite presidential attorney Rudy 
Giuliani’s assertion that the probe would be done “in a week or 
two.”79 Trump lawyer Ty Cobb, known for promoting a coop-
erative approach with the seventy-three-year-old Republican and 
his team, was replaced in mid-2018 by Emmet Flood, who had 
represented Bill Clinton during his 1990s impeachment proceed-
ings and was known for his adversarial approach. As the mid-
term elections loomed, the administration worked to move the 
investigation along as swiftly as possible. This was not necessar-
ily because it would loom large as a priority issue for voters as 
they headed to the polls; however, Republicans were tipped to 
lose their Congressional majority on November 6th, putting the 
President in a far more vulnerable position. A lengthy Mueller 
investigation was deemed unlikely, not least due to the $1 million 
a month price tag. Nonetheless, in such polarized times it was 
crucial that Lady Justice did not peep from under her blindfold. 
If this made for slow progress, then so be it. From the administra-
tion’s perspective, the ongoing challenge to its power and prestige 
were deeply damaging.
Leadership in foreign policy
Presidential leadership in foreign affairs does not always play out 
as forecasted, especially when judged against the expectations cre-
ated during the inadequate time normally given to debating inter-
national affairs during a presidential election campaign. Moreover, 
events can quickly and sharply change the perceptions and actions 
of the incumbent of the White House. President George W. Bush, 
for example, in a campaign debate with Vice President Al Gore, 
famously spoke of the US needing to act as a “humble nation” 
rather than an “arrogant” one in order to win the “respect” of 
the world.80 This was perhaps misinterpreted to mean that Bush 
favored a more isolationist foreign policy, likely to prefer keep-
ing the US out of the international arena. That is certainly not 
what his foreign policy legacy turned out to be. Clearly the ter-
rorist attacks of 9/11 explain the nature of the interventions in 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   175 18/08/20   1:30 PM
obama v. trump
176
Afghanistan and also, to some extent, provided a rationale for 
those in his administration looking to justify the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003.81 Yet, even prior to 9/11, it was evident that “humble” 
did not mean modest; nor did it signify that the US would not 
aggressively pursue its own interests.82
Similarly, much of candidate Obama’s rhetoric on the cam-
paign on foreign affairs was over-interpreted by some of his more 
liberal supporters who ended up being disappointed by aspects of 
his leadership in foreign policy, which they saw as more muscular 
than they anticipated. Candidate Obama’s message was one that 
appealed to those looking for a change from the sometimes brash 
foreign policy leadership exercised by Bush’s team. On the cam-
paign trail he promised an end to executive branch justifi cations 
for practices at the least very close to torture, along with ending 
the practice of detaining “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo 
Bay. The former was fulfi lled with an executive order on January 
22, 2009, stipulating that interrogation could only be conducted 
in accord with Army Field Manual guidelines and that any legal 
advice permitting interrogation techniques beyond those guide-
lines issued between September 2001 and January 2009 was to 
be ignored. In summer 2014, in advance of a Senate Intelligence 
Committee report on the CIA’s activities, Obama again spoke out 
against what had happened: “When we engaged in some of these 
enhanced interrogation techniques, techniques that I believe and 
I think any fair-minded person would believe were torture, we 
crossed a line.”83 In his inaugural address, Obama had laid out 
how American power needed to be both tempered by an under-
standing of the needs of other nations and reinforced through tak-
ing the high ground: “[O]ur power alone cannot protect us, nor 
does it entitle us to do as we please. . . . our power grows through 
its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our 
cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humil-
ity and restraint.”84
Yet, if these messages along with his dove-like stance on the 
Iraq war led to the perception that Obama was to be a timid 
leader in foreign affairs, such an impression was misleading. 
Critics were certainly frustrated by the inaction as Syria burned, 
and some accused him of weakness when challenged by Russian 
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aggression. For example, as the crisis in Crimea grew and Rus-
sian annexation of Ukraine territory became a reality, Republican 
Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee—who was to become Chair 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—complained: “Our 
administration is creating an air of permissiveness,” and stated 
that there was a “need to show long-term resolve.”85 It would, 
however, be mistaken to view Obama’s unwillingness to com-
mit US forces as a sign of a president afraid to exert executive 
branch authority. Hence, at times, critics fumed as they accused 
the administration of acting imperially. As noted in Chapter 4, 
the Obama White House was dismissive of congressional pro-
tests that the intervention in Libya needed congressional authori-
zation. In September 2014, refl ecting on the Libyan intervention 
and the emerging military actions against Islamic State, Jack 
Goldsmith, who had served as assistant attorney general in the 
Offi ce of Legal Counsel in the Bush administration, noted:
Future historians will ask why George W. Bush sought and received 
express congressional authorization for his wars (against al Qaeda 
and Iraq) and his successor did not. They will puzzle over how Barack 
Obama the prudent war-powers constitutionalist transformed into a 
matchless war-powers unilateralist.86
This comment contains its share of partisan-inspired hyper-
bole, but it is based on the actuality of the Obama administra-
tion’s ambiguous attitude toward a congressional role in foreign 
policy-making. In turn, this refl ects how Obama’s legacy with 
regard to the conduct of foreign policy did not match the expecta-
tions of those who championed him as the unalloyed antidote to 
George W. Bush’s willingness to push the boundaries of legality.
The contradictions between the Obama administration’s 
desire to take what might be termed the moral high ground and 
its willingness to assert American power in controversial ways 
was highlighted by the use of drones to conduct military strikes, 
notably in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Obama’s use of drones 
signifi cantly expanded a program that had begun under the Bush 
administration. For Obama’s liberal supporters, the decision to 
“embrace an offi cial program of targeted killing of suspected 
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terrorists was one of the most surprising developments” of his 
time in offi ce.87 This was despite the fact that candidate Obama 
had stated in summer of 2007 that he would be willing to act in 
a foreign country even if the government of that country did not 
endorse the action. Referring explicitly to Pakistan, he said: “If 
we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets 
and President Musharraf won’t act, we will.”88 Nevertheless, the 
scale of drone strikes in Pakistan in the face of strong internal 
popular opposition was striking. In the early years of the admin-
istration, as Pakistan became a focus of US drone strikes, the 
number of strikes in that country peaked at 122 strikes in 2010, 
with one estimate of 830 casualties.89 Moreover, the anxieties 
about the value of these strikes was particularly acute given how 
the use of drone warfare in Pakistan was increasingly infl uenced 
by CIA assessments, with attacks carried out against the advice 
of successive US ambassadors to Pakistan.90 Pakistani resentment 
was on public display when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
visited Pakistan in late 2009. Reporting suggested that she han-
dled diffi cult situations in as dignifi ed a manner as possible but 
that she was left unable to appease angry audiences who chal-
lenged her about the missile strikes.91
For his part, Obama was clearly aware of the potential abuses 
that came with the use of drones and explicitly addressed that mat-
ter in a speech at the National Defense University in May 2013. 
First, he acknowledged the issues raised by the use of drones as a 
means of conducting warfare:
this new technology raises profound questions—about who is tar-
geted, and why; about civilian casualties, and the risk of creating new 
enemies; about the legality of such strikes under US and international 
law; about accountability and morality.
Next, if not accepting the estimates of some non-governmental 
organizations about numbers of civilian casualties, Obama did 
concede that “it is a hard fact that US strikes have resulted in 
civilian casualties” and he referred to how, as Commander in 
Chief, he had to live with “these heartbreaking tragedies.” Still, 
he argued that drones were preferable to alternative means of 
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warfare and insisted: “Our efforts must be measured against the 
history of putting American troops in distant lands among hos-
tile populations.”92
An in-depth New York Times report detailed how personally 
involved Obama was in the decision-making with regard to the 
use of drones, but also noted how some advisors worried that the 
emphasis on this type of technological solution to the problem of 
al Qaeda, even though successful in killing many senior fi gures in 
that terrorist organization, had substituted for the development 
of long-term strategies to combat the appeal of anti-American 
preaching.93 More generally, Andreas Krieg maintains that the 
use of drones was consistent with the administration’s efforts to 
maintain an active presence in a fraught international environ-
ment while “externalizing the burdens of warfare.”94
To further understand the somewhat confl icting nature of 
Obama’s leadership in foreign policy and the manner in which 
he left a legacy that simultaneously illustrated a willingness to 
exert executive authority while also demonstrating an underly-
ing institutional weakness, it is also worth briefl y revisiting the 
circumstances in which the Obama administration signed the US 
up to the JCPOA, or the Iran nuclear deal, which was discussed 
in Chapter 4. In the context of Obama’s substantive foreign pol-
icy legacy, we noted in that discussion how relatively simple it 
was for President Trump to undo that deal. One reason for this 
was that the deal was implemented as an “executive agreement” 
rather than as a formal treaty. From Obama’s perspective there 
was minimal value in trying to formalize the deal as a treaty, since 
there was zero chance of it receiving sixty-seven votes in order to 
be ratifi ed in the Senate. Hence the political rationale for declar-
ing the deal an agreement, even though it contained “economic 
and national security implications” that precedent would have 
suggested meant “the deal is at least the kind of agreement that 
has been negotiated as a treaty in the past.”95 The process was 
further complicated by the manner in which the administration 
appeared to make a concession to opponents in Congress, but 
did so in a way always likely to leave the administration able to 
implement its will. That is, in April 2015 the White House agreed 
that there would be an opportunity for a congressional vote on 
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the looming fi nal deal, but that this would be a vote on whether 
to strike down the deal. Critically, even if there was a majority 
for that position, Obama retained the authority to veto the mea-
sure.96 This effectively meant that there needed to be a two-thirds 
majority against the deal to deny it coming into force, rather than 
the two-thirds majority that would be needed in favor if it had 
been presented to the Senate as a treaty. In this immediate context, 
therefore, the administration’s actions look like an attempt to do 
an end run around congressional capacity to check the executive 
branch’s actions. From a broader perspective, however, it also 
illustrates the manner in which the extension of partisan confl ict 
to foreign as well as domestic affairs has diminished the capacity 
of any White House to negotiate international deals that stand a 
serious chance of being ratifi ed as treaties by the Senate. Hence, 
as was often the case with the administration’s actions in domes-
tic affairs, the turn to an expansive use of executive authority to 
implement the JCPOA refl ected an inherent weakness of the con-
temporary presidency as well as a willingness to push executive 
authority to its limits.
So Obama’s leadership legacy in foreign affairs was ambigu-
ous. His was not an explicitly muscular style of leadership in the 
fashion of his predecessor, but nor was it one that shrank from 
asserting the priorities of the executive branch when it was deter-
mined to do so. The decision to ignore the requirements of the 
War Powers Resolution with regard to the intervention in Libya, 
yet to ask for congressional approval for missile strikes against 
the Assad regime in summer 2013, demonstrate intellectual and 
institutional inconsistency but also a consistent prioritization 
of political calculations. Overall, categorizing the fundamentals 
underpinning Obama’s foreign policy leadership is perplexing. He 
was by no means the “dove” that many, perhaps including the 
Nobel Prize committee, had initially anticipated, but his time in 
offi ce saw the constrained use of American power in both real and 
rhetorical terms. That was a legacy that was not embraced by his 
successor, though the evidence of the opening thirty months of 
Trump’s presidency suggested its own contradictions.
During the campaign, candidate Trump made some extraor-
dinary statements that seemed to embrace the use of torture and 
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question the value of the US’s traditional alliances.97 Moreover, 
he made little effort to claim that the US role in the world was 
not simply based on its power but also on its moral leadership. 
Famously, just after assuming the presidency, he said in an inter-
view that he would not criticize Russian president Vladimir Putin’s 
style of leadership, as the US also had a “lot of killers”—going 
on to ask the interviewer, rhetorically, “What, do you think our 
country is so innocent?” This led conservative columnist Jonah 
Goldberg to refl ect that “if Obama had ever suggested the same, 
conservatives would have pounced,” and the writer continued to 
lament that while the US had often fallen short of its ideals, the 
problem with Trump’s language was that “he often sounds like he 
has contempt for those ideals in the fi rst place.”98
This was a stark rejection not just of Obama’s approach, but of 
the public position traditionally taken by US presidents through-
out the country’s history. Critics of US foreign policy actions might 
argue that Trump was in fact simply being more honest about US 
motives than his predecessors, but appealing to American virtue 
was an established feature of presidential rhetoric. Obama had in 
fact sometimes been ambivalent in his expression of the inherent 
goodness of American exceptionalism, particularly when address-
ing non-American audiences, but he was explicit about the value 
of the US maintaining a leading role in international affairs.99 In 
this framing, while “America First” was not an embrace of isola-
tionism, it was a turn away from the idea that the US was either 
a role model or a nation with a particular responsibility to pro-
vide leadership in a turbulent world. Moreover, on an individual 
level, Trump sometimes appeared admiring of political leaders in 
authoritarian regimes. Hence, regardless of the merits of a policy 
of negotiating directly with the North Korean regime, Trump’s lan-
guage lauding personal praise on Kim Jong-un contrasted with his 
verbal jabs at leaders of the US’s traditional allies such as Angela 
Merkel of Germany.100
In other ways, President Trump took Obama’s legacy and 
ran with it. In the summer of 2016, British columnist and com-
mentator Simon Jenkins refl ected on the US’s use of air power, 
which had just left scores of civilians dead in Syria, observing that 
“Obama’s wars remain unresolved and immoral.” He mused that 
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at least the election of Trump would likely lead to a decline in the 
use of drones, given what he saw as the more isolationist noises 
being made by the candidate.101 This, however, did not come to 
pass. Under Trump, the use of drones continued and in some 
cases accelerated.102 Strikes in Pakistan had dwindled to three in 
Obama’s fi nal year in offi ce; focus had switched to Yemen, with 
forty-three strikes in 2016, and Somalia, with thirteen strikes that 
year. Under Trump the rate of strikes in Yemen continued at a 
similar pace during 2017 and 2018, while in Somalia there were 
eighty strikes by the end of 2018 and a further fi fty-fi ve in the 
opening nine months of 2019.103
On the other hand, the Trump administration did change some 
of the practices of the Obama era. Firstly, it reduced the already 
limited transparency about the use of drones and the numbers 
of civilian casualties from US strikes.104 In the summer of 2016, 
Obama did issue an executive order laying out stricter ground 
rules for when and how US strikes would be carried out in places 
where the US was not a formal combatant. The order also required 
that the US government offer an estimate of the number of civilian 
casualties from any such strikes. President Trump rolled back that 
order in March 2019.105 Secondly, Trump reduced White House 
oversight of the drone program and loosened restrictions on the 
CIA’s ability to use drones under rules that were less restrictive 
than those observed by the Pentagon.106 Depending on perspec-
tive and intellectual starting point, these moves could be seen as 
an extension of the logic of the Obama administration’s position 
or a reversal of safeguards put in place to constrain the potentially 
excessive use of American power. These clashing interpretations 
are more a refl ection of the ambiguous nature of Obama’s legacy 
than of the direction of travel under the Trump administration.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the Obama administration ran into many 
institutional roadblocks, particularly in its last years after the 
GOP had taken control of the Senate in addition to the House. 
This meant that the frustration caused by the relentless prob-
ing of Hillary Clinton’s record as secretary of state by House 
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Republicans was now multiplied by the manner in which Senate 
Republicans slowed the confi rmation of judges to the federal 
bench to a trickle. This was not a new story for the modern 
American presidency. The scandals may have been very different 
but the Iran-Contra and Lewinsky affairs disrupted and stymied 
the second terms of presidents Reagan and Clinton respectively. 
George W. Bush too found his second mandate haunted by 
the failure of the effort at Social Security reform and then the 
botched practical response and the profoundly misjudged pub-
lic reaction to the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina. 
Clearly, maintaining a composed and effective leadership equi-
librium over an eight-year presidency is an almost impossible 
task. On the other hand, the chaos that engulfed the Trump 
administration from its opening week was unprecedented. Pres-
ident Clinton had quickly become mired in controversy over 
the issue of gays serving in the US military and the withdrawal 
of his original nominees to be Attorney General and Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights, and his approval rating had 
dropped from 58 percent when he entered offi ce to 37 percent 
by June 1993.107 Yet, Donald Trump’s approval rating was only 
45 percent when he took offi ce and his fi rst week was marked 
by chaos at the nation’s airports as the fi rst iteration of the 
“travel ban” was put in place.108
Another indicator of disorganization came with the high turn-
over of senior fi gures in the administration in its opening years. 
This was exemplifi ed by the comings and goings of the supposed 
gatekeeper to the Oval Offi ce, the chief of staff. The Clinton 
administration, known for its disorganization, saw two people 
in that role during the fi rst term. The much tighter ship of the 
Bush administration saw Andrew Card serve over fi ve years from 
January 2001, while there were two permanent chiefs of staff in 
Obama’s opening mandate. Reince Priebus, Trump’s fi rst chief 
of staff, lasted only 192 days before being replaced by General 
John Kelly, who was seen as a fi gure more likely to be assertive in 
guarding against unfi ltered and un-evidenced information being 
passed on to the President. He had limited success in that task and 
lasted less than eighteen months in the job. At the start of 2019 
Mick Mulvaney took over as acting chief of staff and he remained 
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in that role, with the same title, as the year drew to a close. Unsur-
prisingly, Trump denied that this high turnover rate signaled prob-
lems in the White House. In late summer 2018, after announcing 
the impending departure of White House Counsel Don McGahn 
by tweet to the reported surprise of McGahn himself, Trump fur-
ther tweeted: “The Fake News Media has it, purposely, so wrong! 
They love to portray chaos in the White House when they know 
that chaos doesn’t exist—just a “smooth running machine” with 
changing parts!”109 Extensive reporting, however, reinforced the 
picture of what was clearly visible chaos.110 In September 2018 
the New York Times published an anonymous op-ed piece by 
someone described as a senior offi cial in the administration. The 
article praised some of the policy initiatives taken over the previ-
ous two years, such as tax cuts and efforts at deregulation, but 
described “the president’s leadership style” as “impetuous, adver-
sarial, petty and ineffective.” Further, the author asserted,
Meetings with him veer off topic and off the rails, he engages in repet-
itive rants, and his impulsiveness results in half-baked, ill-informed 
and occasionally reckless decisions that have to be walked back.111
Yet, in at least one critical, legacy-establishing arena, the Trump 
administration proved more effective than its predecessor. As 
reported by the New York Times in the fall of 2019, President 
Trump celebrated “his success confi rming his judicial appoint-
ments, an achievement crucial to maintaining his hold on conser-
vatives and on evangelical voters,” even as his presidency again 
grew mired in scandal and controversy.112 To an important group 
of conservatives, the Trump administration’s effectiveness in 
remaking the federal judiciary provided a rationale for continuing 
to endorse a president whose personal behavior they privately con-
sidered reprehensible. Trump might sour the national conversa-
tion for eight years, but the judges that he and Senate Republicans 
placed on the federal bench could serve for decades.
The fact that these judicial nominations and confi rmations 
took place against a backdrop of repeated scandals illustrated 
the importance of continuing Republican control of the Senate. 
This majority also seemed a bulwark for President Trump as 
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impeachment proceedings gathered pace in the House over the 
emerging story in fall 2019 of efforts by the President to encour-
age the Ukrainian government to investigate the activities of for-
mer Vice President Biden’s son, Hunter Biden, when he held a 
position with a Ukrainian gas company.113 That scandal blew 
up almost as soon as the storm over the Mueller investigation 
appeared to have blown over. In the end, Trump’s presidency 
survived the Mueller investigation. The fi nal Mueller report 
sent somewhat mixed messages. It detailed numerous instances 
that might have constituted obstruction of justice and warned 
that the Russian threat to American democratic practices was 
a real one.114 But Mueller did not conclude that there had been 
direct collaboration between the Trump campaign and Russian 
state operatives in his report and in testimony to Congress he 
explained: “Based on Justice Department policy and principles 
of fairness, we decided we would not make a determination as 
to whether the President committed a crime.”115 As it turned 
out, both President Trump’s supporters and opponents took the 
report as vindication of their pre-existing position. To Trump’s 
champions, the President was cleared of any wrongdoing and 
it was time to investigate the investigators for malicious intent. 
As read by the President’s opponents, Mueller’s report provided 
ample evidence that team Trump had happily let the Russian 
state intervene on its behalf in 2016 and had then engaged in 
multiple episodes of obstruction of justice. The report did not, 
however, provoke an immediate existential threat to the Trump 
presidency in the form of impeachment. That was yet to come.
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Public communication and vision
The border of a rug in Obama’s Oval Offi ce included the quote: 
“The arc of the moral universe is long, and it bends toward jus-
tice.”1 The 44th president was clearly fond of these words, and 
often wove them into his speeches. When President Trump took 
offi ce on a promise to “take our country back,” he had the rug 
replaced. Standard refurbishment practice for a new administra-
tion, yet this seemed laden with symbolism, as the nation’s fi rst 
African American leader and his rug left the building. In con-
temporary politics, style is often superfi cially equated with sub-
stance, and this was among numerous gestures making it clear 
that Donald Trump wanted to overtly break with his predecessor 
in as many ways as possible.
In the canon of presidential leadership literature, the capacity to 
communicate ranks high. From Richard Neustadt’s emphasis on the 
importance of persuasion to Fred Greenstein prioritizing it among 
his six traits for greatness, scholars tend to agree that the capacity to 
convey one’s message fl uently is vital both for winning and maintain-
ing power even if there is disagreement on how much persuading can 
actually be done.2 Greenstein speaks of the “atmospherics” of presi-
dential communication when discussing the eloquence of a leader’s 
oratory.3 Hence, in this chapter we compare and contrast the com-
munication styles of presidents Obama and Trump. Our purpose is 
not to examine the effectiveness of their respective approaches to 
the use of the bully pulpit, but to refl ect on the differences between 
how they chose to speak to the public. Thus we do not attempt to 
assess whether either had a more “winning” method, but look at 
how “no-drama Obama” was succeeded by a president seemingly 
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addicted to causing friction through a constant helter-skelter stream-
of-consciousness commentary.
In order to provide a focus to this analysis, we will concentrate 
on how the two presidents addressed matters of race and key parts 
of the so-called culture wars. How did the fi rst African American 
president deal with the issues raised by his own identity and the 
continuing evidence that his own election did not herald a post-
racial settlement in American society? And what of the language 
of his successor, which often bordered on the racially incendiary? 
Indeed, in June 2016 Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan 
from Wisconsin called out Trump, then the prospective Republican 
nominee, for a “textbook defi nition of a racist comment” after 
Trump had said that a judge presiding in a case involving Trump 
University could not be impartial because of his Mexican ances-
try.4 Further, by looking at how the two men addressed the issues 
of abortion and LGBT+ rights rather than economic concerns, we 
have identifi ed matters where political discourse is often emotion-
ally heightened.5
On the campaign trail candidates for the White House often 
indulge their supporters with what they want to hear and try to 
persuade swing voters with grandiose promises and attractive, if 
sometimes ultimately insubstantial, soundbites. They certainly 
make claims about what they will do if they win offi ce that pay 
little regard to their likely institutional capacity to deliver on their 
promises. In this context, Obama certainly fulfi lled the dictum of 
Mario Cuomo, the former governor of New York, by campaign-
ing in poetry but governing in prose.6 On the other hand, few 
would describe Trump’s campaigning style, let alone his time in 
offi ce, as poetic. Throughout 2016 his diet of outlandish claims 
and unkeepable promises was reinforced by a consciously bul-
lying persona. Yet, as commentators fulminated at what they 
perceived to be candidate Trump’s lies and his consistently ad 
hominem style, his supporters mocked his political opponents and 
the media elites for taking his words literally but not giving seri-
ous pause to his ideas. This approach, Trump’s advocates insisted, 
was to get things exactly the wrong way around, as his appeal 
was to those people who took the sentiments behind his words 
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seriously but understood that the actual language was bombastic 
showmanship.7
One common aspect of the Obama and Trump presidential 
campaigns was the attention given to their respective rhetoric. 
They may have differed dramatically in terms of content and style 
but in both instances they won votes by delivering what was, to 
their respective bases, an underlying authentic message. In addi-
tion, as they traveled around the country and engaged in social 
media communication with audiences, they promised an alterna-
tive to the previous administration and all its perceived shortcom-
ings. Hence Barack Obama was offering a distinct alternative to 
the George W. Bush agenda, which even Republicans were tiring 
of after years of expensive wars and an increasingly shaky econ-
omy. Clearly, campaign trail rhetoric inevitably offers observa-
tions on the legacy of previous incumbents. George W. Bush liked 
to use Harry Truman as his example of how much perceptions of 
legacy and success can alter over time. Nonetheless, the US public 
was ready for change by 2008, and this was clearly demonstrated 
in how John McCain avoided utilizing the President as he cam-
paigned around the country.8
A key aspect of candidate Obama’s campaign message was 
that he desired to draw a line under the Bush era. This included 
ending certain negative aspects of the legacy, including a with-
drawal of US troops from Iraq, a drawdown from Afghanistan, 
and future use of “wisdom” in military deployment.9 The positive 
campaign moving-on-from-the-legacy-of-his-predecessor messages 
included promoting a “green jobs” agenda (which was his way 
of transcending the earlier “it’s the environment or the economy” 
dichotomy that voters felt they faced) and, of course, the promise 
to fi nally bring about reform of the country’s health care system. 
America was not in good stead during those waning Bush 43 days, 
and there was a palpable desire for political change. The “skinny 
kid with the funny name” was unlikely to appeal to conservatives, 
but his message of “hope and change” was intensely seductive 
to many.10 Nevertheless, despite the vitriol of some progressives 
toward the presidency of his predecessor, Obama avoided direct 
personal assaults on the outgoing president, instead focusing on 
the future and possible ways to unite a fractious nation operating 
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in an unstable world.11 Using the dual rhetorical functions of pol-
icy and visionary speeches, Obama successfully drew in a range of 
supporters. Policy wonks were impressed by his capacity to engage 
with the detail of health care reform, whilst the youth vote was 
enthralled with his ability to speak authentically to them and offer 
an optimistic future.
Donald Trump
In the context of political communication, if there is such a thing 
as rhetorical legacy rollback, then candidate Trump approached 
this with gusto. Conventional wisdom dictates that effective polit-
ical messaging can be achieved via hope or fear.12 Barack Obama 
chose the former route, whilst Donald Trump excelled at the 
latter. For every “Yes We Can” refrain from 2008, there was a 
resounding chorus of “American carnage” eight years later. From 
this, we can deduce that fi rstly, candidate Trump did not orches-
trate the negative score but he and his team did pen the 2016 lyrics. 
The former had already been laid down by the Tea Party years 
earlier. A brief glance at the movement’s placards dating back 
to 2009 reveals clear messages: “Taxed Enough Already,” “Cut 
Government Spending: Fire a Politician,” “No More Taxes, No 
More Spending,” and many more.13 Whilst Donald Trump had no 
direct affi liation with the Tea Party movement, undeniable syner-
gies were present between their respective agendas. In addition, 
the contradictions of Trump’s own political perspectives were 
refl ected in the mish-mash of attitudes huddling under the Tea 
Party umbrella. Sarah Palin may have been the keynote speaker of 
choice, but the movement was not always united in a small-gov-
ernment conservative direction when it came to the status of some 
big-government programs such as Social Security and Medicare.14 
These internal contradictions and differences were put aside as it 
was clear that the Tea Party, and soon after, Donald Trump had a 
common goal: to overturn and undermine the Obama agenda as 
forcefully as possible.
If there was a link between the Palin-era Tea Party and the 
Trump campaign, it came in the shape of Steve Bannon. His ide-
ology, infl uence and agenda were of paramount importance not 
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only to Trump’s victory but also to Hillary Clinton’s loss. Bannon 
had been so impressed with the phenomenon that was Sarah Palin 
that when she asked him to shoot some videos for her coming 
up to the 2010 midterm elections, he went one step further. He 
made a movie-length documentary, The Undefeated (2011), on 
which he apparently spent $1 million of his own money.15 Palin’s 
decision not to run for the 2012 Republican nomination was a 
crushing disappointment to her supporters, who believed that she 
embodied a winning formula of the populist, socially conserva-
tive, telegenic soccer mom. With the speculation fi nally at an end, 
the Tea Party energy needed a direction. Breitbart News, hailed 
by its co-founder in 2007 as the “Huffi ngton Post of the Right,” 
provided a locus and platform for this charged but essentially 
leaderless movement.16 With Breitbart users at his disposal, Ban-
non involved himself in a number of signifi cant Clinton-bashing 
projects. The publication of the snappily titled Clinton Cash: The 
Untold Story of How and Why Foreign Governments and Busi-
nesses Helped Make Bill and Hillary Clinton Rich was facilitated 
by research at the conservative Government Accountability Insti-
tute. The GAI was co-founded by Bannon, whilst funded by the 
Koch Brothers and Robert Mercer. Bannon Film Industries then 
went on to fund a movie version of the book, which was shown 
at the Cannes Film Festival in 2016. As a Time reviewer observed, 
Clinton Cash was not aimed at conservatives, who already dis-
liked and distrusted the Clintons. It was instead intended for 
“Environmentalists. Anti-nuke activists. Gay-rights advocates. 
Good-government folks,” with a purpose to highlight claims that 
their party’s nominee had, according to the fi lm, received cash 
from “the darkest, worst corners of the world.”17
Bannon’s multifaceted attack on Hillary Clinton, for him the 
personifi cation of the limousine liberals, was highly successful. 
From overt criticism of her and her policies to covert negative 
propaganda, the former secretary of state received multiple body 
blows. Anyone who had missed the book or movie version of Clin-
ton Cash could digest it in graphic novel form, or simply head to 
Breitbart.com, where an entire section of the website was dedicated 
to Clinton and her alleged misdeeds. For every progressive horrifi ed 
at stories of the Clinton Foundation and suspect donations, there 
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was a conspiracy theorist rubbing their hands at the online traction 
that the Pizzagate fabrication gained.18 High-profi le controversial 
fi gures including Milo Yiannopoulos utilized their fame both on 
and offl ine via speaking tours and engagement with alt-right out-
lets such as Infowars.com and 4chan.org. What conspiracy theories 
Breitbart did not create, it promoted and shared with its audience, 
which included Donald Trump.19 Importantly, in this context, 
Trump did little to distance himself from even the more fanciful 
and infl ammatory social media memes promoting his candidacy on 
the political fringes.
Throughout the presidential campaign, even before he was hired 
as chief executive by Team Trump in August 2016, Bannon was 
fi ring on dual anti-Hillary and pro-Trump cylinders. The populist 
party disruptor was as scathing about the establishment GOP as he 
was about liberals and those he perceived as the Washington elite. 
It was diffi cult to see what, if any, common ground he may have 
had with Paul Ryan, whom Bannon described as being “born in a 
petri dish at the Heritage Foundation.”20 The House Speaker and 
his ilk were as anathema to the shoot-from-the-hip populist new-
comers as were Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. From their 
outsider perspectives, all of these “swamp dwellers” were to blame 
for the abysmal state of the nation. It was not clear initially what 
the Breitbart executive chairman, IGE founder, and vice president 
of Cambridge Analytica had in common with real-estate mogul 
Donald Trump. The Apprentice star did not at fi rst glance appear 
to be the prime candidate for fi ghting the culture wars tooth and 
nail, as was clearly Bannon’s purpose. Over time, however, the 
logic of the relationship became clearer. Bannon, the disheveled 
and profane ideas man, could never do front of house. Trump, on 
the other hand, possessed an enormous feel for television and, for 
some at least, huge charisma. These were key traits for a political 
candidate operating in a hyper-visual, post-print era of communi-
cation. Bannon explained the symbiosis of their relationship via his 
capacity to formulate Trump’s feelings and emotions into a policy 
agenda. Bannon was always crystal clear about his own three-tier 
political vision: His agenda was to promote economic national-
ism, a foreign policy to reinforce that nationalist message, and the 
dismantling of the administrative state. The “state,” in his view, 
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included the mainstream media, academia, and non-government 
organizations as well as establishment bureaucrats.21
Hence, as his campaign progressed, Trump’s message sounded 
increasingly populist. One favorite refrain was crystalized in his 
election night tweet, which promised “the forgotten man and 
woman will never be forgotten again. We will come together as 
never before.”22 This is a fairly loose statement, but it struck a chord 
in the way that Richard Nixon’s “silent majority” focus had decades 
earlier. In both instances, it was an effective means of reaching out 
to anxious white America. After years of liberal Democrat rule, with 
a progressive agenda highlighting health care reform and economic 
inequality but seemingly unresponsive to the apprehensions of those 
whose jobs were disappearing, the white working class felt as though 
a candidate was fi nally speaking to and for them. As Trump warmed 
to his campaign after leaving sixteen GOP opponents stunned and 
defeated, he channeled the Bannon message with increasing aplomb 
throughout the general election campaign. By November 2016, 
even on those topics where he came later to the party than most 
Republicans, such as abortion, overall Republican voters increas-
ingly embraced his style and message.23
Even as late as 2016, Trump did not seem to be the social con-
servative’s clear choice. Donor Robert Mercer had poured $11 
million into a PAC which supported Ted Cruz. He had not, appar-
ently, expected the Texas senator to win against Clinton, but along 
with so many others he came late to the realization that the experi-
ence-free candidate would actually win the GOP primary race.24 In 
order to explain how even a billionaire might be willing to put $11 
million on a losing bet, Mercer’s perception of Clinton needs to be 
understood. Dating back to the 1990s, a group of low-profi le con-
servatives had funded the “Arkansas Project,” the aim of which 
was to destroy the reputation of Bill and Hillary Clinton. Back 
then, when the First Lady went on national television to talk of 
“a vast right-wing conspiracy,” her claims were met with derision. 
However, the ongoing character assault was damaging both to the 
President and his wife. Accusations of everything from murder to 
drug-running were railed against them, and one of those promot-
ing the conspiracy theories was Robert Mercer.25 Twenty years on, 
there was a new opportunity to undermine the Clinton name and 
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exploit the decades-old feeling among many Americans that the 
Clintons, as bad as each other, were not to be trusted.
Hence, there were two arcs of legacy rollback efforts taking 
place: one quite vast and ideological, the other more targeted and 
personal. Bannon and his associates were extremely focused on the 
dismantling of the “deep state” and no one personifi ed this quite 
as precisely as the Clintons. The anti-Clinton agenda stretched 
back decades and went some way at least to explain why Hill-
ary tended to present as suspicious and secretive. Experience had 
taught her to be both. From individual funders to Arkansas media 
and opposition politicians to special prosecutors, the Clinton-
dismantling machine was multifaceted and highly effective. The 
Obama rollback efforts were, in a way, more straightforward. This 
agenda came more directly from Donald Trump. In interviews, 
Bannon did not tend to speak negatively about Obama, and post-
election, his primary complaint was against the Republican estab-
lishment, which he said was trying to undermine the legitimacy of 
Trump’s win. It is fair to surmise that Bannon’s vision and political 
desires transcended simply unpicking what the 44th president had 
achieved. Unlike Donald Trump, he was clearly thinking on a far 
grander scale.26
Looking at the language of the campaign trail, much of 
Trump’s to-dismantle list was simply focused on what Obama 
had done. From the signature achievements of Obamacare, the 
Paris Agreement, and the JCPOA Plan to the hot-button issues 
of abortion access and transgender rights, if Obama had imple-
mented or promoted it, Trump seemed against it. This personal-
ized approach thrilled voters who detested Obama, not only for 
his policy agenda but for his vision and his very presence in the 
Oval Offi ce. The remainder of this chapter will examine some 
key issues where presidential tone and rhetoric played a key role 
in polarizing debates.
Talking about race
As the fi rst African American president it was inevitable that 
Barack Obama’s language and messaging around issues of race, 
be those messages explicitly or implicitly expressed, would be 
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carefully scrutinized. When he left offi ce his record on this front 
came under criticism from differing wings of the American politi-
cal spectrum. Some felt that he had only timidly and hence inad-
equately addressed matters of racial inequity, as he had pandered 
too much to accommodate white prejudice. Others felt that 
Obama’s attention to race at particular moments during his presi-
dency was manipulative, as his very election had demonstrated 
that continued concentration on matters of race was unwarranted 
and that the country was best served by a “color-blind” attitude.27 
If, however, Obama’s record lent itself to some ambiguity with 
regard to his legacy on the discussion of race and the continuing 
place for that discussion in American society, there was little mis-
taking the tone of his successor when he invoked race. As a can-
didate and then as president, Donald Trump regularly turned to 
racially infl ammatory language. Democrats had previously chal-
lenged Republican presidential candidates for their alleged dog 
whistles to white prejudice. However, in comparison to Ronald 
Reagan’s speech at Neshoba County Fair in Mississippi in 1980 
or George H.W. Bush’s use of the Willie Horton case in 1988, 
candidate Trump put aside the whistle and used a bull horn 
throughout 2016, maintaining his provocations into his time in the 
White House.28
In order to gauge President Obama’s dialogue with regard to 
racial politics it is important to acknowledge that his election vic-
tories were not an indication that the US had reached a post-racial 
moment. His victory in November 2008 was unquestionably of 
huge historic importance, but Richard Johnson has illustrated how 
the assumption that voting in 2008 and 2012 could not have been 
divided along racial lines because Obama won is misguided, and 
the political science evidence emphasises how racial polarization—
in particular, increased levels of racial resentment amongst some 
categories of white voters—impacted voting in 2016.29 This helps 
explain Daniel Gillion’s fi nding that Obama made fewer direct ref-
erences to race in his public speeches than any other Democratic 
president since the end of World War II.30 On the other hand, this 
fact should not obscure how he did sometimes engage with racial 
controversies. For example, when Professor Henry Louis Gates, 
an African American scholar at Harvard University, was arrested 
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despite being at his own home in July 2009, Obama said that the 
police department “acted stupidly.” He then acknowledged that 
he regretted this remark and organized what became known as the 
“beer summit” at the White House between Gates and the arrest-
ing offi cer, Sergeant James Crowley.31 A further compelling public 
intervention came in the aftermath of the jury’s acquittal of George 
Zimmerman following Zimmerman’s trial over the death of the 
seventeen-year-old African American Trayvon Martin. Speaking in 
unusually personal terms, Obama did not dispute the jury’s verdict 
or the conduct of the trial, but refl ected on how the lived experi-
ence of African Americans inevitably impacted on how many in 
the black community interpreted events:
You know, when Trayvon Martin was fi rst shot I said that this could 
have been my son. Another way of saying that is Trayvon Martin 
could have been me thirty-fi ve years ago. And when you think about 
why, in the African American community at least, there’s a lot of pain 
around what happened here, I think it’s important to recognize that 
the African American community is looking at this issue through a 
set of experiences and a history that doesn’t go away.
There are very few African American men in this country who 
haven’t had the experience of being followed when they were shop-
ping in a department store. That includes me. There are very few 
African American men who haven’t had the experience of walking 
across the street and hearing the locks click on the doors of cars. That 
happens to me—at least before I was a senator. There are very few 
African Americans who haven’t had the experience of getting on an 
elevator and a woman clutching her purse nervously and holding her 
breath until she had a chance to get off. That happens often.32
These comments drew praise, but also anger from those who 
felt that the President was stirring racial tension, and frustration 
from others who wished that Obama would more regularly and 
forcefully express these ideas.33 As it turned out, as Obama’s 
second term progressed the relationship between black Ameri-
cans and law enforcement came into ever-sharper relief as the 
Black Lives Matter movement, which emerged in reaction to 
the Zimmerman verdict, gained national attention with protests 
marking the deaths of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, 
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and Eric Garner in New York City. Obama’s attempt to strad-
dle the divided response to the Black Lives Matter protests was 
illustrated in a so-called Town Hall event organized by ABC 
News in the summer of 2016. This event took place very shortly 
after fi ve white police offi cers had been killed in an ambush 
in Dallas when policing a Black Lives Matter demonstration 
which had been organized to protest against further incidents 
of black men being killed by police offi cers. At the Town Hall 
Obama appealed for unity and urged Black Lives Matter activ-
ists and the police to have some understanding of each other’s 
perspective.34 Overall, this episode is indicative of the “tight-
rope” that Obama regularly attempted to navigate as he talked 
in color blind or race neutral terms while fully aware of the con-
tinuing racial disparities in American society.35 The diffi culty 
of expressing his message successfully was illustrated by polls 
showing that during the second term a declining number of the 
population thought that race relations between white and black 
Americans were “very good” or “somewhat good.”36
In contrast to Obama’s efforts, however limited in their impact, 
to encourage dialogue and to use rhetoric to bridge racial divi-
sions, candidate and then President Trump regularly stirred the pot 
of racial animosity. On occasion Trump proclaimed that the accu-
sations of racism against him were false. Indeed, at the end of July 
2019, Trump declared himself to be “the least racist person there 
is anywhere in the world”: Yet this claim came amidst controversy 
as he tried to justify a series of comments over the summer of 2019 
directed against Democratic members of Congress, which had 
drawn widespread condemnation for their racial overtones. These 
included deriding the city of Baltimore as “rat-infested” as part 
of an attack on Elijah Cummings, a veteran congressional Demo-
crat representing the city.37 And even if it was possible to see these 
comments through a non-racial lens, the same could not be said 
of his attacks on four House Democrats, collectively labeled “the 
squad” by the media for their sometimes abrasive challenges to 
their own party’s leadership. Trump’s tweet that these four women 
of color should all “go back” to the “crime-infested places from 
which they came” played into clear racist tropes and his comments 
were described in these terms by much of the media.38
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It is worth noting that during his reality television star incar-
nation, Trump gave little or no indication of how forcefully 
the Obama legacy rollback on race would play out. When The 
Apprentice aired in the 2000s, Trump consistently rated highly 
among ethnic minority viewers and some of the show’s winners 
included African Americans.39 Trump’s 1970s rental policies 
notwithstanding,40 many observers were slow to categorize the 
Republican candidate as “racist” based on the dynamics of the 
show. PBS fi lmmaker Michael Kirk spent months interviewing 
Trump associates for his 2016 election documentary The Choice. 
Kirk deduced that Trump was not a racist but judged others on 
the basis of their economic success.41 This seemed a plausible 
conclusion during The Apprentice years, but became less so 
once Trump associated himself with the anti-Obama “birther” 
conspiracy theory.
Harris polls conducted in 2010 showed that 25 percent of 
Americans believed that Barack Obama was not born in the US.42 
The internet had given birth to this conspiracy theory, and the 
rumor swirled around a small group of right-wingers mostly via 
email until it gained further traction via the Trump megaphone. In 
2016, the New York Times stated that “facts hold a sacred place 
in western liberal democracies.”43 This claim has not aged well. 
So, when a high-profi le popular culture icon promoted an item 
of fake news, the public were inclined to believe it—or, at least, 
those who were eager to embrace information that delegitimized 
a president that they saw as an interloper. For the next fi ve years, 
Donald Trump utilized his platform to full effect, reiterating his 
alleged uncertainty in interviews with regard to the origins of the 
44th president. “I’m starting to think he was not born here,” he 
stated in 2011. Such sentiments were music to the ears of anti-
Obama conservatives and in many ways were Trump’s earliest 
efforts at de-Obamafi cation. What better way to undo the legacy 
of a president than to question his core legitimacy? This was an 
existential attack, one far more satisfying than simply criticizing a 
policy choice or administration priority.
If birtherism can be understood as the vulgarism of an outside 
provocateur, Trump’s capacity to step outside the boundaries of 
normal, and by any conventional defi nition acceptable, behavior 
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came in his reaction to the demonstrations and counter-protests 
that scarred Charlottesville, Virginia, in the summer of 2017. As 
neo-Nazis and white supremacists rallied in the city, ostensibly 
to protest at the impending removal of a statue of Robert E. Lee, 
explicitly racist and anti-Semitic chants were loudly proclaimed. 
Fighting broke out with counter-protesters and one woman in the 
counter-protests, but not involved in any skirmishes, was killed 
when a far right supporter deliberately drove his car into her. In 
the aftermath of this incident, Trump initially seemed to express 
some sympathy with the right-wing agitators, before then mak-
ing the expected noise condemning Nazis. Yet he almost immedi-
ately gave an extraordinary press conference in Trump Tower in 
New York, where he referred to there being “very fi ne people on 
both sides.”44 This statement went beyond reversing the discourse 
of the Obama years. Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush 
had been accused of surreptitiously exploiting white prejudice for 
political gain, and George W. Bush was perceived by some to have 
been inadequately attuned to the disproportionate suffering of the 
African American community caused by Hurricane Katrina; yet 
all three of these presidents were very direct in their criticism of 
overt forms of racism and anti-Semitism. In this context, Trump 
rewound the presidential rhetorical clock to a time that most 
Americans thought had passed.
The travel ban
It is a matter of public record that George W. Bush left blank 
the tick box for “president” on the 2016 electoral ballot, a fact 
that may represent the distance traveled by his political party in 
the years since his 2009 departure. During his fi rst year in offi ce, 
Bush made history as the fi rst president to deliver an entire weekly 
address from the Oval Offi ce in Spanish. Although not fl uent, he 
was lauded for his effort and for what was considered an authen-
tic outreach to the American Latino community.45 In this speech 
and many others, Bush spoke of strengthening relations with 
Mexico and applauded the Latino infl uence on American culture. 
As the 2000 census demonstrated, the Latino population had sur-
passed that of African Americans and therefore it was prudent for 
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any Republican president to make an effort to capture some of 
this increasing voter demographic. Plenty of what the GOP man-
date offered was in line with mainstream Latino values.46 Eight 
years after President Bush stepped down, the immigration debate 
in the Tea Party-infused GOP had shifted, and the rhetoric of the 
2016 election candidates refl ected this. The contender with the 
most bullish slogans won the day, albeit with no support from his 
Republican predecessor. Trump’s “Build the Wall” mantra struck 
a chord with many, along with his call for “a total and complete 
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our coun-
try’s representatives can fi gure out what the hell is going on.”47
In a February 2017 interview with Today’s Matt Lauer, when 
asked about President Trump’s travel ban, George W. Bush stated: 
“I’m in favor of immigration policy that is welcoming and 
upholds the law.”48 It is a rule of thumb among former presi-
dents not to publicly offer too many opinions on the policies of 
their successors, and Bush did not offer an overt criticism of the 
new administration. Nonetheless, the language Bush used had the 
effect of clearly distancing him from his Republican replacement. 
Bush also talked about the importance of people of all faiths being 
able to worship freely.49 His Hawaiian-born successor pushed the 
rhetorical boundaries on immigration further than any president 
before him, coming as he did from Kenyan roots and a childhood 
spent abroad. Had she succeeded him, Hillary Clinton would 
likely have stayed in Obama’s immigration policy lane, advo-
cating comprehensive reform, with a focus on keeping families 
already in the US together. On the 2016 campaign trail, border 
security and terrorism featured high on the list of voter anxiet-
ies and the politics of fear won the day. The infl uence of Steve 
Bannon’s clash of civilizations-based worldview was clear to see 
in Donald Trump’s tone and rhetoric and, on entering the White 
House, in his actions.
On January 27th 2017 President Trump signed Executive Order 
13769, which prevented Syrian refugees from entering indefi nitely, 
and immigrants from seven majority Muslim countries for up to 
120 days. The order was clearly a manifestation of the “extreme 
vetting” pledge from his “Contract with the American Voter.”50 
Here, Elaine Kamarck’s view of the President as the CEO of an 
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industry he had never worked in rang true.51 There was little or 
no evidence of advance consultation or planning, and the initial 
outcome and response was consternation. From a legal, bureau-
cratic, and logistical perspective this was an inevitable snafu, 
swiftly accompanied by political and diplomatic fallout. As one 
of the incumbent’s earliest agenda items, the rollout of the plan 
suggested an administration that lacked a basic understanding of 
process. Viewed through the prism of Greenstein’s organizational 
capacity criteria, this was a fail. The backlash transcended the lib-
eral media and included international condemnation, even from 
those clearly eager to foster close ties with the new president. One 
such was British prime minister Theresa May, who was on a state 
visit to the US when the ban was implemented. Her response, stat-
ing “we do not agree with this kind of approach,” was considered 
the bare minimum rebuke by many.52
Unsurprisingly, lawsuits began immediately, as those with 
visas and green cards were among the affected passengers. Within 
twenty-four hours, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had par-
tially and temporarily halted the travel ban. Already brimming 
with anti-Trump sentiment, the liberal media piled scorn on the 
President’s action. Social media responses went into overdrive as 
protesters arrived at airports around the US to decry the ban and 
show support for those affected. The chaotic manner in which 
the travel ban was imposed and the anger with which Trump 
responded to the federal court rulings suggest that he was not fully 
aware of process and procedure. In these early days, which should 
have been the height of his presidential honeymoon, his adminis-
tration was mired in diffi culty and under widespread attack. His 
supporters did not waver in their positive opinion of him, despite 
the fact that he was unable to fulfi ll his “total and complete shut-
down” pledge. Signifi cantly, from the President’s perspective, the 
nation was split in its response to the ban, and support for it was 
slightly higher than for the man himself, which remained fairly 
constant (around 44 percent) during this period.53 National tele-
phone polls saw averages of 51 percent in favor and 55 percent 
opposed to the policy. Polls tended to use slightly different lan-
guage and not all referred to it as a ban. Overall, Trump’s job 
approval rating tended to be pegged to the ban, therefore those 
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who supported the ban supported the President, and vice versa.54 
Eventually, showing some capacity for learning, the administra-
tion managed to produce a third iteration of the ban that satisfi ed 
the Supreme Court, though the 5–4 decision was accompanied by 
a vigorous dissent written by one of Obama’s nominees, Justice 
Sotomayor.55
The substance of Barack Obama’s immigration legacy has 
been examined elsewhere in this book. Only a cursory glance is 
required to see the difference in content and intent between the 
leader who spent his childhood years in Indonesia and the insular, 
nationalistic rhetoric of his successor. Within a brief period, Presi-
dent Trump succeeded not only in undermining what the nation’s 
fi rst non-white president had achieved in immigration terms, but 
also what the predecessor from his own political party had estab-
lished. Many Bush-era Republicans were pragmatic about the 
benefi ts of migrant labor. By the Trump years, it was those party 
members who believed, rightly or wrongly, that their economic 
status was being undermined by unfettered immigration whose 
voice was in the ascendant. Crines and Dolowitz discuss how 
Trump’s pathos-driven rhetoric on the topic “expanded the range 
of what was allowable in public discourse, thereby pushing the 
boundary beyond what would have been previously considered 
civil.”56 Such presidential norm-busting, twinned with the no-
holds-barred platform that social media provided, set the bench-
mark for the nation’s political dialogue.
Reproductive rights
On the 2016 campaign trail, the Republican nominee took a 
highly personalized approach. In a similar way to Obama sup-
porters in 2008, it was clear that many voters were enamored with 
Trump’s character. In both cases, despite their radically different 
views on what America should be, Obama and Trump ran decid-
edly personal campaigns, and their direct communication with 
voters was a key element of their success. Alongside the medium 
of Twitter, it was at Trump campaign rallies where the Obama 
legacy rollback plans took center stage. From promises to Make 
America Great Again to anti-Clinton chants of “lock her up,” 
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the former reality television star had a masterful capacity to woo 
and direct his audiences. It was, however, on those hot-button 
“moral values” issues that many voters set their hopes on Trump 
to turn back, as they viewed it, the unbridled liberal progress of 
the previous eight years. It came as no great surprise to observers 
that candidate Trump warmed to a range of socially conservative 
themes as his 2016 election campaign progressed. Historically, no 
one could have mistaken citizen Trump for a feminist, but he had 
publicly stated his position on abortion as far back as his pro-
posed presidential run in 1999 as “very pro-choice.”57 Earlier in 
his 2016 campaign, his rhetoric on the issue was muted, incon-
sistent, and at times completely removed from the Republican 
party line. When pressed in a MSNBC interview with Chris 
Matthews, he stated rather unconvincingly that he thought “there 
should be some sort of punishment” for women who sought abor-
tions.58 This fl ew in the face of the GOP platform position, which 
promoted abstinence, tax incentives for fostering and adoption, 
along with compassion for individuals seeking terminations, with 
punitive action reserved for abortion providers. The candidate 
swiftly distanced himself from those comments and took a more 
politically astute stance that was in line with the mainstream pro-
life movement. Aligning himself with the nation’s favorite Repub-
lican, he claimed “Like Reagan, I am pro-life, with exceptions.”59 
This offered vital comfort to social conservatives who, despite 
their eagerness to redress the impact of the previous eight liberal 
years, were nervous about throwing their support behind some-
one with a personal history like Trump’s. Hence, offering reassur-
ing public communication on their key issues was crucial.
Holding out hope for various future conservative Supreme 
Court appointments required voters to display a steady nerve 
and strategic mindset. They also needed a more immediate dem-
onstration of commitment from a candidate who was not their 
fi rst choice. Clearly, this was a political marriage of convenience 
between the twice-divorced reality television star and his conserva-
tive base. During the honeymoon period, the President was quick 
to display his powers of political seduction. On January 23, 2017, 
a presidential memorandum reinstating the Reagan-era “Global 
Gag” rule was signed. This restored the conditions relating to US 
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funding of international NGOs who offered abortion services or 
counseling. The 45th president was continuing a trend dating back 
decades, in which the Global Gag was revoked, or re-invoked, 
depending on who was in power. Whilst this international devel-
opment issue did not impact American women directly, it sent a 
clear message with regard to the new administration’s priorities. 
First and foremost, it rolled back a specifi c action of the previ-
ous president. Furthermore, the “America First” aspect of saving 
$500 million of tax dollars dovetailed nicely with the “moral val-
ues” message attached to withdrawing US support for NGOs who 
provided abortions and associated advice. Described by Amnesty 
International as “a devastating blow for women’s rights,” the 
executive action went further than those of Republican predeces-
sors and referred to all global health aid.60 This, along with his 
pledge to end federal funding for Planned Parenthood and choice 
of conservative stalwart Mike Pence for vice president, provided 
comfort and reassurance to religious voters unsure of the Presi-
dent’s own commitment to their “moral values” concerns. A key, 
if distant, prize for this voting demographic was the overturning 
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade.
This inability to allow an almost half-century-old ruling to 
settle demonstrates how, even by the early twenty-fi rst century, 
America had “not made peace with the sexual revolution of the 
1960s and 1970s.”61 No other “moral values” issue lit up both 
sides of the political spectrum in quite the same way as women’s 
reproductive rights. After a period of issue stability, individual 
states increasingly took measures to restrict abortion rights. 
Research published by the Guttmacher Institute in 2019 demon-
strated that eighteen states had laws that could be used to restrict 
abortion. In contrast, ten states had laws that protected such 
rights.62 During the 2016 election campaign, 61 percent of voters 
who identifi ed as “pro-life” told Gallup that they were unsure of 
candidate Trump’s position on abortion. In 2019, twenty years on 
from his apparently unequivocal 1999 “I believe in choice” dec-
laration, President Trump’s public communication on this most 
emotive issue left voters in no doubt. Addressing a rally at Green 
Bay, Wisconsin in 2019, with an eye on his 2020 run, he talked of 
doctors and mothers who planned to “execute the baby.”63 Such 
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language would inevitably play well with those who turned out 
in such impressive numbers for him in 2016, not least 81 per-
cent of white evangelical Protestants, but overall the 65 percent 
of white Christians who supported him.64 Presidential reference 
to “children being ripped from their mother’s womb” in relation 
to late-term abortion legislation in New York and Virginia took 
place alongside moves in conservative states toward what were 
effectively near-total bans on abortion clinics operating.65
Presidential rhetoric on reproductive rights came a long way 
in the short time since the pro-choice position of the previous 
administration. Obama had faced challenges before and during 
his time in offi ce with regard to his stance on abortion. In The 
Audacity of Hope, he outlined his fears that a ban on abortion 
would oblige women to seek illegal options.66 On the 2008 cam-
paign trail he highlighted the importance of contraception educa-
tion for teenagers, as well as abstinence advice.67 Here he sought 
to balance his position as a practicing Christian with being some-
one whose re-election victory Planned Parenthood would later 
refer to as “a resounding victory for women.”68 It was clear that 
Obama faced a greater challenge than his successor when deal-
ing with the thorny issue of abortion. Firstly, Donald Trump was 
not held to the same standard as his political counterparts, as the 
“Pussygate” tape so clearly indicated. For any other presidential 
contender, such an undeniable embarrassment would have ended 
their campaign instantly. This was not the case for the business-
man who had had outlined his adversarial strategy in The Art of 
the Deal. When attacked or exposed, his preferred response was 
to come out fi ghting. As he warmed to his anti-abortion base, if 
not to the cause itself, Trump increasingly owned the issue. Unlike 
his predecessor, he did not shy away from publicity on the day of 
his Global Gag executive action. In 2009, Barack Obama sched-
uled his executive order on January 23rd—one day after the Roe 
v. Wade anniversary. He took care to ensure that this occurred on 
a Friday evening, away from the media spotlight.69 In contrast, 
Donald Trump reinstated the funding ban in front of a wall of 
cameras, surrounded by men. The image was shared hundreds of 
thousands of times online, frequently accompanied by the refrain: 
“Where are the women?”70
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Rhetoric and LGBT + rights
On the campaign trail and later in the Oval Offi ce, Donald Trump 
spoke more authentically about some issues than others. Regard-
ing trade and immigration, for example, his positions were more 
consistently based on long-held views. On other issues, including 
those termed as “moral values” issues, in the early days at least, 
his tone was more muted, his rhetoric less certain. Over time, his 
position on key voter issues solidifi ed as he warmed to conserva-
tive themes. He went from speaking for his evangelical base to 
sounding like one of their own. This occurred despite the dearth 
of evidence to suggest that he had strong (or any) views on hot-
button issues such as transgender rights or reproductive health.
At the time Barack Obama came to offi ce, national attention 
had been increasingly focused on gay and, more widely, LGBT+ 
rights. As discussed elsewhere in this book, Obama’s legacy on 
LGBT+ issues has been described as monumental.71 There were, 
without doubt, some hugely signifi cant leaps forward for gay and 
transgender Americans on his watch. Clearly, this was not well 
received by everyone, although societal acceptance has evolved 
markedly in terms of tolerating, even embracing, such progress 
as gay Americans in the military and same-sex marriage. Efforts 
to track Donald Trump’s position on gay rights show that, unlike 
those of his vice president, his views have not always been clear. It 
is fair to say that in comparison to some other recent aspirants to 
the GOP’s presidential nomination such as Mike Huckabee, Ted 
Cruz, and Rick Santorum, Trump presented as at the very least 
undecided about his position on gay marriage and related issues. 
Consequently, he may have presented as a reasonable option for 
any gay conservatives pondering who to support.72 Not every-
one saw him this way, however: For example, in January 2017, 
Salon magazine published a piece which outlined why the Trump 
presidency would be “a paradise for the Christian Right.”73 It was 
unlikely that both of these conclusions could be accurate. Per-
haps simple voting mathematics could explain the New Yorker’s 
trajectory from being perceived as the gay-friendly candidate to 
a poster boy for the religious right. With 81 percent of the white 
evangelical vote behind him, it was clear that Trump was going to 
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prioritize their agenda over the 14 percent of gay Americans who 
turned out for him on election day.74 An early taste of red meat 
for the base was the choice of Mike Pence as vice-presidential 
nominee. The former governor of Indiana’s track record on “cul-
ture wars” issues was enough to warm the heart of any religious 
conservative.
Gay marriage
In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled via Obergefell v. Hodges that the 
fundamental right to marry was guaranteed to all citizens under 
the 14th Amendment. The issue made its way up through the judi-
ciary until a Supreme Court majority agreed to bring federal law 
into line with those states which had already progressed on the 
issue. Therefore, Barack Obama could not take personal credit 
for this development. Nonetheless, same-sex marriage activists on 
the whole considered Obama a champion of their cause and there 
is no doubt that through the tone and rhetoric emanating from 
the White House, he proactively created an environment sympa-
thetic to progress on the matter. This view was reinforced when 
both of his Supreme Court appointments, Sonia Sotomayor and 
Elena Kagan, voted in favor of same-sex marriage in the Oberge-
fell case. Here was a substantial and solid progressive aspect of 
the Obama legacy, which would be hard (although not impos-
sible) for a successor to undo, should he wish to.
Any undoing would depend on the opportunities that would 
arise for Donald Trump to put a Supreme Court justice on the 
bench. On the subject of gay marriage, Trump had not been con-
sistent in the past, which is just one reason why evangelicals were 
nervous about his nomination. Unlike Ted Cruz and other GOP 
candidates, Trump had used mild language on the topic and pub-
licly stated that if elected, he would not plan on revisiting a deci-
sion that had been put to rest by the court. As a New Yorker who 
had previously identifi ed with Democrats on various “moral val-
ues” issues, Trump did not always authentically talk the socially 
conservative talk on the campaign trail. Nonetheless, his position 
on the issue was, in his words, “evolving,” and appeared to do so 
in a conservative direction as the 2016 election drew nearer.75
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Military service
LGBT+ developments on Obama’s watch included the repeal of 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” via bipartisan legislation in December 
2010 as well as ensuring that federal contractors have guarantees 
against discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation or 
gender identity.76 This settled a long-standing and unsatisfactory 
arrangement dating back to the days of Bill Clinton and his trouble 
with social conservatives decades earlier. Back then, Clinton had 
dodged the policy bullet and created a compromise relating to gay 
Americans serving in the military that essentially pleased no one. 
The 2010 repeal was met with only muted objection, and a study 
commissioned by the Department of Defense and undertaken by 
the RAND Corporation found that gay Americans serving in the 
military “brought no meaningful harm” to the armed forces.77
Trump’s own version of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is the issue 
of transgender Americans serving in the military. Like the conten-
tious matter of transgender bathroom access, this may have only 
impacted a small proportion of the population, but the symbolism 
was enormous. Such matters acted as a lightning rod for those on 
both sides of the political fence to state their case and abuse their 
perceived opponents, not least via the global platform of Twitter. 
Back in 2010, despite being pressured by LGBT+ rights activists, 
Obama did not mention transgender Americans in relation to “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell.”78 At that point, the decades-old language on this 
topic in the Department of Defense guidelines referred to transgen-
der people as “sexual deviants.” In 2015, then Secretary of Defense 
Chuck Hagel stated that the military should “continually review” 
its prohibition of transgender people in the armed forces. In 2016 
Hagel’s successor, Ashton Carter, announced that transgender Amer-
icans would be allowed to serve in the military and acknowledged 
that many already were, albeit not openly. The RAND Corporation 
estimated that there were approximately 2,450 trans Americans serv-
ing in an army consisting of 1.2 million active personnel and 800,000 
reservists. Around sixty-fi ve of those would seek to transition each 
year. The cost was estimated to be in the region of $3–4 million per 
year. The study concluded that the situation “would cost little and 
have no signifi cant impact on unit readiness.”79
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Ashton Carter made a formal announcement on June 30th, 
2016 stating that with immediate effect, transgender Americans 
may serve openly in the military. Now, this was only months 
before the presidential election and clearly an impending change of 
administration invariably brings the prospect of uncertainty. That 
uncertainty was enhanced when, in July 2017, again in a series 
of tweets, Trump announced that there would be a full reversal 
of the Obama-era progress on allowing transgender Americans to 
serve in the military in any capacity. The Pentagon was caught 
unawares, especially as this had not been something that Trump 
had publicly given attention to previously or discussed with his 
generals. In August 2017, the White House then sent a two-and-
a-half-page executive memo to the Pentagon outlining three key 
requirements: Firstly, how to remove existing service-people where 
appropriate, secondly, instructions to reject any new transgender 
army applicants, and thirdly, to stop medical treatment spending 
on existing trans service members.
The RAND Corporation estimated that the fi nancial cost to the 
military for transgender medical treatment would be 1/1000th of 1 
percent of the nation’s defense budget. Hence, this was less about 
saving money or reducing the readiness of the armed forces than 
about the culture wars and de-Obamafi cation, and here, Trump 
aimed to score a win with his base. Plus, he proved that it was 
actually possible to direct policy via social media. In response, Sec-
retary of Defense Mattis requested a six-month study to consider 
the impact of trans Americans in the military. The same month, 
fi fty-six retired generals and admirals wrote an open letter oppos-
ing the proposed ban. In autumn 2017, a series of lawsuits were 
issued (Jane Doe v. Trump and Stone v. Trump among others) 
and this resulted in ten federal judges blocking the attempted ban. 
Trump’s policies went against the military’s own recommendations 
regarding transgender service members. Moreover, he squandered 
political capital on an issue that had already been dealt with.
This unprecedented situation involved presidential efforts to over-
turn a predecessor’s specifi c policy item initially via the emotive and 
non-binding medium of Twitter, which instigated a heated national 
conversation on the matter, and then moving to the more formal 
method of a presidential memorandum, followed by strong public 
responses, court cases, confusion, and stress for those impacted by 
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the change in administration position. In January 2019, the Supreme 
Court ruled 5–4 in favor of allowing the Trump administration to 
limit transgender Americans from serving in the military.
Conclusion
It is unsurprising that presidential rhetoric and style differs from 
one president to the next. Even a new president who succeeds 
a like-minded president of the same party will likely have their 
own distinct approach to how they use the bully pulpit. Nobody, 
for example, tagged George H. W. Bush as the Great Commu-
nicator II. The advent of the age of social media has offered 
ever more ways for presidents to communicate to the public and 
hence to display their alternative means of charming voters. Yet 
even in this context the shift from Obama to Trump was a jar-
ring one. It was not just that their messages on the matters dis-
cussed in this chapter of race and LGBT rights were so different, 
but across the whole scope of political and policy debates the 
tone in which they delivered those messages was far apart. The 
matter at hand is not that one was more effective than the other, 
or even more authentic. What is clear, however, is that, in the 
round if not on every occasion, Obama paid heed to the tradi-
tional boundaries of presidential behavior. On the other hand, 
while Trump could deliver speeches as might be expected in the 
wake of tragedy, he regularly fl outed the norms of what it meant 
to be presidential.80 The outlandish nature of much of his rheto-
ric is in fact well illustrated by the blowback he received when 
he did give what might be called the “expected” speech. For 
example, Trump was mostly praised for hitting the right note, 
at least in the immediate moment, in the aftermath of the Las 
Vegas mass shooting in October 2017. Yet his speech on this 
matter prompted a furious response from the “never Trumper” 
David Frum, a former speechwriter for George W. Bush. Frum 
attacked those commentators who simply took Trump’s words 
at face value, adding:
For once, Trump read the speech exactly as written. Perhaps his aides 
talked him into it. Because Trump is not a good reader, he read the 
speech wrong. And because it sounded wrong, he looked bad.81
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Part of Frum’s particular complaint was Trump’s turn to piety 
in his speech, but a broader version of the argument is that this 
was an instance where President Trump was trying to act as the 
nation’s healer, as is expected of a president at a time of natural 
disaster or an act of terror, yet this meant adopting a language 
and tone that was alien to him. And Trump was certainly more 
comfortable free-wheeling at rallies and unleashing provocations 
that inevitably stirred both his supporters and opponents.
One example of Trump’s use of a rally to exploit cultural divi-
sion came in September 2017. Trump was in Alabama, ostensibly 
in support of then sitting Senator Luther Strange as he sought 
to win the GOP’s nomination for the forthcoming special Senate 
election in the state. The next day, however, the headlines were not 
about Strange but about Trump’s attack on NFL players kneeling 
during the national anthem. That act of protest had been started 
by San Francisco quarterback Colin Kaepernick and his example 
had been followed by a handful of other players across the league. 
Their focus was on racial disparities and especially allegations 
of police brutality against African Americans. Hence President 
Trump’s rhetoric, when he pronounced: “Wouldn’t you love to 
see one of these NFL owners, when somebody disrespects our 
fl ag, to say, ‘Get that son of a bitch off the fi eld right now, out, he’s 
fi red,’” was widely interpreted through a racial lens.82 Further-
more, rather than taking a step back from the political fi restorm 
that followed, Trump embraced the melee and doubled down on 
his stance the following summer. That came even after the normal 
presidential invite to the White House for the team winning the 
Super Bowl was canceled for the 2018 winners, the Philadelphia 
Eagles, after several players said they would not attend in protest 
at Trump’s language.83
Overall, both the style and substance of Trump’s dialogue with 
the American public were extraordinary. His capacity and willing-
ness to break the rules of acceptable discourse went well beyond 
reversing the norms and manner adopted and largely practiced 
by President Obama. As Trump neared the end of his third year 
in offi ce, it remained unclear whether his embrace of provocation 
and open crudity to deride his opponents would be a political and 
presidential one-off or whether future presidents might see this as 
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an attractive model, setting them free from the constraints of even 
pretending to represent and heal an entire nation.
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Conclusion: From “Renegade” to “Mogul”
Barack Obama’s Secret Service codename was “Renegade.” Whilst 
this may have chimed with supporters’ interpretation of his refresh-
ing outsider role, the more formal defi nition of the term would 
doubtless have satisfi ed his detractors. To those who opposed him 
he truly was a president who embodied the defi nition, as someone 
who “deserts and betrays an organization, country, or set of prin-
ciples.”1 By the time he left offi ce, as with all presidents aged by 
the experience, the freshness had gone after numerous institutional 
battles at home, and the reality that military deployments are dif-
fi cult to disentangle had tested his opening set of principles to the 
limit. Yet, before reviewing Obama’s achievements and failures 
and the resilience of the plans he was able to put into place, it is 
necessary to refl ect on the importance of the very fact that he was 
elected and re-elected as president of a country with such a deeply 
troubled and violent racial history.
In his seminal 2004 speech at the Democrat National Conven-
tion, the Illinois senator reminded the audience that “in no other 
country on earth is my story even possible.”2 It is fair to assume 
that the fi rst paragraph of any Obama political obituary will men-
tion his heritage. Yet, racial reality continued to bite. While run-
ning on the idea of a post-racial ticket in the 2008 presidential 
election may have been politically necessary, there was little in 
America that could be categorized as post-racial before, during, 
or after the Obama years. Nonetheless, that apparent barrier to 
the highest offi ce in the land was fi nally transcended, and this was 
a moment of profound signifi cance not only for African Americans 
but for everyone who cared about social progress. It was also a 
watershed moment for those less pleased that the skinny kid with 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   232 18/08/20   1:30 PM
conclusion
233
the funny name had attained the nation’s highest offi ce. The long 
shadows of the nation’s racially fraught past remained distinctly 
present. In fact, even at the time of his election, there was evi-
dence that many were not just unhappy but uncomfortable with 
the outcome. A Gallup poll, cited at the time of the election as 
showing grounds for positivity, found that 67 percent of respon-
dents said that they were “proud” and “optimistic” as a result of 
the election outcome: Yet, while 32 percent of people who had 
voted for John McCain did express pride, 56 percent said that 
they felt “afraid” at the prospect of Obama’s time in offi ce.3 That 
fear may have been motivated by partisanship rather than racial 
animus, but whatever the cause, it suggested a truth to Ta-Nehisi 
Coates’s refl ection that Obama was obliged to be “half as black” 
and “twice as good.”4 In turn, there was always a likelihood that 
politics could soon turn ugly once the presidential honeymoon 
period was over.
At the extreme, one remit of the Southern Poverty Law Cen-
ter is to track serious and credible threats against the govern-
ment, dating back to the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995. In 
its Terror From the Right report, conspiracies and right-wing 
plots were documented and until 2008 tended to average around 
two per year. At least correlated by the Obama victory was a 
spike in neo-Nazi threats and violence.5 As the threats against 
President Obama became increasingly disturbing, a Presidential 
Threat Task Force was created inside the FBI to track and moni-
tor assassination attempts that might be linked to domestic or 
international terrorism.6 Amongst older African Americans the 
fear that something might happen to Obama was palpable. One 
scholar, Anthea Butler, explained: “somebody who’s 70 or older, 
they’re gonna be like, ‘Honestly, we just want him to get out 
alive.’”7 In the conservative media ecosystem fear and resentment 
was stoked continuously, even if the relevant pundits simultane-
ously denied that they had a racial axe to grind. Talk radio host 
Rush Limbaugh fretted about white decline, whilst on Fox and 
Friends Glenn Beck taunted Obama for “having a deep-seated 
hatred of white people.”8
While Limbaugh and especially Beck might be seen as being 
on the fringes of conservative politics, the anger they expressed 
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was brought into the mainstream by the emergence of the Tea 
Party, which infused the Republican Party throughout Obama’s 
fi rst term.9 This in turn further morphed into Trumpian populism, 
with its racially antagonistic streak not too well hidden. In fall of 
2015, when Trump’s election to the White House still seemed a 
distant prospect, Anthea Butler pointed to one driver of his early 
surge in the polls for the Republican nomination: “I mean, here 
people are, acting so surprised about Donald Trump’s popularity. 
Hello? He’s the one who asked Obama for a birth certifi cate!”10 
Further to this, the best analysis in political science suggested that 
the 2016 vote did refl ect a greater degree of racial rather than 
simply economic resentment.11 This backlash against the fact of 
an African American president does not, of course, take away 
from the reality that Obama served two terms and left offi ce with 
a 60 percent approval rating, but it suggests that building a last-
ing political coalition that would continue his policy project in the 
longer term was always going to be a highly fraught task.12
The “Renegade” era: opportunities and restraints
In truth, based on his voting record in Congress, Senator Obama 
sat on the center-left of the political spectrum, with a record simi-
lar to that of Hillary Clinton.13 Health care reform and modest 
wealth redistribution were ambitious goals but did not amount to 
radical socialism, and by 2008 opposition to “dumb wars” was a 
widespread sentiment. Perhaps the fact that Obama did not pursue 
a Bernie Sanders-style agenda helps to explain the disappointment 
felt toward him by those on the left. In his Requiem for the American 
Dream, Noam Chomsky presented as equally underwhelmed by 
the “hope and change thing” as Sarah Palin.14 Other leftist com-
mentators also pointed to missed opportunities and the conserva-
tism of some of Obama’s choices to senior cabinet and advisory 
positions.15 More centrist voices also expressed some concern that 
Obama might be too cautious. The New York Times acknowledged 
that Tim Geithner and Lawrence Summers, who were the central 
fi gures in Obama’s economic team when he took offi ce, had “dem-
onstrated a capacity for good judgment and good ideas,” but the 
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editors added that both had “played central roles in policies that 
helped provoke today’s fi nancial crisis.”16
One reason behind some liberal disappointment with the fi nal 
scale of Obama’s achievements might be that many commentators 
thought that the apparent mood of celebration at the emblematic 
importance of his victory was matched by an opportunity for his 
to be a transformative presidency in concrete policy terms, which 
in turn could lead to the building of a new majority political coali-
tion. As it turned out, both the notion that there was a universal 
mood of welcome for Obama and the idea that there was an open-
ing for radical political change and policy change were overstated. 
Nevertheless, there were grounds at the time for believing that the 
2008 election represented a landmark event beyond the transfer 
of power between the parties. In the language of political science, 
the crisis that Obama inherited also seemed to offer an opportu-
nity for him to be a president of “reconstruction.”17 Economic 
meltdown, arriving as it did on the back of war fatigue, increased 
public concern regarding key issues such as climate change, health 
care reform, income inequality and more, apparently presenting 
a window for presidential boundary-pushing, even cracking. The 
possibilities seemed to be recognized in what became a famous, 
or perhaps notorious, line by Obama’s fi rst chief of staff, Rahm 
Emmanuel, when, during the transition period, he stated: “You 
never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by 
that, it’s an opportunity to do things you think you could not do 
before.”18 In this spirit, also during the transition, Time magazine 
mocked up a picture of Obama as Franklin Roosevelt, the most 
transformative president of the twentieth century, with the banner 
headline: “The New New Deal.”19 The scholarly community was 
also anxious to chart the progress of this new venture, with titles 
such as Reaching for a New Deal.20
Yet, a thorough read of that last title, edited by leading politi-
cal scientists Theda Skocpol and Lawrence Jacobs, illustrates not 
only the opportunity for change but also just how much opposi-
tion Obama was always likely to face when trying to pursue an 
ambitious policy agenda. At the start of 2009, Republicans were 
not in a strong institutional position in Washington, DC, with 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   235 18/08/20   1:30 PM
obama v. trump
236
both executive and legislative branches controlled by Democrats; 
but GOP leaders quickly laid plans for how they could thwart 
the new president. At a dinner on the night of Obama’s inaugural 
that January, leading Republican fi gures from both the Senate and 
the House met with strategists, lobbyists, and the pollster Frank 
Luntz. The most specifi c topic of their discussion was the issue of 
health care, but the wider theme was to plot how to undermine 
the credibility of the Democrats’ forthcoming legislative agenda 
and to ensure that their party remained united in its opposition.21
Hence it was always likely naïve of those millions of Obama 
supporters to think that the new president, however talented, 
could straightforwardly bring meaningful change in the dys-
functional twenty-fi rst-century mechanism that is the US gov-
ernment system, even at a time when the Democrats were in the 
ascendancy. But it is critical to stress that Obama did deliver 
on many of his campaign promises. In order to get some per-
spective on the achievements of Obama’s opening two years in 
offi ce, it is worth comparing his record with that of the previous 
Democratic incumbent of the White House, Bill Clinton, who 
also presided over a two-year period of unifi ed partisan gover-
nance in Washington, DC.
The institutional similarities between the two presidencies 
should not be overstated. Obama’s personal mandate was consid-
erably clearer and, while the Democratic majorities in the House 
were similar in size through the 103rd and 111th Congresses, the 
latter session was marked by greater ideological coherence and 
higher levels of partisan loyalty amongst congressional Democrats 
as well as Republicans.22 Critically in the Senate, Democrats, if 
briefl y, had a potential sixty votes to get past the fi libuster in 2009, 
which they had never enjoyed in 1993–4.23 And before making 
claims that the Obama era was marked by greater achievement 
than that of Clinton, it is important to acknowledge that the leg-
islative outcomes promoted by Clinton throughout 1993–4 were 
consequential. The 1993 budget, which increased taxes on the 
highest-earning Americans, was an important moment in control-
ling the defi cit and contributed to the very short period of budget-
ary surplus at the end of the 1990s (and, refl ecting the ensuing 
politics, it was the fi rst substantive bill to pass without a vote 
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from the minority party in the post-war period). NAFTA, which 
was ratifi ed in 1993, was a landmark free trade agreement, and 
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
contained a temporary ban on nineteen types of assault weapon, 
funding for extra police offi cers, and money to give more teeth to 
the implementation of the Violence Against Women Act. For all 
this, that legislative session was at least equally renowned for the 
failure of Clinton’s health care reform effort to make any serious 
progress through the congressional maze.24
The contrast between the failure of the Health Security Act 
and the successful passage of the Affordable Care Act provides 
the most obvious point of divergence between Clinton’s opening 
two years as president and Obama’s. Clinton’s plan was more 
radical than the ACA, but Vice President Biden’s colorful words 
did accurately capture a truth that the ACA was a big “deal.”25 
Further, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was a 
near-$800 billion fi scal stimulus package enacted in early 2009.26 
The economic crisis that Obama inherited dwarfed the recession 
of 1990–1 that had framed Clinton’s election campaign and so 
demanded a different scale of response. Hence, the contexts were 
quite different, but Clinton’s successful efforts to reinvigorate the 
federal government as a driver of economic growth were limited 
by any standard. Despite considerable rhetoric about increasing 
investment in human capital through increased education spend-
ing, the actual expenditure commitments were limited by the 
emphasis on the defi cit and the plan for a stimulus bill of just 
over $16 billion early in 1993 fell victim to the same refrain that 
fi scal constraint was the priority. In contrast, whatever the later 
laments that an even bigger package would have been appropri-
ate, ARRA was a massively expansive project. Further, the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act, which created 
the CFPB, was a signifi cant challenge to existing banking and 
Wall Street practices.
This summary of the 1993–4 period offers its own caution-
ary tale of the dangers of imposing too much hindsight and not 
enough understanding of the contemporary circumstances when 
considering a president’s legacy. Clinton’s plans for economic 
stimulus and investment spending may look restricted, but the 
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defi cit was a primary concern in the early 1990s, as illustrated 
by President George H. W. Bush’s politically disastrous breaking 
of his “no new taxes” pledge in the budget agreement of 1990 
and then Ross Perot’s emphasis on the issue in the 1992 election 
campaign.27 Further, NAFTA had never been popular on the left, 
and free trade remained an issue that tended to divide Democrats 
in the White House from those outside it in a pattern that was 
repeated during Obama’s time in offi ce. And, two decades after 
its passage, the crime bill was remembered less for the assault 
weapons ban than for its punitive measures, which contributed to 
the expansion of the federal prison population and reinforced the 
era of mass incarceration.
One crushing similarity between the Clinton and Obama pres-
idencies was the loss of Democratic Party control of Congress 
after only two years, and in both cases the scale of the rebuke 
was telling. In 1994 the Democrats lost control of the House for 
the fi rst time in forty years, and in 2010 the party’s losses in the 
House were the largest for any party in the post-war period. As 
Obama acknowledged, it was a “shellacking.”28 This left both 
of the presidents dealing with at least one at times overtly hos-
tile chamber of Congress for 75 percent of their time in offi ce. 
Furthermore, Obama had to operate in an environment where 
the Tea Party wave not only pushed the GOP agenda sharply to 
the right, but also succeeded in increasingly taking control of the 
political narrative. Their counterparts on the left, the Occupy 
Movement, never achieved anywhere near the same momentum.
In this less hospitable environment, the prospect of a new “New 
Deal” and an expansive legislative agenda evaporated. Obama 
did continue to talk of working with Congress, and in 2011 there 
were tentative negotiations between the White House and Repub-
lican House Speaker John Boehner’s offi ce about a “grand bar-
gain” on taxes and entitlement reform. The reality, however, was 
that even if such discussions had led to an agreement there was 
little likelihood that either Obama or Boehner would have been 
able to persuade their own side of the merits of a deal with their 
opponents, such was the level of partisan hostility.29 At the end of 
2015, the administration did agree a budget deal with new House 
Speaker Paul Ryan that passed Congress on a bipartisan basis; this 
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included the permanent extension of tax credits for low-income 
households that had originally been part of ARRA. Yet, important 
as such measures were to many Americans, it would be stretching 
thin evidence to make a claim that the last six years of Obama’s 
presidency fulfi lled the transformative promise that had been fl eet-
ingly in view in the early months of 2009.
As it was, at least in domestic affairs, the most far-reaching 
initiatives of Obama’s presidency in its later years came through 
executive actions. As his second term progressed, Obama began 
referring to the notion that he had a pen and a phone that he 
could use to bring about change. At the start of 2014 he spoke, 
optimistically, of a “Year of Action.” At an event in January of 
that year he explained,
I am going to be working with Congress where I can to accomplish 
this, but I am also going to act on my own if Congress is dead-
locked. . . . I’ve got a pen to take executive actions where Congress 
won’t, and I’ve got a telephone to rally folks around the country on 
this mission.30
As we have explored with regard to immigration and climate, 
Obama’s use of the pen brought mixed results. DACA did bring 
relief to many of the so-called “dreamers,” but the courts effec-
tively stymied DAPA, which would have afforded legal status to 
many more undocumented immigrants, and the Clean Power Plan, 
which would have restricted emissions from coal-burning power 
plants. Many other less high-profi le measures were introduced 
through various executive actions, including some environmental 
regulations, minor gun control measures and adjustments to the 
implementation of the ACA.31 These were of varying consequence 
and legality in their own right, and then of limited durability from 
January 2017.
The 2016 election: no third term
Overall, and not just with the benefi t of hindsight, it was always 
naïve to think that the Obama presidency would leave a wide-rang-
ing legacy that would be smoothly embedded. The abrupt change 
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of political direction that came with the 2016 presidential election 
was, however, more of a surprise. Given the electoral reversals suf-
fered by Democrats in 2010 and 2014, it was evident that Obama’s 
winning electoral coalition had not taken the form of a new politi-
cal majority in the country for his party. Hence a strong Republican 
challenge for the White House in 2016 was always likely—but 
until votes were actually counted in the Republican primaries, few 
expected that challenge to come from a candidate so far outside the 
established political framework as Donald Trump. And that out-
sider status was refl ected not just in the fact that he had never com-
peted for political offi ce, but also in the way that he seemed to revel 
in trampling on the rules of acceptable behavior, explicitly deploying 
divisive language that played on racial and ethnic tensions and ques-
tioned the very legitimacy of his political opponents.
Thus, as the campaign unfolded and the general election 
shaped up with nearly all opinion polls suggesting a win for Hill-
ary Clinton, Democrats understandably looked toward a new 
president who would reinforce the legacies of the Obama admin-
istration. In short, victory for Obama’s former secretary of state 
would have been as close as possible to a third term in the White 
House. Michael Wolff exaggerated when he wrote of Democrats 
as being “so intoxicated with the righteousness of their cause” 
that they never saw defeat coming, but it was nevertheless a shock 
when the electoral college’s math meant that after eight years with 
a progressive African American in the Oval Offi ce, it turned out 
that demography was not destiny, or not yet at least.32
One similarity between Obama and Trump was that they both 
used social media in innovative ways on the campaign trail in their 
attempts to reach directly to voters. Advances in communications 
technology made such efforts possible, and the result powerful. In 
Obama’s case, he utilized the new media of the day to good effect, 
offering tailored YouTube and MySpace videos to specifi c voter 
demographics and signing any personal Twitter messages with “BO.” 
Compared to what came later, this approach was highly structured. 
Donald Trump caught the wave of increased public Twitter usage 
and utilized it in an unprecedented way. His engagement was vis-
ceral and, for many, addictive. This bypassing of the gatekeeping 
“fake news media” and communicating directly with followers via 
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the intimacy of their phones allowed the President to connect in a 
radical and unprecedented way. Taking the new technology baton 
from his predecessor and running so successfully with it allowed him 
to publicize every aspect of his de-Obamafi cation plans directly to 
his followers. From disparaging comments while Obama was still 
in offi ce, rising to an onslaught on the 2016 campaign trail, Trump 
successfully convinced supporters that he would revert, reduce and 
roll back key aspects of the Obama legacy. It also worked to Trump’s 
great advantage that Fox News reinforced and amplifi ed his mes-
sage, regularly trampling on the traditional fourth estate boundaries. 
Former Fox contributor and conservative intellectual William Kristol 
blamed the network for escalating its “whipping up of ethnic resent-
ments, racial resentments and the deep state.”33
In this context, it was hardly surprising that Obama predicted 
dire consequences should Trump defeat Clinton, as he warned 
rallies when campaigning: “All the progress we made over the 
last eight years goes out the window if we don’t win this elec-
tion.”34 After the election, the outgoing president offered a more 
considered refl ection, insisting that most achievements do “stick.” 
His earlier admonishments were not, however, without justifi ca-
tion. Pushback from a presidential successor of the other party 
is a natural part of political process and it is inevitable, expected 
even, that certain aspects of a legacy will be overturned. The early 
days of a new administration often involve rollback-related execu-
tive actions, offering a political sorbet between one administrative 
course and the next. At times, a highly symbolic act may occur, 
providing an early nod to voters anxious to see an immediate sign 
of change in a new presidency. The Mexico City reproductive rights 
ruling is a case in point, used as a political football by Republican 
and Democratic administrations since Ronald Reagan. For voters, 
such actions can act as a barometer of a president’s policy position, 
as comforting to some as it is unnerving to others.
The “Mogul” in power
Donald Trump chose the name “Mogul” as his Secret Service 
moniker. The Cambridge online dictionary defi nes this term 
as “an important person who is very rich or powerful.”35 It is 
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evident from observing the New Yorker’s words and deeds that 
it matters greatly to him to be perceived as both. Clearly, being 
a billionaire and president of the United States ticked these 
boxes, but as a newcomer to any political offi ce his capacity to 
wield power effectively was uncertain.
Our focus in this book has not been to assess President Trump’s 
own legacy, but his success in reversing the path set by his prede-
cessor. As we have seen, this proved to be a wide-ranging effort 
but with a mixed record of accomplishment. As the midterm elec-
tions of November 2018 saw the Democrats take control of the 
House, thus severely limiting the chances of further rolling back 
the Obama era through the legislative process, important ele-
ments of Obama’s legacy remained in place. The ACA was still the 
law of the land, if somewhat battered and bruised. Further, while 
battles raged over transgender rights and questions of whether 
those providing wedding services could be compelled to serve a 
same-sex wedding, there seemed little public appetite for a full 
frontal attack on the right to same-sex marriage itself.
On the other hand, if progress toward national-level climate 
action was halting under Obama, the very notion of government 
acting to check global warming was mocked by the Trump admin-
istration. Similarly, while Obama’s legacy on immigration reform 
was thinner than he had promised it would be as he entered offi ce, 
DACA illustrated a preferred direction of travel. In the Trump era 
liberals could scoff at Mexico’s unwillingness to pay for a border 
wall, and administrative sloppiness left DACA intact and pro-
tected by the courts for longer than may have been anticipated; 
but again, the reversal of policy was quite distinct. Further, the 
appearance of an Obama legacy could be deceptive. For example, 
the CFPB still existed in 2019, but it was a hollowed-out institu-
tion that was not performing the same functions as it had been 
doing three years earlier.
In some cases reversal was easy for the Trump administra-
tion since Obama had established legacy in a manner that might 
be, albeit harshly, characterized as “in name only.” Certainly the 
commitment to the Trans Pacifi c Partnership and the Paris climate 
accords were not much more than paper pledges without binding 
mechanisms placed on US participation. The Iran nuclear deal 
6497_Harrington and Waddam.indd   242 18/08/20   1:30 PM
conclusion
243
clearly had more weight to it than these agreements, since it was a 
multilateral deal that had gone into effect. Hence, pulling the US 
out of this deal would have real-world consequences for ongoing 
international politics: It would not only aggravate the Iranians, 
but also alienate the US’s European allies who had been party 
to the agreement. Nevertheless, despite some pushback from the 
State Department, Trump did reverse this central if controversial 
aspect of Obama’s foreign policy legacy.
As people who became presidents, Obama and Trump could 
barely be more different. From their personal stories to their con-
duct of public relations, the two refl ect not just different politi-
cal philosophies but alternative visions of what it means to live 
a “good life.” Unsurprisingly, these differences translated into 
their styles of presidential leadership and how they communi-
cated their values to the public. The “twitterer-in-chief” was a 
stark contrast to the studied approach of “no-drama” Obama. 
On the other hand, Obama did not bequeath a retiring executive 
branch to his successor. Obama had proved quite willing to use 
and stretch executive authority to, and sometimes beyond, the 
legal limit. Hence, while Trump’s executive actions were often 
intended to reverse Obama-era policies, Trump’s use of those 
powers should be seen as an extension rather than a reversal of 
his predecessor’s behavior.
Contextualizing legacy
Presidents do not get to choose their own legacy, at least as judged 
over time. Truman is often cited as an example of someone who 
left offi ce amidst discontent, but whose reputation has subse-
quently been restored. If not to the same extent, both Eisenhower 
and Lyndon Johnson are granted more credit for the accomplish-
ments of their presidencies than was sometimes given in the 
immediate aftermath of their departure form offi ce. Looking fur-
ther back, Ulysses Grant, president from 1869 to 1877, has risen 
in recent rankings by scholars of US presidents. He has never 
made the top tier, but has moved well away from the bottom-of-
the-table places that he occupied in mid-twentieth-century polls. 
While the corruption and faltering economy that marked his time 
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in offi ce cannot be revised away, there has been a greater appre-
ciation of his support for reconstruction and recent writers “have 
given him high marks for his efforts on behalf of African 
Americans and Native Americans.”36 Hence, what might be 
thought of as the changing moral standards of those who judge 
presidents can impact on the place of presidents in history. On 
the fl ip side of Grant’s re-evaluation, President Andrew Jackson’s 
brutality toward Native Americans is now sometimes seen in 
sharper relief, serving as a lens into his presidency that was some-
times neglected by previous generations of historians in their 
emphasis on the transformative nature of his time in offi ce.37
Even assessing the political success of more recent presidents 
is problematic. Reagan is sometimes cast as a transformative 
president, and he certainly helped shift the political discourse in 
a conservative direction, but the major welfare state entitlement 
programs survived his time in offi ce.38 Historians have been kinder 
to George H. W. Bush than the voters were in 1992, but however 
much his handling of international affairs may gain acclaim, he 
was a one-term president. Bill Clinton’s two terms in offi ce proved 
that Democrats could win presidential elections after a run of fi ve 
defeats in the six elections from 1968 onwards; yet the “Third 
Way” did not prove to be a lasting political settlement, and the 
disintegration of his relationship with Vice President Gore as a 
consequence of the Lewinsky scandal prevented Clinton from 
being a campaign asset in 2000, thus undermining the chances 
of reinforcing what there was of his own legacy. George W. Bush 
must surely have expected to be remembered for tax cuts and per-
haps Social Security reform, rather than for initiating America’s 
longest war following the intervention in Afghanistan.
A president’s legacy is shaped by contingency as well as by 
deliberation. More than a shopping list to be ticked off as the 
years progress, it is a messy and complex business with no fi xed 
guarantee of durability. Presidential fortunes will fl uctuate and 
in terms of legacy-building achievements there will inevitably 
be disappointment and opposition. Sometimes apparently pop-
ular initiatives will quickly prove to have little foundation or 
arouse sustained opposition during the implementation process. 
Conversely, policies that were underwater with the public in 
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their early stages can gain traction over time and develop insti-
tutional resilience.
The early stages of the the Democratic primary campaign in 
2019 provide some context for how perceptions of legacy can 
change over time, even over relatively short periods. When 
enacted, the 1994 Crime Bill was acknowledged to contain a 
number of controversial elements. In one sharp analysis written 
at the end of the 1990s, Ann Chih Lin commented that the Clin-
ton administration’s efforts to portray the bill as showing that 
the Democratic Party understood public concern about high levels 
of crime worked to some extent, but that Republican efforts to 
“paint it as full of failed Great Society programs had succeeded 
as well.”39 In his 1995 State of the Union address, when refl ect-
ing on the loss of so many Democrats in the 1994 midterm elec-
tions, Clinton lamented that “several” had been defeated due to 
the efforts of the NRA in response to the assault weapons ban.40 
Twenty-fi ve years later, however, one of the prime sponsors of 
that law in the Senate, Joe Biden, came under fi re for his part in 
pushing the bill through. The debates of the merits of the 1994 
law, however, paid little attention to the gun control measures but 
focused on the “tough on crime” clauses that helped expand the 
federal prison population and reinforce the era of mass incarcera-
tion. Hence, ironically, Clinton’s effort to use rhetoric on crime 
to reposition the Democrats, in the context of the early to mid-
1990s, as a party that could be as tough as the GOP on criminal 
behavior resonated more singularly amongst Democrats a quar-
ter-century later than at the time. Further, as a lesson in rollback, 
the fact that this was the last signifi cant piece of federal legislation 
that had gun control as a centerpiece caused little comment in 
the 2019 debate as President George W. Bush had let the assault 
weapons ban die a natural death at the end of 2004, since that 
measure had been time-limited.
In Greg Barker’s documentary on Obama’s fi nal year, the 
President talks, as he had done before, about how history has a 
tendency to zig-zag. As his watch drew to a close, he refl ected: 
“one of the things that I have been telling my younger staff, who 
in some cases have only known politics through my presidency, 
is history doesn’t travel in a straight line. And it zigs and it zags 
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and sometimes you take two steps forward and then you take a 
step back.”41 For Obama’s champions his positive legacy was one 
of substantial achievement, such as the ACA, and of a putting in 
place a road map for where the country should go next on issues 
such as climate change, immigration, and LGBT rights. Whether 
President Trump’s time in offi ce represents a zig and zag or a 
fundamental re-routing is a profound question for the future of 
the nation.
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